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ABSTRACT
Life as we know it in modern society relies on the smooth functioning of the electric Grid –
the Critical Infrastructure system that generates and delivers electricity to our homes,
businesses, and factories. Virtually all other Critical Infrastructure systems depend on the
Grid for the electricity they require to execute other essential societal functions such as
telecommunications, water supply and waste water services, fuel delivery, etc. This study
examines the concepts of Critical Infrastructure and electric Grid resilience, and the role
nuclear power plants do and might play in enhancing U.S. Grid resilience. Grid resilience is
defined as the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy. The question of whether current U.S. nuclear
power plants are significant Grid resilience assets is examined in light of this definition.
Despite their many virtues and their “fuel security,” the conclusion is reached that current
U.S. nuclear power plants are not significant Grid resilience assets for scenarios involving
major Grid disruptions. The concept of a “resilient nuclear power plant” or “rNPP” – a
nuclear power plant that is intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a
manner to enhance Grid resilience – is presented. Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP
Functional Requirements are defined. Several rNPP design features (system architectures
and technologies) that could enable a plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional
Requirements are described. Four specific applications of rNPPs are proposed: (1) rNPPs
as flexible electricity generation assets, (2) rNPPs as anchors of hybrid nuclear energy
systems, (3) rNPPs as Grid Black Start Resources, and (4) rNPPs as anchors of Resilient
Critical Infrastructure Islands. The last two applications are new concepts for enhancing
U.S. strategic resilience. Finally, a few key unresolved issues are discussed and
recommendations for future research are offered. Study results support the overall
conclusion that successful development and deployment of rNPPs could significantly
enhance U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience, while transforming the
value proposition of nuclear energy in the 21st century.
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PREFACE
This dissertation deals with the role nuclear power currently plays, and potentially could
play, in enhancing societal resilience in industrialized countries (the U.S. in particular). Any
detailed examination of societal resilience requires the integration of knowledge and
information from an unusually diverse range of scientific and technical arenas – both
academic and industrial in nature. The core scientific and technical disciplines involved are
the social sciences (primarily sociology, political science, and economics), natural sciences
(primarily earth and space sciences), and (with respect to the dependence of societal
resilience on access to electricity from nuclear power plants) the applied sciences of electric
power system engineering and operations, and nuclear power station engineering and
operations. Societal resilience and the challenge of achieving and maintaining it is by its
very nature a Gordian Knot of difficult issues – an intimidating and inconvenient “wicked
problem” [1, 2] intrinsic to life as we live it in the 21st century. The peril in investigating the
relationship between societal resilience and nuclear power is the trap of providing analyses
that are “a mile wide and an inch deep.” The analysis presented here, the issues raised
here, and the solutions proposed here, are but starting points for a much-needed dialog
within and between diverse communities and stakeholders – many who do not often find
themselves at the same table or even in the same room. This work is presented with hope it
will catalyze and inform this dialog as well as inspire others to dig deeper.
1. Horst W. J. RITTEL and Melvin M. WEBBER, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning,” Policy Sciences, 4: 155-169. (1973) dos:10.1007/bf01405730
2. Jeffrey CONKLIN, Dialogue mapping: building shared understanding of wicked
problems, Wiley Publishing, (2005) ISBN-13: 978-0470017865.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background

This dissertation is a “top-down” investigation of the current role and potential future role of
nuclear power in enhancing U.S. societal resilience. Useful examination of this issue
necessitates a basic understanding of a “long chain” of human-machine and machinemachine dependencies, starting at the top with a nation-group of over 300 million people
and ending, at the bottom, with a single human operator in the control room of a modernday or future commercial nuclear power plant. Considerable attention is given to
establishing the global context for the exercise: basic definitions of societal resilience and
engineered system resilience; and the relationship and dependences of societal resilience
on Critical Infrastructures, energy infrastructure, electricity supply infrastructure, and nuclear
power as an element of U.S. electricity supply infrastructure. Each resilience “layer”
provides the essential context for examination of its underlying layers. Useful examination
of these intertwined issues is a lofty goal – one that is best approached with preconceptions
laid aside, a hefty dose of humility, and great patience. The author has aspired to exercise
these traits in the conduct of this analysis, and asks the same of the readers of this
document.

1.2

Document Organization

This dissertation is a multi-part “Manuscript Dissertation.” As such, it is built around a core
of four refereed / peer reviewed journal articles published by the author – each paper
discussing a particular aspect of the societal resilience – nuclear power resilience arena.
Chapter 2 discusses the motivation and context for research. Chapter 3 presents the
dissertation problem statement and research approach employed for this study. The four
journal papers that present the study results and comprise the core of this dissertation are
presented in Chapters 4–7. Chapter 8 summarizes the study’s major results. The most
significant unresolved issues and future research priorities are presented in Chapter 9.
Chapter 10 provides a few closing thoughts.
Appendix A presents the results of the literature review conducted as a launching point for
this research effort. The information and observations gained from the literature review
provided the context for synthesis of the research approach described in Chapter 3, and for
the various analyses documented in Chapters 4–7.
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Precise terminology is essential for effect communications – particularly in highly technical
endeavors. This study of electric Grid, nuclear power plant, and Critical Infrastructure
resilience necessarily involves the integration of knowledge bases and vocabularies from
diverse social science, natural science, and applied science and engineering arenas. Thus
many readers may be unfamiliar with terms employed by subject matter experts in any one
of the knowledge domains integrated in this work. Useful terminology did not exist in some
instances, and had to be “invented”. Many of the new or possibly unfamiliar terms employed
in this dissertation are therefore defined in Appendix B.

2

2 MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH
2.1

Resilience Of Industrialized Societies

Every human being is a member of a society – a collection or group of people (local,
regional, or national) who share geographic affinity as well as common traditions,
institutions, and interests. Among those common interests is a collective desire to survive
and prosper in an environment filled with hazards, threats, and seemingly countless
unknowns and uncontrollable factors. “Societal resilience” has been defined in this context
as the ability of a society to “contain a disaster or series of catastrophes in an adaptive
manner and to react to them flexibly (by bending rather than breaking)… to bounce back
from the low point of functionality reached following the disaster…” and to utilize “the
unfortunate circumstances constructively by learning from its flaws and enhancing its
functioning or by “bouncing forward” to an even more resilient position than before the
disaster occurred.” [2.1] The response of the nation of Japan to the Great East Japan
Earthquake and tsunami of 2011, and of the island of Puerto Rico to Hurricanes Irma and
Maria in 2017, are two recent and ongoing illustrations of societal resilience at play.
Modern industrialized or “developed” societies are energy-intensive entities that rely on a
readily available supply of electricity for the execution of their most essential societal
processes and functions. Modern societies are typically characterized by their ubiquitous
dependence on complex and interconnected human and physical infrastructure networks.
Just as a house built upon a poor foundation is unlikely to withstand an extreme weather
event, a society can be no more resilient than the human and physical infrastructures upon
which it depends for its essential functions.

2.2

Societal Resilience And Critical Infrastructure

Concerns over societal resilience have multiplied at a rapid pace over the past decade as
our dependence on electricity has grown, and natural disasters and human malevolent
actions have revealed vulnerabilities in the systems and infrastructures that support life as
we know it in industrialized countries [2.2, 2.3]. U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD21) in 2013 defined the term “Critical Infrastructure” as “systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
system and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” [2.4] This definition of Critical
Infrastructure (or one essentially equivalent to it) has been adopted by the international
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community as well. PPD-21 also identified sixteen “Critical Infrastructure Sectors” (Figure
2.1). Whether it’s the production and delivery of gaseous and liquid fuels; e-commerce and
e-finance; communications; operation of water supply and wastewater management
systems; or the transportation and storage of food – the smooth functioning of U.S. society
depends on seamless operation of these sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Thus the
“health” and resilience of these sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors is of utmost strategic
importance with respect to U.S. national and homeland security, economic prosperity, and
the health and welfare of our citizens.

2.3 Critical Infrastructure Sector Interdependencies – The Tangled
Web We Weave
Many of the challenges to societal resilience stem directly from the “interconnectiveness”
and “interdependencies” of modern societies. The simplicity of Figure 2.1 conceals several
embedded interdependences between the various Critical Infrastructure Sectors. For
instance, the Dam Sector includes facilities that serve as critical assets in water
management and flood control (i.e. the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector), and as
electricity generating facilities (the Energy Sector). Seamless operation of the Energy
Sector depends both on the capabilities of the Communications Sector, as well as those of
the Transportation Systems Sector for delivery of fossil and nuclear fuels to power plants
and removal of waste products from the plants. Most importantly, even a cursory
examination of the sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors reveals that every sector is either
directly involved in the generation of electricity, or depends on the availability of electricity to
perform its critical functions.

2.4

Energy Infrastructure, The Grid, and Nuclear Power

Figure 2.2 is a highly simplified and truncated taxonomy of societal resilience and Critical
Infrastructure dependencies. The Energy Sector includes, among other things, the nation’s
electricity supply system or the “Grid.” The Grid is the integrated network of electricity
generation, transmission, and distribution assets, and their supporting subsystems, that
produce and deliver electricity to the end user. In many ways, the Grid is the “umbilical
cord” of the nation. Due to the ubiquitous need for electricity, the Grid is the one physical
infrastructure upon which almost all other Critical Infrastructures depend.
The Generation System embedded in the Grid is comprised of many types of electricity
generating facilities. Though itself designated by PPD-21 as a Critical Infrastructure Sector,

4

Figure 2.1 Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors
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Figure 2.2 Societal Resilience and Critical Infrastructure Dependencies
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the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste (NRMW) Sector is also an element of the
Grid’s generation system. Today, nuclear power supplies approximately 20% of total
electricity generated in the U.S. [2.5]. But nuclear power’s contribution to our nation’s
energy supply is far more important than this 20% metric would imply. This 20% of total
generation is over 50% of total “carbon-free” U.S. electricity generation, avoiding the annual
release of ~ 550 million metric tons of carbon dioxide that would otherwise escape into the
atmosphere if the same power were generated via combustion of fossil fuels [2.6]. U.S.
nuclear power fleet-average capacity factors (CFs) have ranged between ~ 90–92% for the
past few years – far surpassing second place geothermal generation (74% CF), natural
gas-fired generation (56% CF), coal-fired generation (53% CF), hydro generation (38% CF),
wind generation (36% CF) and solar photovoltaic generation (27% CF) [2.7]. Indeed, one
of the hallmark characteristics of nuclear power during the past few decades has been its
“24x7” availability for the generation of baseload electricity – a foundation of Grid stability,
reliability, and economic operations.

2.5

The Changing Grid

Given our nation’s dependence on a smooth functioning Grid, the concern over “Grid
resilience” – exactly what it is and how it can be achieved – holds a special place in the
societal and Critical Infrastructure resilience dialog. The (largely privately-owned) U.S.
electric Grid has been subject to a cascade of regulatory, institutional, and physical
changes during the past two decades. A shortlist of these changes includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Deregulation of electricity markets.
Consolidation and specialization of generation and transmission functions (and the
business entities who own them).
The advent of wind and solar energy.
The fracking revolution and cheap natural gas.
The demise of coal-fired generation.
The growing frequency with which nuclear power plants are being retired due to
their inability to provide electric energy that is cost-competitive with natural gas-fired
and wind generation.
The reduction in electric generating system “fuel diversity” that has resulted from the
superposition of these trends.

Americans have during the past century become accustomed to a level of electric service
availability that is the envy of the world. It is no exaggeration to characterize the current
state of change in the electric Grid as a metamorphosis in society’s most essential Critical
7

Infrastructure. Some of the developments cited above have the potential to undermine the
Grid’s performance in the face of our nation’s 21st century portfolio of malevolent human
threats and natural hazards. What kind of Grid will emerge from this metamorphosis? It is
not a given that this metamorphosis will result in a more resilient Grid.

2.6

The Demise Of Nuclear Power’s Value Proposition

In parallel with the avalanche of developments that have shocked the electric power
industry over the past decade, the nuclear power industry has been rocked by its own
cascade of developments. The shortlist of developments includes:
•
•
•
•

•

Slower than anticipated growth in domestic U.S. electricity demand.
Cancellations of new nuclear plant construction.
The accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011.
The continuing trend to retire “healthy” commercial merchant nuclear power plants
(NPPs) due to their inability to produce electricity that is cost-competitive with that
generated from natural gas and wind power.
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Westinghouse Electric Company (the entity who
commercialized the power reactor technology upon which two-thirds of the world’s
commercial nuclear power plants is based).

Much to the chagrin of nuclear power advocates, the combined impact of these
developments has been to (once again) stop the long-anticipated “nuclear renaissance” in
its tracks. These developments have caused many to question the future role of nuclear
power in an electric world. At the very least, these developments support the view that
nuclear power’s historic value proposition (that of providing cost-competitive and reliable
baseload electricity) is no longer compelling in the 21st century. Nuclear power plants must
do more than provide cost-competitive baseload electricity if they are to remain a major
source of safe, emissions-free electricity throughout the 21st century.

2.7 Grid Resilience And Nuclear Power: The Nexus And The
“Probletunity”
The dual 21st century challenges of (1) achieving and maintaining the necessary level of
electric Grid resilience and of (2) realizing the promise of nuclear power, constitute an
interrelated “probletunity” – an opportunity masquerading as a problem. It is the author’s
belief that a major component of the solution to the first challenge is also a component of
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the solution to the second challenge – that there is a symbiotic solution to these coupled
21st century challenges. This conviction is the genesis of the research documented in this
dissertation.
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3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH APPROACH
3.1

Problem Statement

This dissertation addresses the following question:
“What role do today’s U.S. commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) play in enabling
electric Grid resilience, and what type of future nuclear power plant might maximize
nuclear power’s contribution to Grid resilience?”
The answer to this question is an important consideration in the developing dialog regarding
electric Grid resilience and the value of nuclear power to society in the 21st century.

3.2

Research Approach

The Problem Statement was investigated by deconvolving it into five questions (“The Five
Research Questions”):
1. What is electric Grid resilience and why is it so important?
2. Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets,
and why or why not?
3. Concerning future resilient nuclear power plants (rNPPs): What performance
attributes and functional requirements might maximize their value as Grid resilience
assets?
4. Concerning future rNPPs: What design features might enable the identified rNPP
functional requirements?
5. Concerning future rNPPs and the Grid they will serve: What specific applications of
rNPPs might enhance their overall contribution to electric Grid, Critical
Infrastructure, and societal resilience?
The approach adopted for addressing The Five Research Questions is depicted in Figure
3.1 and discussed in the following subsections.
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Figure 3.1 Research Approach
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3.2.1 Task 1: Define Critical Infrastructure Resilience
The goal of this activity was to provide the context for answering Research Question 1 in
Task 2. Available literature in the fields of Critical Infrastructure resilience and Critical
Infrastructure interdependence analysis were identified and reviewed. The bulk of the
available information was found to originate from two sources: governmental studies and
modest analyses conducted by academia. Many of the relevant investigations to date have
been conducted in Europe and in Asia.

3.2.2 Task 2: Define Electric Grid Resilience
This task provided the answer to Research Question 1, “What is electric Grid resilience
and why is it so important?” A working definition of electric Grid resilience was developed –
one that is consistent with higher-level definitions of Critical Infrastructure resilience
identified in Task 1, and that is useful for examining the impact of generating plant behavior
on Grid resilience. The relatively small body of literature dealing specifically with electric
Grid resilience was reviewed. The results of the literature review indicated there is no
consensus on the definition of Grid resilience; nor, at present, are there accepted
quantitative metrics by which Grid resilience can be predicted and measured, or analytical
schemes (computational approaches) for quantifying Grid resilience. Information and
insights gained from the literature were supplemented by direct discussions with electric
power industry subject matter experts (SMEs), including experts from both the generation
and transmission organizations within the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Dominion
Virginia Power, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and the Electric Infrastructure
Security (EIS) Council. The ultimate product of this task was a heuristic (non-numerical)
definition of Grid resilience that was employed in Task 3 to assess the value of today’s
commercial nuclear power plants as Grid resilience assets.

3.2.3 Task 3: Evaluate The Grid Resilience Value Of Today’s NPPs
This task provided the answer to Research Question 2, “Are current U.S. commercial
nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets, and why or why not?” in the context
provided by Tasks 1 and 2. The operating history and behavioral traits of today’s NPPs
were examined in light of the definition of the Grid resilience and key Grid resilience
attributes developed in Task 2. The impact of these NPP behavioral traits on Grid resilience
were evaluated, and an assessment was made of the extent to which existing NPPs enable
Grid resilience. The NPP behavioral traits that dictate the answer to Research Question 2
were identified.
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This task was, at its core, a synthesis of information from (a) analyses of NPP and NPPGrid interface designs, (b) nuclear power operational experience during routine (day-to-day)
operations, and (c) NPP operating experience during major crises such as superstorms,
hurricanes, and widespread Grid de-energizations (i.e. regional blackouts). The relevant
literature consulted included NPP licensing documents (e.g., NPP Final Safety Analysis
Reports), previous studies of NPP-Grid interfacial requirements, U. S. nuclear power plant
Licensee Event Reports, and after-action forensic reports generated in the wake of major
Grid disruptions.

3.2.4 Task 4: Define The Concept Of A “resilient Nuclear Power Plant” (rNPP)
This task provided the answer to Research Question 3. A “technology neutral” working
definition of a resilient nuclear power plant or “rNPP” (a nuclear power plant that is
intentionally designed, interfaced, sited, and operated to enhance Grid resilience) was
synthesized in this task. The philosophy underpinning this exercise was that the definition of
an rNPP should be anchored in its value as a Grid resilience asset, rather than the specific
technologies or system architectures employed in the plant (i.e. “technology neutral”). In
addition to a basic definition of an rNPP, the Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP
Functional Requirements were defined.

3.2.5 Task 5: Identify Enabling rNPP Design Features
While it was not the intent of the proposed research to develop a specific rNPP concept or
design, it was considered helpful to provide the advanced reactor vendor community
insights with respect to design features that would enable an rNPP to deliver its
promised Grid resilience benefits. This task, (which answers Research Question 4)
endeavored to provide such guidance by (a) identifying NPP subsystems and components
that constrain the plant’s ability to meet the functional requirements developed in Task 4,
and (b) describing the NPP subsystem or component level performance attributes
necessary to enable plant-level rNPP functionalities. Where evident, observations were
offered regarding promising rNPP architectures, reactor sizes, subsystem and component
technologies, and NPP-Grid interface technologies. Finally insights with respect to
regulatory hurdles associated with development and deployment of rNPPs were identified
when such obstacles were evident.

3.2.6 Task 6: Identify High Impact rNPP Applications
Task 6 addressed Research Question 5, by identifying and describing (in a preliminary
manner) four specific rNPP applications that show promise for enhancing electric Grid and
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Critical Infrastructure resilience. These four applications were defined in sufficient detail to
gauge the nature of their impact on electric Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience, and
the mechanism by which that impact could be delivered.

3.3

Issues Outside Research Scope

The preceding sections have described the scope of the proposed research – the questions
and issues that were addressed. It is also important to clearly identify some issues and
questions that were not addressed in this research effort.
The research conducted lays a foundation for thinking about electric Grid resilience, and a
(new) way of thinking about nuclear power in the 21st century. As such, it is preliminary
work that others can – and hopefully will – build upon. Attempts to define Grid resilience
are in their infancy. The question of whether current nuclear power plants are truly Grid
resilience assets has never been examined in a rigorous manner – though the topic has
recently garnered some attention from the Trump Administration. The concept of a truly
“resilient” nuclear power plant (defined in terms of its contribution to Grid resilience) is a
new idea. No prior examination of the functional requirements, design features, and
potential applications of such resilient NPPs has been performed.
There are three important topics that were considered to be beyond the scope of this
research effort. These three topics were only addressed in a superficial manner, or not
addressed at all:
• Development of a preconceptual rNPP design – The development of credible
preconceptual reactor concepts requires the talents and skills of teams of subject
matter experts. No effort was made here to develop a specific rNPP concept.
However, preliminary suggestions regarding promising approaches to rNPP
subsystem design and technology selection were developed.
• Regulatory barriers to rNPP development – The electric Grid, the electric power
industry, and the commercial nuclear power industry are regulated by an armada of
federal and state (sometimes even local) governmental entities. Some obvious
federal regulatory (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) challenges associated
with the development, deployment, and operation of rNPPs were identified.
However, it is premature to conduct a detailed evaluation of this topic until a
consensus develops regarding the functional capabilities of rNPPs and the manner
in which they are employed in the Grid.
• The economic viability of rNPPs and market mechanisms to accelerate their
development – Today’s nuclear power plants are not compensated for the capacity,
15

reliability, fuel security, or greenhouse gas avoidance benefits they deliver to the
Grid. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), at the request of
the Trump Administration, launched an effort in March 2018 to collect information
and input from Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission
Operators (RTOs) to inform the dialog regarding the market value of resilience and
market mechanism to compensate generation assets owners for the resilience value
they provide the Bulk Electricity System [3.1]. The subject of how rNPPs might be
compensated for their Grid resilience contributions, how policies and market
mechanisms might be engineered and implemented to compensate them, or how
prototype and first-of-a-kind rNPPs might be financed, are all topics largely beyond
the scope of this analysis.

16

Chapter 3 References

3.1

Nuclear Energy Institute; https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/us-capacityfactors-by-fuel-type (current as of 2 April 2018).

17

4 ARE CURRENT U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS GRID
RESILIENCE ASSETS?
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This chapter is based on the Accepted Manuscript of an article published as an Open
Access document by Taylor & Francis in the American Nuclear Society’s journal, Nuclear
Technology, Volume 202, 2018, Issue 1, 15 March 2018. The Version of Record is
available online at
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00295450.2018.1432966 .
This article focuses on current U.S. NPPs and Grid resilience, contains the product of
research Tasks 1–3 (as well as a brief introduction to the results of research Tasks 4 and
5), and presents the answers to Research Questions 1 and 2:
1. What is electric Grid resilience and why is it so important?
2. Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets,
and why or why not?
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Chapter 4 Abstract

This paper examines the concept of Grid resilience in the context of the North American
electricity supply system and the role existing (Generation II) light water–cooled nuclear
power plants (NPPs) play in enabling and enhancing Grid resilience. (Because of
similarities in technology and plant design, it is likely that most of the discussion in the
paper is also relevant to Generation III and Generation III+ light water NPP designs. The
applicability of the analysis to Canadian CANDU and Russian VVER technology has not
been assessed.) The paper asks and answers three compound questions: (1) what is Grid
resilience, and what is a resilient Grid? (2) what is a resilient nuclear power plant (rNPP),
and what are the basic functional requirements of rNPPs? and in light of the answers to
these questions, (3) are today’s U.S. NPPs significant Grid resilience assets? The
conclusion reached is that existing U.S. commercial NPPs are safe and efficient capacity,
energy, and reliability assets and they have demonstrated some Grid resilience benefit
during regional weather events. However, today’s NPPs do not deliver the Grid resilience
benefits nuclear power can and should provide the nation. The author argues that nuclear
power’s unique fuel security (an attribute that could allow NPPs to energize the Grid during
extended periods in which fuel could not be delivered to other types of power plants) is a
compelling reason to develop future rNPPs that would deliver strategic Grid resilience
benefits in the face of evolving hazards and threats to the U.S. Grid.
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4.1

Introduction

The concept of societal resilience in a world of growing human populations, limited natural
resources, seemingly intensifying natural hazards, and expanding man-made threats has
become a matter of global importance [4.1]. Within this context, society’s ever-increasing
dependence on several key critical infrastructures is a matter of concern for both governmental
and private sectors [4.2]. Critical infrastructures are societal assets, systems, and networks so
vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on national security,
economic prosperity, public health and safety, etc. The U.S. electric power system or the
“Grid” can arguably be viewed as the most critical of America’s critical infrastructures because
it is the foundation upon which virtually every other critical infrastructure depends. The Grid
consists of the integrated bulk electric system (comprising electricity generation and
transmission networks) and the distribution system that delivers electricity over the “last mile”
to the end user [4.3]. Indeed, in many ways the Grid is the “umbilical cord” of modern society.
Resilient modern societies require resilient Grids. Given society’s dependence on electricity,
the subject of Grid resilience is a matter of great relevance to U.S. economic, energy,
homeland, and national security [4.4].
The U.S. Grid consists of some 7700 operating electric power generation facilities with capacities
of 1 MW (electric) or larger, over 700 000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines (240 000 miles
of which operate at or above 230 kV), approximately 56 000 substations, and 6.5 million miles of
local distribution lines [4.5]. Of these 7700 operating power plants, 99 are commercial nuclear
power reactors located in 61 nuclear power plants [4.6] (NPPs). These reactors produced
approximately 20% of the total electrical energy generated in the United States in 2016 [4.7].
When considered in terms of their contribution to Grid reliability and greenhouse gas emissions
avoidance, it is clear these NPPs play a much larger role in the nation’s electricity supply
strategy than their numbers would otherwise suggest.
This paper explores the concept of Grid resilience in the context of the U.S. and North
American electricity supply system; the role current Generation II, light water–cooled reactor
(LWR) NPPs play in enhancing Grid resilience; and the role a new type of NPP—a resilient
NPP (rNPP)—could play in enabling and enhancing Grid resilience. The analysis is applicable
to both pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) concepts. The
general principles of Grid resilience discussed here are believed to be broadly relevant around
the globe. However, the applicability of this analysis to any specific region other than the United
States has not been assessed. Additionally, because of similarities in technology and plant
design, much of the discussion here is believed to be relevant to existing Generation III and
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Generation III+ light water–cooled NPP designs. The applicability of this analysis to Canadian
CANDU and Russian light water reactors (VVER) technology has not been assessed.
Section 4.2 presents a working definition of Grid resilience that is useful for exploring the
characteristics of NPPs that impact Grid resilience. Based on the definition of Grid
resilience provided in Section 4.2, Section 4.3 provides a definition of a generic resilient
power plant (rPP) and an rNPP, the two key attributes of rNPPs, and the functional
requirements of rPPs and rNPPs in particular. Section 4.4 discusses the response of
today’s NPPs to Grid disruptions in terms of their ability to absorb and adapt to Grid
anomalies. Given the likelihood that today’s NPPs will shut down in response to major Grid
anomalies, Section 4.5 identifies and explores the principal Grid resilience implications of
NPP shutdown in such situations. Section 4.6 discusses the role of today’s NPPs in Grid
recovery operations. Based on the evidence presented in Sections 4.2 through 4.6, Section
4.7 presents the conclusion that NPPs in the United States do not deliver the Grid resilience
benefits today that nuclear power can and should provide the nation. However, the story
does not end there. Section 4.8 discusses the fact that all NPPs possess one unique
characteristic that should provide great motivation for enhancing the resilience of future
NPPs. Finally, and in light of the analysis presented in the foregoing sections, Section 4.9
presents a challenge for the designers and operators of future NPPs and the Grid they will
serve.

4.2

Grid Resilience: A Definition

Given modern society’s growing dependence of critical infrastructure and the Grid in
particular, it is perhaps surprising that a consensus definition of Grid resilience has not yet
evolved. What is resilience? And precisely, what is Grid resilience?

4.2.1 Basic Concepts Of System Resilience
Resilience as an engineering term is one whose definition is surprisingly difficult to
articulate in a precise manner. Resilience is typically defined and measured at the system
level. One recent working definition of resilience is “the ability of a system to withstand a
change or a disruptive event by reducing the initial negative impacts (absorptive capability),
by adapting itself to them (adaptive capability), and by recovering from them (restorative
capability).” [4.8]
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Many of the basic elements of system resilience are captured in a system resilience curve (SRC).
Figure 4.1 is an illustrative generic SRC (adapted from Reference 4.8) that depicts a system’s
time-dependent performance in response to a disruptive event. The units of time and performance
plotted in Figure 4.1 are arbitrary and obviously depend both on the system and the event under
examination. The time period upon which the resilience curve is based begins at the far left of the
curve, with the system operating within some nominal steady-state performance (functionality)
range. The specific disruptive event of interest is assumed to begin at point 1 in Figure 4.1. The
system’s initial response is to absorb the disturbance within its nominal band of operation. System
performance, as viewed from the outside of the system, is still nominal. As a consequence, it is
quite possible no one (including the system’s operators) would even be aware of the disturbance.
However, in this case the disturbance is assumed to continue to point 2 (time duration Δt0) and to
be of such severity that the system can no longer absorb the stressor without perceptible impact
on the system’s performance. The normal operations phase of the event ends at point 2.
Unable to cope with the stressor event while maintaining nominal system performance, the
system’s event response cascade is triggered at point 2 and proceeds to point 3 (time
duration Δt1), at which time the damage is complete. This shock and response cascade is the
second phase of the event sequence. The shock and response cascade may consist of a
diverse set of preplanned and unplanned actions inherent to the system architecture and
composition, automatic control system actions, and human operator interventions, all of
which impact the terminal point of the system’s response cascade, the magnitude of
performance loss, the shape of the system response curve between points 2 and 3, and the
duration Δt1 of the response cascade.
The third or recovery phase of the event commences at the time the system performance
has reached its minimum level (point 3 and minimum P) and ends at a point in time in which
some minimally acceptable and stable level of system performance has been recovered
through adaptive actions by the system and its human operators (point 4 and recovered P).
The recovered P at point 4 in Figure 4.1 reflects restoration of some intermediate level of
system performance in which the system’s high-priority functionalities are recovered and
from which the system can be further reconstituted, reconfigured, and restored.
The restoration phase of the event commences at point 4 and ends at point 5 with the
system performance at restored P. As previously mentioned, the timescale depicted in
Figure 4.1 (especially for the restoration phase) may not be linear as depicted. The duration
of this restoration phase is Δt3, which may often be much longer than the duration of the
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Figure 4.1 Generic SRC (adapted from Reference 4.8)
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recovery phase Δt2. Depending on the damage inflicted on the system, the restored P might
be higher, the same, or lower than the original system performance, original P. For cases in
which system functionality is not restored to its original pre-disturbance value, system
operators and those who are served by the system must become accustomed to a “New
Normal” (typically reduced) level of system functionality [4.9]. The achievement of any stable
New Normal can be a demanding long-term societal undertaking.

4.2.2 Limitations Of SRCs
System resilience curves are useful for visualizing and discussing the basic dynamics of
system resilience, but they have many limitations. First, SRCs do not actually plot
resilience; they plot system performance (however defined) versus time. The physical
significance of the integral of performance over time (or conversely the performance
decrement represented by the area between the nominal system performance curve and
the disturbed system performance curve) is open to debate and in any event depends on
the units (metrics) employed for performance. SRCs do not define or depict how
performance is measured or the individual metrics that constitute performance.
Major challenges faced by those seeking to employ SRCs for real-world engineered
systems include the development of a meaningful definition of the performance plotted in
the SRC, the development of approaches to predict performance in response to a specified
disturbance, and the development of methods for testing and measuring this performance
for disturbances of interest (particularly for systems that cannot easily be taken off-line for
testing). In order to be useful, the performance plotted in the SRC must be a function of
parameters and metrics that can be measured, estimated from prior experience, or
simulated via computational modeling. For instance, consider the hypothetical case of a
U.S. commercial airline operating out of three major hubs with connecting flights through a
dozen connecting airports and providing customer service to 40 destination locations. In
this case, the disruptive event might be the closure of one of the connecting airports due to
extreme weather. The performance plotted on the ordinate axis in this case might be the
average delay in destination arrival time for all of the airline’s customers as a function of
time from the onset of the weather event.
Finally, a SRC is a product of many unique time-dependent factors such as (1) the nature of the
disruptive event (its type, magnitude, persistence, etc.), (2) the system’s evolving (timedependent) composition as individual system elements respond to the event, (3) the system’s
evolving configuration as individual system elements respond to the event, and (4) the system’s
automatic and manual control protocols and how they are implemented through time in
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response to the disruptive event. Because items 2, 3, and 4 all depend on both intrinsic (to the
system) actions and those of the system’s human maintainers and operators, the SRC actually
masks most of the engineering details required to understand the “why” of what is transpiring as
the system responds to the disruption.

4.2.3 Grid Resilience
Application of the resilience concept to both the Grid and to the NPPs it hosts is a nontrivial
exercise. Arghandeh et al. [4.10] recently offered one possible working definition for “power
system cyber-physical resilience”: “the system’s ability to maintain continuous electricity
flow to customers given a certain load prioritization scheme.” The authors do not propose
specific metrics by which Grid resilience can be measured or by which different systems
can be compared. Their definition captures many system resilience considerations but
appears to focus primarily on preventing interruptions in electricity flow.
The National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recently released the report,
“Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s Electricity System,” [4.4] which offers the following
observation regarding Grid resilience: “Resilience is not the same as reliability. While minimizing
the likelihood of large-area, long-duration outages is important, a resilient system is one that
acknowledges that outages can occur, prepares to deal with them, minimizes their impact when
they occur, is able to restore service quickly, and draws lessons from the experience to improve
performance in the future.” [4.4] In light of the National Academy’s observation (i.e., the concept
of capturing prevention, recovery, and restoration in the definition of Grid resilience), the author
has proposed the following working definition of Grid resilience:
“Electric Grid resilience is the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity
flow to customers given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.” [4.11]
The National Academy’s report briefly reviews a variety of potential Grid resilience metrics, which
are primarily those proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Grid Modernization
Laboratory Consortium. These include metrics such as cumulative customer hours of outages,
cumulative critical customer hours of outages, time to recovery, loss of utility revenue, and
several other direct and indirect consequences. However, the report does not recommend
specific metrics by which Grid resilience should be measured. Rather, it states the following:
“Unlike reliability, there are no generally agreed upon resilience metrics that are used widely
today.” [4.4] The report goes on to recommend (Recommendation 2.2) that the DOE, the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation, and others collaborate in the development and
operationalization of appropriate resilience metrics.
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Because Grids are composed of linked generation, transmission, and distribution elements,
Grid resilience truly is a weakest-link issue. Ideally, every element of the Grid must possess
essential resilience attributes: the ability to withstand, absorb, adapt to, and quickly recover
from offending disturbances and disruptions. Alternatively, less resilient elements of the Grid
must be buffered or isolated in some manner from offending disturbances by other more
resilient elements of the system. Thus, an optimally designed and operated Grid should function
in a manner in which every system element is resilient and each element also reduces the
stress placed on the other elements of the system by offending Grid disturbances.
The customer-focused definition of Grid resilience offered here is arguably the most relevant
approach for defining Grid resilience from the societal perspective. However, the use of such a
definition is greatly complicated by the reality that neither the ownership and operation nor the
regulation of the Grid’s generation, transmission, and distribution assets is vertically integrated
in today’s deregulated electricity markets. Because of the mosaic of regional transmission
organizations and independent system operators, and because many entities own and operate
only generation or transmission or distribution assets (or two of the three), an enormous
challenge confronts those seeking to enhance the resilience of the U.S. electricity supply
system. (This is a matter of great importance but one that is beyond the scope of this paper.)
Figure 4.2 presents a simplified Grid resilience curve that follows directly from the concepts
captured in the generic SRC in Figure 4.1 and the definition of Grid resilience offered above. The
simplified Grid disruption behavior depicted in Figure 4.2 assumes the Grid operator has
designated three load prioritization classes (high priority, middle priority, and low priority)—hence
“3-step”—and that the system ultimately regains its pre-disturbance functionality. The Grid’s
generation, transmission, and distribution subsystems (and the interfaces between them) all play
a role in shaping the Grid’s SRC. The basic disruption response depicted in Figure 4.2 is one in
which low-priority loads would be actively interrupted or passively surrendered first, as the
system’s performance/ functionality decays or descends between points 2 and 3. Loads of
increasing priority are interrupted as the performance descends to minimum P at point 3. Truly
essential “must run” critical loads would all lie in the region beneath point 3 in Figure 4.2 and (at
least theoretically) would never be interrupted. As is the case in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 illustrates
the reality that the time to recovery and to restore complete system functionality can be much
longer than the duration of the original Grid disturbance. The serial impact of Hurricanes Irma
and Maria on the island of Puerto Rico’s Grid during September 2017 (and their continuing
aftermath) are grim reminders that the recovery and restoration phases of a system may last
much longer than the duration of the disturbance that originally stressed the system. The
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Figure 4.2 Notional 3-Step Grid Resilience Curve (SRC)
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aftermath of these storms also graphically illustrates that the New Normal system performance
may be greatly degraded in comparison with the system’s pre-disturbance performance.
Figure 4.2 also reflects the difficulty in applying SRCs to real systems. What exactly is the
performance being plotted in Figure 4.2? A fundamental difficulty in the application of
resilience curves arises when system performance is not obviously a single number or a
simple mathematical combination of multiple computed or observed metrics. This indeed is
the case with respect to Grid resilience. The plotted performance should embody the
metrics by which Grid resilience is measured. But, as previously discussed, there is no
single measure of Grid resilience. The performance plotted in Figure 4.2 might be a
function of a weighted combination of expected frequency and duration of load loss or
failure to serve for each class of loads in the operator’s load prioritization scheme. Or, the
performance plotted in Figure 4.2 might be related to the percentage of total load being
served at any moment in time. However, given that it is more acceptable to drop low-priority
loads than high-priority loads (in keeping with the utility’s load prioritization hierarchy), the
abscissa scale would not be linear in this case. The difficulty in defining a single
performance metric for Grid resilience is evident and will be the subject of continuing debate
and research in the future.
Finally, Figure 4.2 is not simply the artifact of a managed load shedding protocol. It also
reflects a system damage function. The magnitude of performance degradation or gain (and
the shape of each segment of the SRC between points 2 and 5) would also be a complex
function of a host of voluntary and involuntary actions involving the response and behavior of
individual elements of interconnected generation, transmission, and distribution subsystems.

4.2.4 Utility Of SRCs As Grid Resilience Assessment Tools
If the challenges discussed above could be overcome to construct credible Grid SRCs, the
tool could be applied to provide many useful insights to Grid operators, planners, and
regulators. In the case of existing systems, SRCs might be employed by operators to
optimize emergency operating procedures and Grid recovery and restoration procedures as
well as to maximize the marginal resilience benefit of incremental investments in the Grid.
Grid designers and planners might utilize SRCs to conduct comparative analyses of
different potential Grid architectures and technologies, including the siting of key Grid
assets such as new generating plants, substations, etc. Regulating authorities might
employ SRCs to inform decisions regarding rate structures and to create incentives that enable
infrastructure owners and operating entities to monetize system resilience, thereby creating a
mechanism for financing system resilience investments. Unfortunately, for all their potential utility,
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SRCs are currently more valuable as qualitative tools for discussing high-level Grid resilience
issues than as quantitative Grid analysis and planning tools. Only time will tell whether SRCs will
become useful tools for Grid resilience analysis and planning.

4.3 rPP and rNPP Definitions, Key Attributes, And Functional
Requirements
What does the definition of Grid resilience discussed in Section 4.2 imply with respect to the
electrical generating plants (particularly the NPPs) embedded in the Grid? Indeed, what is
an rNPP? Given the definitions of critical infrastructure and Grid resilience discussed in
Section 4.2 the author has proposed the following definition of an rNPP [4.11]: “A resilient
rNPP is one whose performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance Grid
resilience—the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.” Based on this definition of an rNPP, the author
has also defined [4.11] two essential attributes of rNPPs:
1. rNPP attribute 1: rNPPs enable the Grid to absorb and adapt to a broad spectrum of
Grid anomalies and upsets.
2. rNPP attribute 2: rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to quickly recover from upsets
and to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s
load prioritization hierarchy.
It should be noted that both the definition of an rNPP and the two defining attributes of rNPPs
are equally applicable to all types of resilient power plants (rPPs). Thus, one could also speak
of a rPP as any power plant that exhibits the two rNPP attributes defined above. In any event,
rNPPs are NPPs defined not by the technologies they employ, nor their size, etc., but by the
resilience value and impact they deliver to the Grid they serve. The design, siting, method of
interface to the Grid, and operational characteristics of the rPP or rNPP would all impact the
plant’s value as a Grid resilience asset.
Given the foregoing discussion, what are the generic operational characteristics
(functionalities) of power plants that would enable them to be major Grid resilience assets?
Table 4.1 summarizes a key list of functional capabilities the author believes would
characterize an ideal, generic rPP, along with the specific resilience attribute(s) they
support. Of course, no existing technology and power plant design can deliver all of these
idealized functionalities. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the real-world implications of
this list of idealized generic power plant capabilities with respect to rNPPs. Table 4.2 lists
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Table 4.1 Idealized Generic Resilient Power Plant (rPP) Capabilities

rPP Capability

Relevant
Resilience
Characteristics

1. Capable of supplying power to the Grid anytime the
plant is called on to do so

Absorptive
Adaptive
Restorative

2. Capable of rapidly maneuvering over any power
range between the plant’s housekeeping load and
its rated capacity

Absorptive
Adaptive
Restorative

3. Capable of operating indefinitely at any dispatched
power level

Absorptive
Adaptive

4. Capable of riding through (tolerating) any Grid
anomaly (aberration in load and offsite power
magnitude or quality) without incurring damage,
without isolating from the Grid, and without shutting
down

Absorptive
Adaptive
Restorative

5. Capable of operating in an Island Mode (completely
isolated from the Grid) indefinitely if / when forced
to detach from the Grid

Adaptive
Restorative

6. Capable of independently maintaining a safe
shutdown state indefinitely without drawing power
or other resources from the Grid or offsite if / when
the plant is required to shut down

Adaptive
Restorative

7. Capable of independently cranking (starting up)
without drawing power or other resources from the
Grid or offsite if / when the plant is required to shut
down

Restorative
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Table 4.2 Six Functional Requirements of resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs)

rNPP Functional Requirement

Relevant
Resilience
Characteristics

1. Robust load-following

Absorptive
Adaptive
Restorative

2. Immunity to damage from external events (including
Grid anomalies)

Absorptive
Adaptive

3. Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in
response to Grid anomalies

Absorptive
Adaptive

4. Ability to operate indefinitely in Island Mode (i.e.,
without connection to offsite transmission load and
electric power supply)

Adaptive
Restorative

5. Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling
capability (i.e., requiring no offsite power or
resupply of diesel fuel from offsite)

Adaptive
Restorative

6. Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e.,
the ability to start with no offsite power supply from
the Grid)

Restorative
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the Six Functional Requirements the author considers to be essential to enable an NPP to
satisfy the definition of an rNPP and that, as a package, distinguish rNPPs from today’s
NPPs.
Each of the six rNPP Functional Requirements in Table 4.2 addresses more than one
resilience attribute category. (Because of space constraints, a detailed discussion of Tables
4.1 and 4.2 will be deferred to a forthcoming paper.) rNPP Functional Requirement 1 implies
an rNPP is capable of functioning in modes beyond traditional baseload operations when
called upon by system dispatchers to do so. Functional Requirements 2 and 3 assure the
rNPP is not rendered inoperable by events that trigger the Grid’s need for the resilience
contribution of the rNPP. Functional Requirement 4 reduces the time required for an rNPP to
reload and support the Grid in extreme conditions that have necessitated the plant’s
disconnection from the Grid. Functional Requirement 5 assures the rNPP is not a distraction
or burden to Grid operators when it is not available, especially during emergencies involving
reconstitution and recovery of Grid operations in the wake of a major blackout or other Grid
disturbances. Finally, Functional Requirement 6 enables the rNPP to restart independent of
offsite power supplies and without placing demands on an already stressed Grid during Grid
recovery and restoration operations.

4.4 Today’s NPPs’ Limited Ability To Absorb And Adapt To Grid
Anomalies
Given the discussions in Section 4.2 and 4.3, it is natural to ask the following question: What is
the contribution of today’s nuclear power plants to Grid resilience? The answer to this question
depends, in turn, on the answer to the following set of lower-level questions. How do modern
commercial NPPs respond to changing conditions around them? How do they respond to
disturbances and disruptions in the Grid? Do they enable and enhance the Grid’s ability to
minimize interruptions in electric flow to customers in the face of major Grid disturbances? The
answers to these questions reveal much about the true value of today’s NPPs in terms of their
contribution to Grid resilience.
There is no question that electrical generation facilities (nuclear and nonnuclear) are
impacted by events that occur in the Grid. A cursory search of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s (NRC’s) online Licensee Event Report (LER) database [4.12] for the period
2000 to 2017 returned 26 reports in which a Grid disturbance was a contributing cause to a
reported event at a U.S. commercial NPP. A similar search with the keywords “transmission
line” yielded 31 reports in which issues associated with the NPP transmission lines resulted in
reported events. It is important to note that a single wide-area or regional event (e.g., a
33

weather event) can lead to multiple reported events in the NRC’s LER database. This occurs
when a single external (to the NPP) event impacts multiple reactors at a single site or multiple
NPP sites [4.13].
Many aspects of a particular NPP’s response to a Grid anomaly would depend on plantspecific issues, including the manner in which the NPP is interfaced to the Grid
(Figure 4.3) and the Grid architecture beyond the interfaces [4.14]. Figure 4.3 is a highly
simplified, generic depiction of the interfaces between a typical NPP and its surroundings.
The Grid anomaly can appear at one, some, or all three of the NPP-Grid interfaces
depicted on the right side of the drawing (i.e., the generator step-up “GSU” transformer,
startup “SUT” transformer that energizes the plant’s startup systems, and the engineered
safety features “ESF” transformer). The NPP’s response to the Grid anomaly (especially in
the short term) will be heavily influenced by which NPP-Grid interfaces are involved and
the specific nature of the Grid anomaly.

4.4.1 The Response Of Today’s NPPs To Anticipated Grid Anomalies
For cases in which an NPP operator receives advance notice of an impending Grid
disruption, today’s NPP operators would take prudent preemptive action to protect the
power plant. Such advance notice might originate through federally issued alerts from the
space weather network, the plant’s supervisor control and data acquisition (SCADA) system,
or other means. Theoretically, plant operators might respond to such alerts in four ways
[4.14]:
1. Watchful waiting: The NPP continues to operate as normal but enters a state of
heightened situational awareness. Precautionary and prudent steps are taken to
assure the plant is prepared to rapidly execute one of the other three actions
described below if the plant is presented with boundary conditions it cannot
otherwise accommodate.
2. Manual runback or cutback: The NPP reduces its power level but remains
attached to the Grid via transmission lines and offsite power connections to the
plant’s switchyard. Every effort is taken to maximize and maintain situational
awareness as the plant continues to operate at a reduced power level.
3. Initiation of Island Mode operations: The plant operators both cut back reactor
power and isolate the plant from the Grid. [This mode of operation is not allowed in
the current NRC regulatory regime but is employed (indeed required) of at least
some NPPs in Europe. As discussed below, many – perhaps most – U.S. NPPs are
not designed to enable true Island Mode operations.] Power levels in Island Mode
would likely be as close as possible to the plant’s housekeeping load level while
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Figure 4.3 Simplified NPP-Grid Interfaces [4.14]
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maintaining stable operation of the plant. This low power level is difficult to maintain
for long periods in large power reactors due to operational stability issues and the
stresses such operation imposes on hardware (the main condenser system,
feedwater systems, etc.).
4. Manual shutdown: The NPP operators manually shut down the plant (trip the
reactors) and transition them to normal shutdown decay heat removal, possibly
combined with managed (preemptive) transition at some point to onsite dieseldriven power systems if there is reason to believe the anticipated Grid disruption
could result in a loss of offsite power (LOOP). This action might be taken to avoid
the possibility of unnecessarily harsh transitions in the event the anticipated Grid
anomaly dictates rapid plant response.
The choice of which of these four actions to execute depends on several factors, such as the
nature of the anticipated Grid disruption and the warning time given to the NPP operators, the
potential for direct damage to the NPP plant and equipment from the external initiating event, or
the period of time offsite power might be unavailable (in the event of a Grid de-energization) to
the NPP, etc. The selection of any of the actions other than the watchful waiting option results in
a loss of some, or all, of the NPP’s generation capacity from the Grid for a period of time that
depends both on the NPP’s individual response to the Grid disturbance and the response of the
remainder of the Grid to the disturbance.

4.4.2 Response Of Today’s NPPs To Unanticipated Grid Anomalies
In contrast to anticipated Grid disturbances, unanticipated Grid disturbances would initially
be “sensed” by an NPP as an anomaly in one or more of its NPP-Grid interfaces (voltage
and frequency perturbations, phase angle/power factor anomalies, load perturbations, etc.)
at the NPP-Grid interfaces depicted in Figure 4.3. The plant’s initial response to the event
would depend on the manner in which it was first sensed: Which NPP-Grid interface detects
the anomaly and the specific anomalous parameter that is detected (load or supply voltage,
frequency, and phase angle perturbations; power factor and real/ reactive power
perturbations; etc.) [4.14 – 4.16]. Note that in the case of a complete Grid de-energization,
all three transient responses discussed below would progress to the so-called LOOP event:
1. Partial load rejection: A load rejection is a sudden reduction in electric power
demand at the NPP generator’s terminals (see Figure 4.3). Such events can be
caused by faults in transmission lines or the opening of interconnections between
parts of the Grid experiencing a load rejection. While some Generation II LWR
plants designed by Combustion Engineering were designed to accommodate 85%
or greater load rejection without tripping the reactor, U.S. NPPs typically can
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manage load rejections of up to ~50% by reducing power (run-back) and dumping
excess steam as necessary to the unit’s main condenser [assuming alternatingcurrent (ac) power is still available at that point to drive the pumps that supply water
to the secondary side of the condenser].
2. Complete loss of load: In this case, the NPP might experience a momentary or
short-term partial load rejection that quickly evolves to a complete (100%) load
rejection, i.e., a loss of load event that is ultimately sensed by the NPP at its
generator terminals (see Figure 4.3). This loss of load event could descend on the
NPP with little advance warning. The NPP’s normal response to the loss of load
would be to open breakers at the generator output, isolating the NPP’s main
generator from the Grid. In such cases, it might be possible for the NPP to rapidly
run back its power level to that required to supply its own housekeeping electrical
loads, provided (once again) that AC power is available to drive the pumps that
supply water to the secondary side of the condenser. (It is the author’s
understanding that only a few U.S. NPPs were designed with main generator output
breaker configurations that enable the unit to separate from the Grid while
maintaining electrical feed to the unit’s auxiliary transformers (see Figure 4.3). Thus,
most NPPs in the United States today are probably incapable of transitioning to
Island Mode operations.) In any event, if the (rapid) power reduction and delicate
balancing operation cannot be managed, the reactor will be tripped.
3. Voltage and frequency perturbation-induced reactor trips: North American Grid
AC frequency is typically controlled to within ±0.05 Hz [4.17]. The initial stage of a
widespread Grid anomaly or blackout would involve large variations in system
voltage and frequency as load shedding and real or reactive power supply-demand
mismatches cascade throughout the Grid. NPPs have voltage limits that are more
restrictive than the standard Grid voltage control limits employed by many regional
transmission operators [4.18]. A NPP senses Grid AC voltage and frequency via
several mechanisms. Changes in Grid AC voltage and frequency produce
electromagnetic-induced stresses within the NPP’s turbine-generator system (Figure
4.3) as it seeks to remain in synchronization with the Grid. These Grid voltage and
frequency perturbations also directly impact the speed of AC motor-driven pumps
used to circulate cooling water through the reactor, steam generators (if a PWR),
feedwater to the reactor’s condenser, etc. The thermodynamic balance of the plant
can be significantly impacted by Grid AC voltage and frequency perturbations. The
core protection calculator (CPC) systems in U.S. NPPs (especially Westinghouse
and Combustion Engineering designs) are very sensitive to and intolerant of reactor
coolant pump (RCP) speed variations resulting from Grid frequency perturbations—
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more sensitive than typical European Generation II LWR designs. In addition, most
AC motor-driven pumping systems are protected by breakers designed to open
under unacceptable voltage and frequency perturbations that could cause motor
overheating due to excessive current demands. (Though, as just described, the
CPC system would almost certainly act to trip the reactor before the RCP protection
systems would initiate a reactor trip.) The control band for these protection systems
is relatively narrow. Given all of these design features, excessive Grid voltage and
frequency perturbations would trigger the NPP’s protection systems to rapidly trip
the reactor and transition it to onsite or offsite AC-powered shutdown cooling.

4.5 Four Implications Of NPP Shutdown With Respect To Grid
Resilience
The implication of the three NPP transient response scenarios discussed in Section 4.4 is
that the ultimate response of today’s NPPs to major Grid anomalies (those involving
significant disruptions in the plant’s sensed transmission load or quality of offsite power) will
most likely be to trip the reactors and shut down the plant. A reactor trip and plant shutdown
in the event of a Grid anomaly introduces four concerns that are relevant to Grid resilience:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Maintenance of safe shutdown cooling for the NPP (reactor and spent-fuel pool).
Avoidance of cascading Grid collapse.
Time delay intrinsic to NPP restart.
Provision of the offsite power required to crank (start up) the NPP.

4.5.1 Maintenance Of NPP Safe Shutdown Cooling Is A Burden On Grid
Operators
Once tripped, the NPP’s reactor(s) would be rapidly transitioned to the shutdown decay heat
removal mode. Depending on the circumstances, safe shutdown cooling could be
accomplished via several systems [4.19]: (1) AC-powered pumping systems if offsite power is
available, (2) diesel generator/inverter–driven AC-powered pumping systems, (3) steam
turbine–driven pumping systems (as long as the reactor remains pressurized), and (4) direct
diesel-driven pumping systems. The period of time the plant can remain in a safe shutdown
state obviously depends on the reliability of these pumping systems (and in the case of dieseldriven systems, the inventory of diesel fuel available). Regardless of their onsite shutdown
cooling capabilities, NPPs are considered to be among the highest-priority critical loads to
which electric service must be restored in the event of a Grid blackout. Regional transmission
system operators in the United States typically seek to restore offsite power to the NPPs within
4 h of its loss [4.20]. Thus, once the Grid has gone dark, the NPP actually constitutes a burden
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on Grid operators rather than an asset. It is a facility that demands immediate attention and
draws power from the Grid rather than producing power and contributing in meaningful ways to
early Grid recovery operations.

4.5.2 Avoidance Of A NPP Shutdown-Induced Cascading Grid Collapse Is A
Real Concern For Grid Operators
For cases in which the NPP carries a significant portion of the Grid’s electric load, the loss
of the plant’s generating capacity can result in additional Grid voltage and/or frequency
perturbations. The abrupt removal of a large block of generating capacity from a (already)
stressed Grid is not a recipe for Grid stability. If not quickly corrected by the addition of other
generating capacity, NPP shutdown in the face of a Grid anomaly can lead to the shutdown of
other generation and transmission assets and a cascading collapse of larger portions of the
Grid [4.15]. Such was the case during the Northeast blackout in 2003, when nine NPPs in the
United States, and seven in Canada, rapidly and automatically shut down or disconnected
from the Grid, robbing the Grid of generating capacity and contributing to the cascading
spread of the blackout [4.21]. (Such scenarios also plunge the NPP into a complete LOOP
event if the plant is not already in such a state.)

4.5.3 Post-Blackout NPP Restart Timeline For Current NPPs Undermines
Their Value As Grid Recovery Assets
Speaking strictly from the standpoint of internal (to the NPP) considerations, how quickly
might an NPP that has shut down (either manually in anticipation of a Grid disruption or
automatically in response to an unanticipated event) return to service?
The startup of an NPP is a carefully choreographed exercise involving a series of diverse actions
and activities including holds for tests and verification of required conditions, along with conditional
gates beyond which the process cannot proceed unless required conditions are met [4.22].
Commercial NPPs have several operating modes and rules for transitioning between these
modes. This operational framework determines the ability of and schedule for an NPP’s return to
service if it shuts down in the event of a major Grid disruption. The definition of the NPP operating
modes differs between reactor types and reactor vendors [4.23, 4.24]. Traditional Generation II
PWRs have six operational modes, while BWRs have only five modes. However, in all cases, a
particular mode is defined by a unique combination of reactor thermal power level, reactor
average coolant temperature, and status (tension) of the reactor closure head bolts (for modes in
which the reactor is shut down).
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The relevance of reactor operating modes with respect to major Grid anomalies and
blackouts is that the operating mode that the plant is in at the time of the Grid disruption (or
the operating mode that is the terminal point of the plant’s response to the disruption) dictates
the starting point for restart of the NPP and the time required to return the plant to service.
This is true because the plant’s technical specifications dictate a diverse set of limiting
conditions for operation (LCOs), surveillances, checks, tests, and conditions that must be
executed or confirmed as prerequisites for evolving between operating modes.
LCOs identify the lowest functional capability or performance level of equipment required for safe
operation of the facility. In addition, the manner in which an NPP evolved to its present operating
mode (e.g., whether the plant was automatically tripped or whether the plant was manually shut
down in a controlled manner) and the reactor’s operating history (e.g., reactor fuel burnup) also
impact the operating mode evolution protocol. It is clear an NPP’s operating modes, LCOs, and
operating history are of great importance with respect to its ability to (and schedule for) return to
service and thus its value as a Grid recovery asset in the wake of a major Grid disruption.
Because of these considerations, current (Generation II) LWR plants would probably require a
minimum of several hours to perhaps even a couple of days to return to service—even for cases
in which the plant is not damaged by the Grid anomaly that precipitated the plant shutdown.

4.5.4 Startup Cranking Power For Today’s NPPs Must Be Supplied By The
Grid
The cranking power requirements of commercial NPPs are largely a function of the size [MW
(thermal)] of the power plant. This is an artifact of the power demands of electric-driven
pumps that provide the motive force for cooling of the reactor core, generation of steam,
power conversion, and rejection of waste heat to the environment. An LWR-based NPP’s
total housekeeping and cranking power load is dominated by the power demand of its RCPs
and the circulating water pumps (CWPs). The RCPs typically represent over 40% of the total
fixed load, while the CWPs contribute ~20% of the total fixed load. Thus, these two systems
are responsible for ~60% of the NPP’s total fixed load. The combined real and reactive power
demand of electrically driven pumps is much larger while they are starting and accelerating to
operating speed.
While all of the plant’s systems and components do not simultaneously start and operate as the
plant is being cranked, several systems do. Thus, cranking power requirements are reasonably
approximated by fixed electrical housekeeping loads. Today’s large GW (electric)-class NPPs
typically require ~30 to 40 MW (electric) of cranking power. The actual cranking power demand
for a specific plant depends on plant size [MW (thermal) and MW (electric)], whether the plant is
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a PWR (higher loads) or a BWR, and a variety of other plant-specific considerations. Cranking
power demands of this magnitude are beyond that which can be supplied by emergency diesel
generators (because the emergency diesel generators are sized primarily to power engineering
safety features and shutdown cooling systems). The implication is that today’s plants require
substantial offsite power to start up—power that often is not available in the earliest stages of the
Grid recovery process.

4.6

The Role Of Today’s NPPs In Grid Recovery And Restoration

Rapid recovery of the Grid system and restoration of electricity service to customers is of
paramount importance if significant social and economic consequences are to be avoided
in the wake of a major Grid anomaly. Therefore, it is relevant to ask, “Do today’s NPPs
contribute in meaningful ways to rapid restoration of a stable Grid?” The answer from
decades of operational experience is clear. Adibi et al. [4.25] provided an analysis of NPP
requirements during power system restoration as an activity of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers Power System Restoration Working Group in 1995. Adibi and Fink
[4.26] integrate some of the conclusions of Adibe et al. into a broader discussion of
postblackout Grid restoration procedures. Sroka and Grzadzielski [4.27] echo many similar
observations. The following major points are conveyed in References 4.25, 4.26, and 4.27:
1. A NPP’s plant technical specifications detail the conditions that must exist before an
NPP that has automatically tripped or has been manually taken off-line can restart.
The optimal mode for NPP restart following a Grid disruption is hot standby.
2. NPPs that have been manually taken off-line in a controlled manner might return to
service within 24 to 48 h. Plants that automatically trip in response to external stimuli
could take considerably longer to return to service. For these reasons, current Grid
restoration plans focus on providing assured offsite power to the NPPs in order to
maintain their safe shutdown condition while restoring as much of the service area
load as possible without any assistance from the NPPs. Therefore, full customer
restoration may not be achievable for an extended period in areas in which nuclear
power constitutes a significant fraction of the generation mix.
3. Grid restoration strategies involving NPPs must incorporate real-time knowledge about
the NPP’s generation (mode) status and must facilitate intimate and continuous
communications between the NPP operator and the Grid system operator.
4. Grid restoration is typically a bottoms-up approach. NPPs interface with the Grid via extra
high voltage transmission lines that are neither available nor stable early in the Grid
restoration process. Given the power maneuvering limitations of large Generation II
NPPs, the ability to rebuild a sufficient amount of stable load for the NPP is a crucial
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constraint on the speed with which NPPs can return to service and contribute to the Grid
restoration process.
5. Premature attempts to reload large NPPs can result in system-wide voltage and
frequency perturbations that can trigger automatic NPP and Grid system protection
measures resulting in generating unit trips and Grid refragmentation (i.e., premature
attempts to restart/reload large NPPs can make matters worse rather than better).
It is clear today’s NPPs do not play a significant role in the early stages of Grid recovery
and restoration in the wake of major Grid disruption.

4.7 Conclusion: Current U.S. NPPs Are Not Significant Grid
Resilience Assets
Modern commercial NPPs are remarkable feats of engineering. They have (with a few
notable exceptions) proven to be safe, reliable, and efficient means of producing massive
amounts of emissions-free electricity. They are major Grid capacity, energy, and reliability
assets. Indeed, they are substantial societal assets in an electricity-dependent world
concerned with local air quality and global climate change.
However, today’s Generation II LWR NPPs are intolerant of Grid disturbances. Once shut down,
they are not typically capable of rapidly restarting. They have large cranking power requirements
that must be supplied from off site. Their large size requires the Grid operator to rebuild large
blocks of transmission capability and stable load to enable the NPP to power up and reload.
Beyond these considerations, the Grid operator’s concern that a premature attempt to reload the
NPP could trigger a shutdown of the NPP and a cascading Grid collapse inhibits the use of NPPs
in the early stages of Grid recovery following a major Grid disruption.
The analysis presented here supports the conclusion that although today’s NPPs are safe
and reliable, the design and operational approaches adopted to achieve these safety and
reliability objectives have resulted in plants that are not significant Grid resilience assets. For
all of their virtues, today’s NPPs are not rNPPs. They are not plants that enable the Grid to
absorb and adapt to major Grid disruptions nor do they enable the Grid to rapidly recover and
restore electric service to its customers.
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4.8 Nuclear Power’s Fuel Security Premium: A Motivation For
Enhancing The Resilience Of Nuclear Power
This paper begins with an observation that modern society is utterly dependent on the
smooth functioning of several critical infrastructures, virtually all of which either depend on
or are involved in the production of electricity. Thus, at the end of the day, Grid resilience is
a matter of energy, economic, and homeland security. There are a number of natural
hazards and man-made threats that have the potential to disrupt the Grid and other critical
infrastructures [4.14]. The recovery and restoration phases of these disruptive events could
last for months, or even years in some extreme scenarios. It is in precisely those “very bad
day” scenarios that the nation might benefit most from one of nuclear power’s unique attributes:
its fuel security.
Unlike other steam cycle power plants that have only hours to days (natural gas-fired plants),
days to weeks (oil-fired plants), or weeks to a few months (coal-fired plants) of fuel onsite,
NPPs have many months to perhaps 2 years of fuel in the tank. Thus, NPPs have sufficient fuel
reserves to operate for extended periods when the delivery of fuel to other steam cycle plants
would be difficult or even impossible. NPPs must be capable of operating in harsh
environments if their fuel security benefit is to be accessed. This capability was aptly
demonstrated during the Southwest Cold Weather Event of February 2011 in Texas and New
Mexico and the Polar Vortex Event of January 2014 (that impacted vast regions of the United
States), when NPPs in the affected areas continued to operate while numerous oil-fired, gasfired, and coal-fired power plants were forced to shut down due to lack of fuel supply and/or a
variety of other issues intrinsic to their use of fossil fuels [4.28, 4.29]. The 2011 and 2013–2014
U.S. weather events clearly demonstrate nuclear power’s short-term or tactical Grid resilience
benefit for such regional weather events. This short-term resilience benefit was delivered
because the NPPs in the affected regions (1) had the fuel to operate through the event and (2)
were capable of operating. The NPPs were not presented with Grid interface anomalies that
they could not accommodate nor were they directly damaged in any significant way by the
weather event itself.
As previously noted [4.14], there are a variety of man-made and natural events that have
the potential to create much greater challenges for the Grid and its NPP operators than the
short-term weather events discussed above. It is precisely in such “very bad day” scenarios
that the long-term strategic Grid resilience value of nuclear power would be of maximum
benefit to society. But, this potential benefit can be accessed only if the NPPs and the Grid
in which they are embedded are sufficiently resilient to operate in the challenging conditions
that accompany such worst-case scenarios.
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Unfortunately, the analysis presented in Sections 4.2 through 4.7 demonstrates that the fuel
security benefit of today’s NPPs would be largely inaccessible precisely at the time society
might benefit most from it. This reality should be a major motivation for enhancing the
resilience of future commercial NPPs.

4.9

The Future: rNPPs Enabling Resilient Electric Grids?

Fortunately, there is nothing intrinsic to nuclear power that prevents it from becoming a
major strategic Grid and societal resilience asset. It may not be feasible from the technical
and economic standpoints to modify most existing NPPs to achieve the resilience
capabilities discussed in this paper. It is possible to envision plant designs and technology
bundles that could enable rNPPs in the future. Indeed, designers of future NPPs can and
should explicitly incorporate Grid resilience considerations into the design of tomorrow’s
plants. Tomorrow’s rNPPs would be NPPs that are intentionally designed, cited, interfaced,
and operated in a manner to enhance the resilience of the Grid they serve. Given the
dependence of life today on sustained access to electricity, the resilience of modern society
in the 21st century may depend on such innovations. Who will take up the challenge?
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International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016, freely available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.7290/V78913SR
The paper extends the generic analysis of the role current NPPs play in enabling and
enhancing electric Grid resilience presented in Chapter 4, to investigate the role current
NPPs play in enabling the Grid to rapidly recover from Black Sky Events – Grid failures of
such geographic scope and duration they could threaten the very fabric of society. This
paper was a product of Research Tasks 1–3, and provides additional insight to the answers
to Research Question 2:
Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid resilience assets,
and why or why not?
The content of this article is presented here without revisions other than minor editorial
changes required to conform to UTK dissertation format and style requirements.
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Chapter 5 Abstract

Modern life relies on ready access to abundant electricity. During the past decade, it has
become apparent that the Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the U.S. are vulnerable to a
variety of natural hazards and man-made threats. The electrical infrastructure (the “Grid”) is
the foundation for all other critical civil infrastructures upon which our society depends.
Therefore, protection of the Grid is an energy security, homeland security, and national
security issue of highest importance. Geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) induced by solar
coronal mass ejections (CMEs), electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, and cyber attacks
are three events that have the potential to plunge the U.S. into partial or total Grid failure
(de-energization) with subsequent blackouts so massive that they are referred to as “Black
Sky Events” (BSEs). Embedded in the U.S. Grid are almost one hundred commercial
nuclear power reactors in some sixty nuclear power plants (NPPs). This paper explores the
nature of society’s coupled “system of systems” (i.e. the Grid, other Critical Infrastructure,
human operators of these infrastructures, the Government, and the Public) that would be
stressed by a Black Sky Event, and presents an analytical framework for probing the
behavior of this system during Black Sky Events. The question of how a prolonged Black
Sky Event might impact NPPs, and what role, if any, NPPs can play in enabling a rapid
recovery from a Black Sky Event is examined. The likely behavior of an NPP during a Black
Sky Event is discussed, and it is concluded that current NPPs are Black Sky liabilities.
However, a unique characteristic of NPPs (the large fuel inventory maintained in the
reactor) could make the NPPs extraordinarily valuable assets should a Black Sky Event
occur. Their value in this regard, depends on whether or not it might be possible to affect a
number of changes in the NPPs, the Grid, and other Critical Infrastructure in the U.S. to
enable the NPPs to become Black Start Units – generating stations that would be the
foundation of recovering the Grid during a Black Sky Event. This paper poses the question,
“Can nuclear power plants be transformed from Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky Assets,
and if so, how?” An integrated framework for addressing this question is proposed.
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5.1

Introduction

Modern life is enabled by reliable access to electricity. This electricity is generated and
delivered by a massive and complex system – the electrical grid, or simply “the Grid”. The
U. S. Grid, with rare exceptions, reliably delivers electricity to our nation’s homes,
businesses, and factories twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. The Grid is the
umbilical cord of modern civilization – the lynchpin that enables each of our society’s
sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors (Figure 5.1) to function [5.1]. Our petrochemical
production, communications, information technology, transportation, healthcare, finance,
and water/wastewater infrastructures are all designed with the assumption that interruptions
of electricity supply will be extremely rare and short-lived when they do occur.
The Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the U.S. have become increasingly vulnerable to a
variety of hazards and threats during the past decade [5.2, 5.3]. There are a number of
natural and man-made events that have the potential to simultaneously compromise the
functionality of multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors on a subcontinental or even
continental scale [5.4]. Such natural hazards include intense geomagnetic disturbances
triggered by coronal mass ejections from our sun, massive seismic events, and extreme
weather events such as superstorms and hurricanes. Man-made threats include
electromagnetic pulse weapons and cyber attacks.
With respect to the Grid, two hazards of particular interest are naturally triggered GMDs and
man-made EMP attacks. The GMD-induced collapse of the Quebec Hydro grid in 1989
(which caused the entire Quebec power grid to collapse in ~ 90 seconds and affected some
six million customers) is but one example of the potential impact of severe weather on the
Grid [5.5]. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union conducted high-altitude nuclear detonation
tests in 1962 that demonstrated the potential for EMP weapons to have massive impacts on
electrical infrastructures [5.6]. These natural and man-made phenomena have the potential
to trigger partial, or even complete, failure (de-energization) of the Grid for periods of time
ranging from hours to perhaps years in extreme cases [5.7]. Such outages are termed
“Black Sky Events”.
While many people in the U.S. have experienced weather-driven power outages lasting a
few hours to perhaps a few days, most of the population of the U.S. has never experienced
power outages lasting for weeks or months. Indeed, most citizens of the western world
rarely even consider how our lives would be impacted by long-term failure of the Grid.
But we should.
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Figure 5.1 All Critical Infrastructure is dependent on the availability of electricity
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Today, some sixty nuclear power plants consisting of roughly 100 nuclear power reactors
are embedded in the U.S. Grid. This “NPP fleet” supplies approximately 20% of our nation’s
electrical production and some 63% of our low-carbon electricity generation [5.8]. It is
prudent to ask, “How would nuclear power plants be impacted by a prolonged Black Sky
Event, and what role, if any, can NPPs play in enabling a rapid recovery from a Black Sky
Event?” Or to pose the question another way, “Are today’s nuclear power plants Black Sky
Liabilities or Black Sky Assets?” And finally, if today’s NPPs are Black Sky Liabilities, “What
can be done to transform nuclear power plants from Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky
Assets?”
This paper provides a preliminary description of the “system of systems” which hosts and
surrounds the U.S. electrical infrastructure, defines the challenges and opportunities
presented by nuclear power plants in Black Sky environments, and proposes high-level
analytical frameworks for further investigation of these issues.

5.2

The U.S. Grid In A System Of Systems

Figure 5.2 is a highly simplified representation of the “system of systems” in which we live.
This "system of systems" involves coupled physical infrastructure and human infrastructure.
Each entity in Figure 5.2 can be depicted as an “intelligent agent” capable of sensing and
interacting with its environment and other agents. The diagram depicts a causal event
(“forcing function”) such as a CME, EMP attack, seismic event, etc., impacting the Grid and
the other Critical Infrastructures agents of our society. The Grid and the other Critical
Infrastructures have an inherent or engineered response to these forcing functions. In
addition, the Grid and every other Critical Infrastructure agent has a command, control,
maintenance, and repair element staffed by human beings who interact with the physical
infrastructure, and the other human agents in the system to modulate the infrastructure’s
behavior. In addition to laws, regulatory frameworks, etc., the Government agent also has a
human element (not explicitly depicted in Figure 5.2) that plays a role in shaping the
response of the Government to a BSE. Finally, there is the Public, who would be interacting
in diverse ways with every other element of the system in the event of a BSE. During a
BSE, all of the physical and human infrastructures (agents) would be compromised in some
manner. Each would have varying and evolving degrees of situational awareness, be
subject to competing and conflicting demands, and would interact with each other in real
time to affect a plethora of evolving societal goals at the individual, family, community,
regional, and national levels.
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Figure 5.2 The Electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure and Society are a System of
Systems
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The granularity of the model depicted in Figure 5.2 could easily be expanded. For instance,
the “Physical Critical Infrastructure” agent could be resolved into its sixteen Critical
Infrastructure agents, and the “Government” agent could be expanded to depict various
federal, state, and local governmental entities. Agents representing non-governmental
organizations or “NGOs” (such as the Red Cross) could be added, and the “Public” agent
could be expanded to depict diverse populations (such as infrastructure workers, first
responders, etc.). Even without this extra level of granularity, the simple model depicted in
Figure 5.2 could provide a useful framework for exploring a diverse set of technical,
political, and behavioral questions relevant to Black Sky Events. Examples of such
questions include:
1. How do the separate Critical Infrastructure agents interact with and influence each
other?
2. How do various policies, regulations, laws, and operating procedures influence the
course of events during a BSE?
3. What are the best policies and regulations to deal with BSEs?
4. What should the relative priorities be for restoring electrical power to various Critical
Infrastructures and their functions?
5. How do human actions or inactions influence the ability of society to endure a BSE
and recover from it?
Many important questions of this nature have not been probed in a rigorous scientific
manner. A multi-agent model based on a simple architecture similar to that depicted in
Figure 5.2 could provide a starting point for simulating the behavior of our society during
Black Sky Events. This model could also inform regulatory and policy formulation,
emergency preparedness and emergency response planning, and a myriad of other
important Black Sky issues [5.9 – 5.14]. As is true in many simulation efforts, the results
obtained from such analyses could prove to be more valuable for sharpening our questions
than for answering them. The potential for such a model to yield useful insights into a
diverse suite of Black Sky issues is discussed further in the following sections.

5.3

Imagining A Black Sky Event

The probability of natural events that might trigger a BSE depends on the specific triggering
event. For example, based on available satellite heliophysics data and Earth geophysical
forensic analysis, Riley [5.15] estimated the probability of a CME-induced GMD of the same
magnitude as the famous 1859 “Carrington Event” [5.16] to be on the order of 12% per
decade. The Carrington Event occurred at a time when the only “wired” network in the U.S.
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and Europe was the telegraph system. Reliable reports from the event indicate widespread
electrical arcing of telegraph lines, papers in telegraph offices (and even wooden telegraph
poles) being set afire from arcing of nearby lines, shocking of telegraph operators, and
telegraph systems continuing to run after being disconnected from their battery systems.
Love [5.17] has predicted the probability of a similar event to be 6.3% per decade (roughly
half of Riley’s estimate). If Riley and Love’s probability estimates are reasonably accurate,
our world is overdue for a massive GMD. Indeed, the Earth has had very close encounters
with a number of CMEs over the past few decades, narrowly missing an encounter with a
Carrington-class CME as recently as July 2012 [5.18].
With regard to seismic hazards, the probability of massive earthquakes capable of
triggering sub-continental Grid damage is location-dependent. Nevertheless, in the U.S. the
potential exists for major seismic events in and around regions such as the San Andreas,
the Pacific Northwest, and the New Madrid seismic zones [5.19].
Finally, it is difficult to quantitatively assess the “probability” of human-based threats that
might trigger Black Sky Events. However, it is prudent to assume there are entities in the
world that are actively seeking to develop EMP and cyber weapons capable of triggering
Black Sky Events.
As previously discussed, Black Sky environments, regardless of their cause, are
characterized by the partial or complete de-energization of the Grid and would “...share a
common attribute: outages would span very large regions, and utilities could require weeks
or potentially months to restore power to even the highest priority customers” [5.20]. As has
been demonstrated on numerous occasions, localized electricity outages can propagate
through space and time to become much larger blackouts. The ultimate size of the blackout
region would depend both on the original damage inflicted by the initiating event (e.g., GMD,
seismic event, EMP, etc.), and the subsequent event cascade within the Grid, between the
Grid and other Critical Infrastructure sectors, and within other Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
Given the dependence of our Critical Infrastructure on the Grid, it is difficult to bound the
ultimate Black Sky event cascade. The behavior of the complimentary physical and human
system of systems (Figure 5.2) is exceedingly complex. For example, systems such as
water supply, wastewater, fuel delivery (gasoline, natural gas, coal), ground and air
transportation, communications, and finance would be severely degraded. The quest for
information regarding the situation, and the competition for goods and services would
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quickly intensify at local, regional, and national levels, with requests for resources
overwhelming their availability at virtually every geographical scale.
How would society endure, and then recover from such an event? Serious analysis of such
situations must take into account the impact of the Black Sky environment on physical
infrastructure, the people who must report to work to operate the physical infrastructure, and
the Public who depend on the infrastructure and interact in complex ways with the people
who operate it. Past experience with a limited number of major (but relatively short-term)
blackouts in the U.S. gives reason for concern [5.21, 5.22]. In the 2013 report “Solar Storm
Risk To The North American Electric Grid,” Lloyd estimated that a Carrington-like event is
likely to directly impact some 20-40 million people in the U.S., with power outages lasting
from sixteen days to “1-2 years,” inflicting $600 billion to $2.6 trillion in damage to the U.S.
economy [5.23].
Our nation’s legal, regulatory, political, and social institutions are ill-equipped to deal with the
overwhelmingly disruptive scenarios described above. However, efforts are underway at the
federal level and in NGOs to bring together the expertise and resources needed to
accurately characterize the nature of the challenge and to formulate plans and actions to
enhance our preparedness for such events [5.2, 5.4, 5.24].

5.4

The U.S. Grid And Nuclear Power’s Place In It

The U.S. Grid (Figure 5.3) is comprised of some 7,300 generating units, a growing
number of energy storage facilities, over 257,000 km (160,000 mi) of high voltage
transmission lines, and millions of low voltage lines and distribution transformers [5.25] .
Some five hundred companies and sixty-six “balancing authorities” whose responsibility
it is to ensure, in real time, that electricity demand and supply are balanced, operate
these assets.
According to the U.S. National Academy of Engineering, the North American Grid is
considered the largest “machine” created by mankind and the foundation of the greatest
engineering achievement of the 20th century [5.26]. The U.S. Grid in the lower forty-eight
states is configured into three “interconnections” (Figure 5.4): the Eastern
Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas (ERCOT) Interconnection [5.27, 5.28]. The Eastern Interconnection covers the
region from the Atlantic coast to the base of the Rocky Mountains. The Western
Interconnection extends westward from its boundary with the Eastern Interconnection to
the Pacific Coast. The ERCOT Interconnection covers most of Texas.
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Source: FEMA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Electric_Reliability_Corpora
ion#/media/File:UnitedStatesPowerGrid.jpg,)
Figure 5.3 North American Electric Grid
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Source: North American Electric Reliability Council
http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Documents/NERC_Interconnections_Color_0
72512.jpg
Figure 5.4 North American Electric Reliability Council Interconnections
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All of the electric utilities within an Interconnection are connected with each other (under
normal operating conditions) and operate at a synchronized frequency of 60 Hz.
Interconnections can be joined to each other via high voltage direct current power
transmission lines (DC ties) or via variable frequency transformers (VFTs). Variable
frequency transformers permit a controlled flow of alternating current (AC) across the
connection, while preventing the transmission of AC frequency perturbations between
interconnections. The Eastern Interconnection is connected to the Western
Interconnection via six DC ties, to the ERCOT Interconnection with two DC ties, and to
the Quebec Interconnection with four DC ties and a single VFT [5.29]. In addition to
being tied to the Eastern Interconnection, the Texas Interconnection has one DC tie and
one VFT tie to systems in Mexico [5.30].
Approximately 100 of the 7,300 generating units mentioned above are nuclear power
reactors (Figure 5.5). At the risk of over-simplification (and with recognition that details such
as voltage levels and even the names of components can be plant-specific), it is helpful to
view the interface between a nuclear power plant and the Grid in terms of four primary
connections (Figure 5.6):
1. The NPP unit’s Generator Step-up or “GSU” Transformer which steps up the ~
25KV output of the main generators to ≥ 345 KV – which is then fed to the Grid
through the station switchyard.
2. The NPP unit’s Startup Transformer or “SUT” (also called the Station Auxiliary
Transformer), which steps down the 345 KV from the station switchyard to the ~ 6.6
KV required to energize the NPP equipment for plant start-up.
3. The NPP unit’s dedicated Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) Transformer, which
provides electricity from the Grid to power the NPP’s Engineered Safety Features.
4. A variety of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
Though not an interface to the Grid, the reactor’s Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) plays an
important role in plant operations. This transformer taps a portion of the plant’s 25 KV Main
Generator output to energize ~ 6.6 KV buses that provide for a variety of housekeeping or
“auxiliary” plant loads during operation. Thus, once an NPP is started, it could run without
being connected to the Grid. It would, however, need to be able to reduce its power level
(“runback”) to a very low-power generation level just sufficient to meet the plant’s
housekeeping loads while rejecting any unneeded power through the plant’s condenser and
normal waste heat removal systems. Finally, it is important to emphasize that once shut
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Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/mappower-reactors.html

Figure 5.5 Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Plants In U.S.
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Figure 5.6 Simplified representation of NPP interfaces with the Grid and the world
outside the plant boundary
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down, the NPP cannot restart without AC power supplied from external sources through the
NPP’s Startup Transformer.

5.5

U.S. Grid Recovery During Black Sky Events

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) have put in place a series of System Restoration Reliability
Standards designed to enhance the ability of the Grid operators to re-energize and recover
the Grid following widespread Grid outages [5.31, 5.32]. These “Gray Sky” restoration
procedures envision a Grid fractured into a large number of “islanded” entities. These
recovery procedures are basically “bootstrapping” exercises in which each of these isolated
entities initially restarts specially configured “Black Start Generating Units,” or simply “Black
Start Units,” that are coupled through secure transmission lines to tightly controlled load
centers. Once these initial islands are operational, and damage assessments and
situational awareness permit, breakers are closed in a carefully choreographed manner to
re-energize other parts of the system. This sequential approach allows other generating
plants to restart, and larger portions of the Grid to be re-energized as the electrified islands
expand, sync, and reconnect to each other. This process is easily envisioned as many
random points of light on a dark map of the U.S. expanding until their boundaries merge
and the entire map is illuminated.
These emergency operating procedures (EOPs) require transmission operators, balancing
authorities, and reliability coordinators to have Grid restoration plans, test protocols, and
Black Start Resources (Black Start Units) in place to enable rapid recovery from large Grid
failure events. Black Start Resources are defined as “generating unit(s) and its associated
set of equipment which has the ability to be started without support from the System or is
designed to remain energized without connection to the remainder of the System, with the
ability to energize a bus, meeting the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for
real and reactive power capability, frequency and voltage control, and that has been
included in the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan,” [5.31]. Where available, hydro
plants (dams) are favored Black Start Resources. However, many regions of the country do
not have direct access to hydro assets and must rely on other assets, such as gas turbines
and oil-fired units, for meeting the Black Start Resource requirements. A practical
consideration in the selection of Black Start Resources is that these generating units must
have sufficient fuel available to attempt multiple system restarts and to be capable of
performing their required Black Start functions for some duration of time following their initial
start-up attempt. (History suggests extraordinary steps can be taken to secure Black Start
and cranking power sources in extraordinary circumstances. For example, the United
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States Army’s nuclear barge Sturgis was a refitted cargo ship containing a 10 MWe nuclear
power plant that supplied electrical power for the locks of the Panama Canal between 1968
and 1976. Some years later (in November 1982) the United States nuclear-powered attack
submarine USS Indianapolis was ordered into Nawiliwili Harbor on the hurricane-ravaged
Hawaiian island of Kauai for the purpose of interconnecting with and repowering the
island’s electrical system. However, the planned interconnection between the submarine’s
nuclear power plant and the island’s electrical grid was never completed because diesel
generators supplied by the U.S. Navy succeeded in cranking the island’s main power plant.
Thus a precedent exists for employing nuclear powered naval vessels as Black Start and
cranking power supplies in coastal areas.)
It is difficult, if not practically impossible, to thoroughly test Independent System Operator
and Regional Transmission Organization Black Sky / Black Start Grid emergency operating
procedures and system restoration plans in truly prototypic Black Sky environments. This is
true because realistic Black Sky test environments cannot be created without impacting the
public in an unacceptable manner. For this reason, testing of system restoration procedures
typically employs some combination of computational simulation and synthesis of results
from testing conducted at subsystem and component levels.
The tendency to assume near-perfect execution of emergency response plans and
operating procedures is a potential Achilles heel of validation approaches that rely on
simulation and limited testing at subsystem levels. It is easy to overlook the inter- and intradependencies of organizational functionalities and human frailties – realities that would
present significant emergency procedure execution challenges during Black Sky Events.
Given the difficulty of testing Black Sky recovery procedures at full scale and in prototypic
environments, intelligent agent-based system models similar to that depicted in Figure 5.2
might provide additional useful insights into relevant infrastructure and human interactions
and interdependencies. Such models could be developed and applied at the individual
power station, electric utility, regional transmission organization, NERC Region,
Interconnection, or entire continental Grid levels. Depending on their focus and specific
questions to be addressed, such models might incorporate elements such as the
FERC/NERC emergency operating procedures into the “Grid Operators” agent shown in
Figure 5.2, individual power plant emergency operating procedures (if individual power plant
agents were incorporated into the simulation), the emergency recovery plans of other
Critical Infrastructure sectors, and planned emergency actions of governmental entities
(e.g., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency,
etc.). Such simulations might offer insights useful for informing and optimizing Grid and
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Critical Infrastructure Black Sky emergency operating and recovery procedures, power
restoration priorities, regulatory structures, national Black Sky strategies, and a host of
other related issues.

5.6

The NPP’s Initial Response To A Black Sky Event

This section examines the likely response of an NPP to Black Sky Events – both those for
which advance warning is available and those that present themselves as unanticipated
propagating Grid failures. It should be noted that the most likely response of a particular
NPP would no doubt depend on plant-specific issues, including the manner in which the
NPP is interfaced (Figure 5.6) to the Grid and the Grid architecture beyond this interface.
There are circumstances in which an NPP operator might receive advance notice (either
through federally-issued alerts from the space weather network, the plant’s SCADA system,
or by other means) of an imminent threat of massive Grid disruptions. In such cases, the
NPP operator would almost certainly take preemptive action to both protect the power plant
and enhance the likelihood the Grid could be recovered rapidly in the wake of a Black Sky
Event. Theoretically, plant operators might respond to such notices in two ways:
1. Manual Shutdown – in which the NPP operators manually shut down the plant and
transition it to normal shutdown decay heat removal, probably with early managed
transition to onsite diesel-driven power systems to avoid the possibility of
unnecessarily harsh transitions if the anticipated loss of offsite power (LOOP)
event actually occurs.
2. Manual Runback or “cutback” – in which the NPP isolates from the Grid and
reduces its power level to only that required to supply internal housekeeping loads
(typically several percent of full power).
Assuming a plant is capable of shifting to the runback mode, the relative desirability of
these two actions could depend on a variety of factors – such as the potential for direct
damage to NPP plant and equipment from the Black Sky initiating event, the period of time
offsite power might be unavailable to the NPP, etc.
An unanticipated Black Sky Event would initially be “sensed” by an NPP as an anomaly in
one or more Grid interface characteristics (frequency perturbations, power factor anomalies,
load perturbations, etc.). The plant’s initial response to the event would depend on how it
was first sensed [5.33, 5.34]. However, each of the three plant response scenarios would
be transitory phases, all ultimately evolving into LOOP events:
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1. Partial Load Rejection – a load rejection is a sudden reduction in electric power
demand at some point in the Grid. Such events could result in the opening of
interconnections between the parts of the Grid experiencing the load rejection,
eventually propagating to the region of the Grid to which the NPP is tied. While
some power reactors designed by Combustion Engineering were designed for 85%
or greater load rejection capability, NPP’s typically can manage load rejections of up
to ~ 50% by reducing power (runback) and dumping excess steam as necessary to
the unit’s main condenser (assuming AC power is still available at that point to drive
the pumps that supply water to the secondary side of the condenser).
2. Complete Loss of Load – for the case of an unmitigated BSE, the NPP might
experience a momentary or short-term partial load rejection that quickly evolves to a
complete (100%) load rejection – a “loss of load” event. This loss of load event
could descend on the NPP with little advance warning. The NPP’s normal response
to the loss of load would be to open breakers at the generator output, “islanding” the
NPP from the Grid, and (today) “tripping” the reactor. In such cases, it might be
possible for the NPP to runback its power level to that required to supply its own
housekeeping electrical loads – provided (once again) that AC power is available to
drive the pumps that supply water to the secondary side of the condenser. If this
delicate operation cannot be achieved and maintained, the reactor will be tripped. It
would then transition to the shutdown decay heat removal mode powered by AC
provided from the Grid. This offsite power would not be available in a Black Sky
Event; so diesel-driven systems would supply the needed backup power to maintain
safe shutdown cooling.
3. Voltage and Frequency Perturbation-Induced Reactor Trips – North American
Grid AC frequency is typically controlled to within (an amazing) ± 0.05 Hz. The initial
stage of a BSE would no doubt involve large variations in system voltage and
frequency as load shedding and real or reactive power supply-demand mismatches
cascade throughout the Grid. A NPP senses Grid AC voltage and frequency via
several mechanisms. Changes in Grid AC voltage and frequency produce forcing
functions within the NPP’s turbo generator as it seeks to remain in synchronization
with the Grid. These Grid voltage and frequency perturbations also directly impact
the speed of AC pumps used to circulate cooling water through the reactor, steam
generators (if a pressurized water reactor), secondary and containment cooling
systems, feedwater to the reactor’s condenser, etc. Thus, the thermodynamic
balance of the plant can be significantly impacted by Grid AC voltage and frequency
perturbations. In addition, most AC pumping systems are protected by breakers
designed to open under unacceptable voltage and frequency perturbations to
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protect the systems from overheating due to excessive currents. The control band
for these protection systems is relatively narrow. Given these design features,
excessive Grid voltage and frequency perturbations would trigger the NPP’s
protection systems to rapidly trip the reactor and transition it to onsite or offsite ACpowered shutdown cooling.
Even if the NPP initially senses the BSE as a load rejection, loss-of-load, or voltage/frequency
perturbation event, it will ultimately (perhaps quickly) sense it as a LOOP event. In response
to the loss of power to NPP systems, the plant protection system shuts down (trips) the
reactor (if it was not already tripped by one of the transients discussed above) and transitions
the plant to shutdown cooling. These cooling systems are controlled and powered by station
batteries, diesel generator-powered AC-driven cooling systems, and/or direct diesel-driven
pumping systems [5.35]. The period of time an NPP can remain safely in this shutdown
cooling mode depends on plant design features (such as the capacity of the station batteries
and control air systems and the design and performance of its diesel generator and dieseldriven pumping systems, etc.), and the ability of the world outside the plant to provide
meaningful assistance such as resupplying diesel fuel, additional diesel generators and
diesel-driven pumps, etc., if/as required.
Thus, the likely response of today’s NPPs to a BSE would be to shut down (either manually
in response to event warnings or automatically in response to sensed Grid anomalies) and
transition in a normal fashion to dependency on shutdown decay heat removal systems
controlled and powered by station batteries and diesel generator-driven or diesel-driven
pumps. The NPP (reactor, primary containment, spent fuel pool) would be in a “safe
shutdown mode” as long as the required cooling is available. The NPP operators would
have no way of knowing the extent of damage to the Grid, nor how long offsite AC power
would be unavailable at the outset of the event. They would be relying strictly on onsite
diesel generators and/or diesel-driven pumping systems to supply the necessary power.
Thus they would be dependent on the inventory of diesel fuel stored on, or very near their
site to maintain cooling to the reactor, the reactor’s primary containment, and the spent fuel
pool.
It is likely that the transfer of materials, equipment, and personnel between the NPP and the
outside world, along with communications with the outside world, would be greatly
compromised during the Black Sky Event, with the situation worsening as the event
persists. The situational awareness of all entities involved would be compromised,
complicating damage assessment and response planning both within and outside the NPP.
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5.7

The NPP’s Long-term Black Sky Response

For all their benefits, the NPP fleet poses a unique Black Sky challenge. Nuclear power
plants can’t simply be “turned off” like other forms of electrical power generation. The
nuclear fuel in commercial power reactors continues to produce significant “decay heat”
long after their electrical power production has ceased. (For example, nuclear fuel still
produces ~ 1% of it’s original operating power two hours after shutdown. The decay power
level drops to ~ 0.4% three days after shutdown, ~0.3% seven days after shutdown, and
~0.04-0.05% six months after shutdown. The exact power level produced depends on
several factors such as the original operating power level, time at power, reactor fuel
composition, fuel burnup, etc.) By way of example, the core of a 1000 MWe / 3000 MWt)
commercial nuclear reactor might still be producing ~2-3 MWt of power three months after
the reactor has shut down. Thus, in the absence of forced cooling, a reactor of this size,
depressurized to 1 atm pressure, would boil off 3200-5000 kg/h or ~830-1320 gallons/h of
water to remove this much energy. This decay heat is produced whether the fuel is in the
reactor or in the plant’s spent fuel pool, and must be removed (in current reactors) by
pumping cooling water through the core of the reactor (and/or spent fuel pool) with
electrically driven pumps. Under normal circumstances the power for these cooling systems
is supplied from the Grid. In the event offsite electrical feed isn’t available, the NPPs rely on
onsite diesel-driven pumping systems to supply the necessary power.
The potential impacts of long-term loss of offsite power events in NPPs have been
extensively studied [5.35]. The accident that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 in the
wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake evolved to a multi-reactor LOOP event – albeit
one that was greatly complicated by the physical damage inflicted on the plant by the
earthquake and the tsunami. From the safety standpoint, the events at Fukushima Daiichi
had a galvanizing impact on the commercial nuclear power industry, not unlike that which
occurred in the wake of the accident at Three Mile Island in the U.S. in 1979. Among other
things, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a detailed “lessons
learned” analysis of the implications of the Fukushima accident [5.36]. The NRC
subsequently implemented a structured activity (still ongoing) to address the insights
identified therein. The U.S. National Academy of Science also conducted a detailed
evaluation of Fukushima with an eye toward identifying key lessons learned [5.37].
One of the key focus areas of the NRC and U.S. nuclear power industry in the wake of the
accident at Fukushima Daiichi has been to enhance U.S. NPPs’ ability to cope with
extreme external events, including sustained loss of offsite power. The nuclear industry’s
FLEX Program was one result of this effort [5.38]. Under the FLEX program, NPP owners
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have invested heavily in additional onsite diesel generators and diesel-driven pumping
systems. Efforts have been made to expand onsite diesel fuel storage capabilities. (For
example, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s 3-unit Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant has the
capacity to store at least 282,240 gallons of diesel fuel onsite for its FLEX diesel generators
[5.39].) Beyond this, the FLEX program has pre-staged additional emergency response
equipment at two regional response centers – one in Memphis, Tennessee and the other in
Phoenix, Arizona. Their goal is to enable delivery of critical equipment by ground and air
transport to NPPs anywhere in their region within 24 hours [5.40].
The FLEX program illustrates an aggressive and innovative response of the nuclear power
industry to the Fukushima Daiichi accident – one that should significantly reduce the risk
imposed by a spectrum of traditional external events. This said, the FLEX program is not
designed to mitigate Black Sky Events:
“Solar-Geomagnetic disturbances could also lead to extended loss of off-site power due to
geomagnetically-induced currents in electrical power transmission systems. However, this
hazard was not included in Reference B-1 so it is not explicitly listed here. Nevertheless,
while such disturbances could cause an extended loss of off-site power, they are not
expected to impact the on-site safety-related equipment (e.g., diesel generators and
internal distribution equipment) due to their being housed in reinforced concrete structures
and would not change the approach to devising FLEX strategies.” [5.38] .
Three observations about the FLEX Program are relevant to the present discussion:
1. First, existing FLEX strategies are clearly based on the assumption civil
infrastructure outside the plant boundary is not so degraded by triggering events as
to prevent delivery of equipment and diesel fuel to the plant for as long as necessary
to keep the plant in a safe shutdown state. The same assumption (that regardless of
the initiating event, the outside world can render meaningful assistance to the plant)
has been incorporated in virtually every NPP risk assessment performed prior to the
Fukushima Daiichi accident [5.35]. This assumption is at least questionable, if not
clearly invalid for prolonged Black Sky Events. Indeed, Black Sky Events are among
the ultimate “common cause” events with the potential to both damage the NPP and
prevent the world outside the NPP from rendering meaningful assistance to it in a
timely manner.
2. Second, the question of whether NPP equipment could withstand a major GMD
such as the 1859 Carrington Event, or a major EMP attack, is somewhat uncertain.
An analysis conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in 1983 [5.41] concluded,
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“... the likelihood that individual components examined will fail is small; therefore, it
is unlikely that an EMP event would fail sufficient equipment so as to prevent safe
shutdown.” This analysis focused on EMP events rather than GMDs triggered by
CMEs, and technologies and systems in place in the early 1980s before the digital
era. It is not entirely clear how differences between the CME-induced GMD and
EMP events, and the transition to digital instrumentation and control technologies
within the NPP impact the conclusions of the 1983 analysis.
3. Lastly, a Black Sky Event in the Eastern U.S. would likely place several NPPs in
jeopardy simultaneously. The FLEX regional response centers are not designed for
situations in which several NPPs are simultaneously in need of FLEX equipment and
resources – even if transport of equipment from the regional response centers to the
affected NPP sites in not an issue.
One must also consider the human side of the NPP’s Black Sky endurance challenge. The
likelihood that transportation fuels will rapidly become scarce or unavailable in an extended
BSE, and that ground transportation pathways will become clogged and dysfunctional, is a
serious issue with respect to maintaining adequate NPP staffing during the event. The
longer the BSE persists, the more difficult it would become for the NPP’s workforce to
commute from offsite to the plant, and the more likely it is that NPP staff will feel compelled
to place the immediate safety and security of their families above the needs of the NPP.
This same issue applies to the workforce of electrical utilities and all Critical Infrastructure
Sectors (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
Decades of disaster recovery experience and current disaster planning practices suggest
that the first 72 hours of a disaster event are especially critical. During this period, disaster
management is almost completely a local and individual responsibility [5.42, 5.43] and the
reality and uncertainties of one’s situation begin to crystalize. The more complex and laborintensive the required BSE coping actions, and the longer the need for activity persists, the
greater the risk that pre-established emergency coping procedures will not be executed as
planned. Therefore, rapid recovery of the Grid and the NPP’s normal shutdown
configuration is imperative.
Nuclear power plant operators in the U.S. employ a framework of carefully-crafted
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Severe Accident Management Guidelines
(SAMGs), FLEX procedures, and Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) to
guide their actions during unlikely extreme events involving progressive deterioration of
plant functionalities. These procedural frameworks have evolved over several decades, and
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incorporate lessons-learned from major federal and industry safety analysis programs and
thousands of accumulated years of plant operating experience. The nuclear power industry
has indeed done a laudable job in preparing for “the unthinkable”. Nevertheless, Black Sky
Events would pose unprecedented challenges to the effective real-time integration and
execution of these procedures. Tabletop exercises in which these procedures are “tested”
in Black Sky environments can offer initial insight with respect to areas in which existing
procedures and guidelines can be improved for Black Sky applications. Additionally, the
intelligent agent-based simulation approach discussed in Section II above, coupled with
appropriate NPP simulation tools, might provide useful insights into the integration and
optimization of these EOP/SAMG/FLEX/EDMG frameworks in Black Sky environments.
Two key questions emerge from this discussion of current NPP’s ability to endure a Black
Sky Event:
1. Under current industry operating procedures, and with sufficient forewarning, NPPs
would almost certainly shut down in advance of a BSE and isolate themselves from
the Grid. Shutting down the reactor is presumed to be the safest response to an
event in which the anticipated damage to the Grid and potential risk to the NPP is
difficult to predict. However, shutting down the NPP places its continued safety at
the mercy of its diesel generators and its diesel fuel supply at a time when neither
the duration of the offsite power outage nor the continuing availability of diesel fuel
from offsite sources can be known. One can reasonably ask, “Would a safer
response be to runback and run through the BSE with the reactor still operating but
safely isolated from the Grid for as long as necessary to ride through the Black Sky
Event?”
2. If it is neither feasible nor advisable to attempt to runback and run through the Black
Sky Event, the question then becomes: What can be done to extend and enhance
the NPP’s shutdown heat removal capability for Black Sky Events? This line of
inquiry would involve investigating: (a) “beyond-FLEX” improvements to the NPP’s
onsite diesel generator, diesel pump, and diesel fuel supplies; (b) “beyond-FLEX”
improvements in the civil infrastructure outside the plant to provide assistance (at
least diesel fuel) to the NPP despite widespread infrastructure damage and
competition for available resources; (c) establishment of a secure offsite electrical
power feed to the NPP that is not vulnerable to the Black Sky Event; and (d) addition
of alternative onsite emergency electrical power supplies (such as solar photovoltaic
systems or even small nuclear reactors) capable of powering all essential shutdown
cooling functions during the Black Sky Event.
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5.8

Today’s NPPs Are Black Sky Liabilities

In the years since the first U.S. NPP became operational in 1957, the U.S. commercial
nuclear power fleet has proven to be a safe, reliable, around-the-clock source of electricity.
Through time, and in response to lessons learned from a handful of accidents in NPPs
around the world, the nuclear power industry and its regulators have continued to improve
the ability of NPPs to safely respond to and cope with a variety of external events and
natural hazards. The industry’s response to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi is a notable
example. Nevertheless, today’s generation of NPPs has a combination of design and
performance attributes that present operational and safety challenges during, and after,
Black Sky Events. Chief attributes include:
1. While they can easily be “shut down,” NPPs cannot simply be “turned off” in the
normal manner of speaking. NPPs continued to produce “decay power” at non-trivial
levels for many months after they are shut down. This decay power must be
removed on a continuous basis if damage to the reactor’s core is to be avoided.
Today’s NPPs are not designed to remove this decay power (without outside
assistance) in Black Sky (i.e. total loss of offsite power) conditions that persist for a
several weeks or longer.
2. Once shut down, today’s NPPs require electrical power from the Grid to restart.
3. If today’s NPPs could be rapidly restarted (or powered-up from a runback status), it
is unclear if they can perform the frequency matching and (possibly extreme) loadfollowing maneuvers likely required to service the Grid during the early stages of the
Black Sky recovery effort.
Given the three characteristics discussed above, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that today’s NPPs are indeed Black Sky Liabilities – generating assets
that require ongoing attention and “tending” during a BSE, and are of little help in
recovering from the Black Sky Event.

5.9

The Potential Value Of NPPs Under Black Skies

Despite the concerns raised in the previous section, it is noteworthy that NPPs have one
unique advantage with respect to other steam cycle generating assets – an advantage that
could make them an extremely attractive Black Start Resource. Nuclear power plants are
typically refueled every eighteen to twenty-four months. Thus on average, an NPP can be
assumed to have one year of fuel “in the tank”. The NPP’s fuel storage advantage
dramatically surpasses that of coal-fired, gas-fired, and oil-fired plants (Table 5.1). Fuel
supply pipelines would be inoperable or at least unreliable in Black Sky environments.
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Table 5.1 NPP’s fuel supply is unique asset in Black Sky Environment

Steam Plant
Type

Typical Onsite Fuel
Supply
(Days)

Fuel
Replenishment
Mechanism

Gas-Fired

<1

Pipeline

Oil-Fired

<7

Pipeline & Truck

Coal-Fired

30-90

Truck, Rail, Barge

Nuclear

~ 365*

Truck

*Assumes mid-point of 2-year refueling cycle
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Therefore, if an NPP can somehow endure the initial stages of the BSE without being
damaged, restart (if necessary), synchronize with and connect to the Grid, and load-follow
as required, the plant would become a Black Start Resource of extraordinary value. This
could be a game-changing asset during a time when transportation systems and other
essential Critical Infrastructures are degraded or inoperable.

5.10 Current Nuclear Industry And NRC Posture With Respect To
Black Sky Events
Neither the U.S. Nuclear Industry nor the U.S. NRC have taken a formal position on Black
Sky issues per se. Rather, the Nuclear Industry and the NRC have been focused on
implementing the lessons evolving out of the Fukushima Daiichi accident with respect to
mitigation of hazards posed by external events.
(The aforementioned FLEX Program is one such example.) The relevant dialog to date
within the Nuclear Industry, between the Nuclear Industry and the NRC, between the NRC
and the U.S. Congress, and between the NRC and the Public has primarily focused on the
ability of the NPPs to achieve and sustain safe shutdown and long-term spent fuel pool
cooling following GMDs or EMP attacks. The NRC announced in November 2015 a
proposed rule requiring NPPs to establish an integrated response capability for mitigation
of Beyond-Design-Basis events with a special focus on mitigation of external hazards
[5.44]. The NRC does not consider GMDs an “immediate safety concern” [5.45]. It is
continuing to evaluate whether specific regulatory actions are required via the
aforementioned rule-making process and is participating in an interagency task force
developing a National Space Weather Strategy and an associated action plan [5.45].

5.11 Formulating “The Question”
Given the conclusion that today’s NPPs are Black Sky Liabilities, and in consideration of the
potential value of having NPPs capable of serving as Black Start Units, there is a
compelling reason to investigate what might be required to achieve such operability. Thus
“The Question” with regard to commercial nuclear power plants and Black Sky Events is:
“Can today’s nuclear power plants be transformed from Black Sky Liabilities to Black
Sky Assets, and if so, how?” The Question can be deconstructed into sub-questions,
namely:
1. What can be done to extend an NPP’s ability to cope with Black Sky Events
(complete loss-of-offsite power events in which the surrounding civil and social
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infrastructures are so degraded that deliveries of diesel fuel, equipment and
commodities to the plant are not possible)?
2. Assuming the NPPs shut down prior to or during the Black Sky Event, and is not
damaged during the event, what might be done to enable the NPPs to restart under
Black Sky conditions?
3. Assuming the NPPs have run through or can restart during Black Sky conditions,
what might be done to enable the plants to synchronize with, reconnect to, and feed
the Grid as necessary to energize it and bootstrap the Grid out of the Black Sky
condition?
These sub-questions will be explored further in the next section.

5.12 A Framework For Addressing NPP – Black Sky Issues
Figure 5.7 presents a highly simplified event/capability tree that provides further insight into
the nature of the questions that must be answered and capabilities that must be enabled if
today’s NPPs are to become Black Sky Assets. The responses and capabilities combine to
produce eight basic NPP Black Sky Response pathways.
The event tree begins on the extreme left of Figure 5.7 at the moment NPP operators
become aware of an impending BSE or the plant senses the effects of the BSE. Immediately
upon becoming aware of an impending loss-of-offsite-power event, the NPP can
preemptively respond by running back power or completely shutting down. If advance
warning is not received, the plant will sense the Black Sky Event via one or more of the
mechanisms discussed in Section 5.6, and automatically trip (shut down). Response 1 in
Figure 5.7 is the approach in which the NPP shuts down, is successfully cooled for as long
as necessary, and then successfully restarts, synchronizes with and reconnects to the Grid,
and load-follows as necessary to bootstrap the Grid. Response 6 achieves the same
outcome as Response 1, but it does so by allowing the NPP to runback and run through the
BSE, reconnect, synchronize, and load-follow. (As indicated in Figure 5.7, it is also possible
the plant might initially attempt to runback and run through the event, only to find it
necessary to shut down later. This sequence is not presented in Figure 5.7 as a distinct
response path. Rather, it can be envisioned as an early transition from Response 6 to
Response 1.
Response 5 is the response to be avoided because it would almost certainly result in
severe damage to the NPP due to loss of heat removal function after the reactor has
runback and/or shutdown. The timing and rate of progression of the damage in Response 5
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Figure 5.7 NPP Black Sky Evaluation Framework

77

will depend on a number of factors, including whether the reactor tripped from full power or
from reduced (runback) power, how long cooling was maintained after the reactor was
shutdown, etc. Assuming all equipment functions as designed (including emergency dieseldriven backup systems), the timing of core damage in Response 5 is tied directly to when
the NPP’s diesel fuel supply is exhausted [5.35].
All other Responses (Responses 2 – 4 and 7 – 8) in Figure 5.7 place the NPP in various
intermediate states of readiness for repowering the Grid. Response 4 is one in which the
previously shut down NPP cannot restart. Responses 3 and 8 are cases in which a plant
that has either restarted or runback/run through an event cannot synchronize with the Grid
and reattach to it. Responses 2 and 7 are cases in which the NPP has successfully
reconnected to the Grid, but cannot load follow as necessary to handle the real and reactive
power swings present on the (compromised) Grid.
The event/capability tree presented in Figure 5.7 mirrors a decision tree based on four key
questions:
1. Should the NPP attempt to “runback and run through” the Black Sky Event (and if
so, what changes in the NPP and the NPP-Grid interface are necessary to enable
this), or should the NPP shutdown and transition to shutdown decay heat removal
operations?
2. What changes to the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, the Grid, and other Critical
Infrastructures might enable the NPP to restart under Black Sky conditions?
3. What changes to the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, and the Grid are necessary to
enable the running NPP to synchronize with a (possibly unstable) Grid, and reattach
to the Grid under Black Sky conditions?
4. What changes to the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, and the Grid are necessary to
enable the NPP, once reattached to the Grid, to remain attached and to maneuver as
necessary to match the load placed upon it by a Grid whose health is unknown, and
whose functionality is impaired?
The answers to these questions will yield the information needed to construct a set of
candidate options for translating NPPs from Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky Assets. Once
these options are defined, a second tier of questions must be addressed:
1. Which options provide the highest benefit with regard to enabling rapid recovery of
the Grid and minimizing societal impacts of the BSE?
2. What are the probable impacts of each option on the NPP’s availability, reliability,
safety, and cost of normal operations?
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3. What are the costs (relative and absolute) of implementing each option?
4. How testable and maintainable are the hardware and procedures required to
implement each option?
The answers to these questions will be somewhat plant-specific due both to the features of
the NPP, the NPP-Grid interface, and the features of the NPP’s “hosting” Grid entity.
However, useful insights could be gained by a methodical evaluation of these questions for
one, or a few, actual “reference plant/Grid” examples chosen from today’s U.S. Grid.
Finally, while the focus of this discussion has been on issues related to existing NPPs and
Black Sky Events, the opportunity exists to optimize future reactors to avoid the Black Sky
challenges presented by current NPPs, and present real Black Sky / Black Start benefits to
their owner/operators. Two potential types of future reactors are of particular interest. First,
small modular reactors (SMRs) could be designed for assured Black Start capability, and
optimized to enable their placement in and interface to the Grid at locations that maximize
their value in terms of Grid resiliency and Black Start recovery. Second, the possibility
exists that “micro reactors or “megawatt class reactors” could be co-located onsite with
existing large power reactors to serve as assured onsite auxiliary power sources and
assured cranking power sources for their larger companion. Such small reactors might be
configured to operated continuously at very low power and configured in a manner in which
they are completely isolated from the offsite Grid and Grid disturbances. Designers of these
future reactors and their potential customers are encouraged to factor these considerations
into their decisions.

5.13 A Word About Risk
During the past three decades, the NRC and the U.S. Nuclear Industry have evolved a
“risk-informed” regulatory regime that illuminates virtually every aspect of the nuclear power
enterprise. Current reactor designs, NPP licensing, NPP operations and maintenance,
emergency response planning, and the implementation of NPP backfits and modifications
are all informed by risk management considerations. This process has unquestionably
improved safety and reduced the risk to the public of nuclear power operations. It is useful
to reflect on how the consideration of Black Sky Events might fit into such a risk-informed
regulatory regime.
From the practical standpoint, the “risk” associated with a undesirable event is defined to
be the product of the probability of the event and the consequences of that event, summed
over all relevant events [5.37]. There are two generic categories of events. “Internal
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events” include phenomena such as valve failures, relay failures, etc. “External events” are
considered to be events resulting from natural phenomena such as fires, floods, seismic
events, GMDs triggered by coronal mass ejections, etc. [5.46]. Overt or intentional actions
taken by humans – such as EMP and cyber attacks – are external events of a special type.
The assignment of a “probability” for premeditated human actions can rapidly become
tangled in philosophical argument.
The application of risk-informed paradigms and traditional “cost/benefit” analyses such as
application of the NRC Backfit Rule [5.47] to evaluate the efficacy of potential Black Skymotivated modifications to NPPs and the Grid is particularly challenging. This is due to the
fact that external events of the type that might trigger a Black Sky Event are considered,
“high-impact, low-frequency” events [5.48]. The challenge presented by such events is that
there is (or there is believed to be) an “insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the
probabilities and consequences of their occurrence” [5.48]. While it may be possible to
estimate the cost of implementing a Black Sky-motivated backfit to an NPP or the Grid,
estimation of the risk benefit (reduction) of doing so can be extraordinarily difficult. What is
the true probability of a Carrington Event-class CME/GMD? What is the “probability” of an
EMP attack? Quantification of the consequences of such events is perhaps even more
difficult.
There are those who would argue that if a true Black Sky Event actually occurred, the
devastation to and impact on our society would be so overwhelming it is not reasonable to
be concerned with questions such as those posed in this paper. It is tempting to consider
Black Sky issues as the same class as, say, those related to the impact of a massive
meteorite impact on Earth – extraordinarily low frequency incidents of such devastating scale
and effect, there is no value in attempting to mitigate the risk they pose to society.
It is worth noting that if Riley’s and Love’s estimates of the probability / frequency of
Carrington-class GMDs are correct [5.15, 5.17], these events represent a class of hazards
far more probable than the proverbial “dinosaur-killing” meteorite. In fact, if Riley and Love
are remotely correct in their estimation of the probability of such events (say an event
frequency of 1 in 100 to 1 in 1000 years), the probability of such events is significantly
higher than that of many events included within the design basis of current generation
NPPs. Indeed, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards require
NPP designers and licensing authorities to ensure “Postulated Initiating Events” (PIEs) with
probabilities exceeding 1 in 10,000 years result in “no radiological impact at all, or no
radiological impact outside the exclusion area” of the plant [5.49]. The key question, and
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perhaps the largest uncertainty is how the probability of a CME or other natural or manmade initiating event translates to the probability of the “ultimate loss of off-site power”
event to which the NPP might be exposed. And then, of course, there’s the additional
initiating event “probability” contribution from EMP and cyber threats.
Given current uncertainties regarding the probability of Black Sky initiating events and how
they translate to NPP accident initiator events, and the response of Critical Infrastructure
(including the Grid and NPPs) to them, “How can and when will society make decisions
regarding issues surrounding NPPs and Black Sky Events?” Analyses of the type discussed
in this paper can inform that process.

5.14 Summary
5.14.1 Summary Observations
Reliable access to electricity is a key enabler of modern life and the foundation of all other
Critical Infrastructures. The Grid is the “machine” which generates, stores, and delivers this
electricity. The U.S. Grid is vulnerable to a number of natural hazards and man-made
threats that have the potential to cause Black Sky Events – blackouts of extraordinary
geographical scale lasting for weeks, months, or even longer. Embedded within the U.S.
Grid are almost 100 commercial nuclear power reactors.
This paper has addressed two levels of relevant NPP Black Sky issues:
1. The behavior of the interconnected “system of systems” that is the coupled physical
infrastructure-human infrastructure world in which Black Sky Events would evolve.
2. The role of nuclear power plants in Black Sky Events.
The role of NPPs in Black Sky scenarios is largely unexplored territory.
A Black Sky Event will ultimately present itself to an NPP as a sustained loss of offsite
power (LOOP) event. Both from the regulatory and technical standpoint, the response of
NPPs to a Black Sky event in today’s environment would be to isolate from the Grid and
“cocoon” until offsite power is restored or available diesel fuel supplies are exhausted. Thus
the safety of the NPPs during a continuing Black Sky Event will ultimately depend on the
ability of world outside the plant to resupply diesel fuel, other consumables, and perhaps
additional equipment to the plant at a time when all Critical Infrastructures are
compromised, transportation systems are dysfunctional, and there is keen competition for
available resources. Once shutdown, today’s NPPs cannot restart without an external
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source of AC power. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that for all their many benefits to
society, today’s NPPs are Black Sky Liabilities.
Today’s NPPs employ an operational framework of EOPs, SAMGs, FLEX, and EDMG
procedures designed to cope with a wide variety of beyond design basis events. However,
these procedures were not designed for sustained Black Sky environments.
Internal to the NPP lies an asset that would be of extraordinary value during Black Sky
Events if the NPP and the Grid could be modified to access it. A NPP might have as much
as 24 (full power) months of fuel in the reactor at the start of a Black Sky Event. When
compared to the onsite fuel inventory at a coal-fired electrical generating plant (typically 3060 days), or gas-turbine plants (hours to perhaps a few days), the NPP’s nuclear fuel
inventory could enable the NPP to become the foundation of a robust U.S. Grid restoration
strategy. This benefit can only be realized if the plant could endure the Black Sky Event
without damage, run through the event or restart in the midst of Black Sky conditions,
synchronize with the Grid, reconnect to the Grid, and run as required to match voltage,
frequency, and (real and reactive) power demands. This could be an enormous societal
benefit during a time when all Critical Infrastructures are compromised and virtually all
resources are over-subscribed. NPPs could become nearly ideal Black Start Resources
(“Units”) and an enabler of Grid resiliency – if these functionalities could be achieved.

5.14.2 Recommendations
In light of these observations, the following recommendations are offered as a catalyst for
generating further dialog with respect to NPP-Black Sky issues:
•

Recommendation 1 – the utility of agent-based simulation (ABS) approaches for
probing several issues relevant to the role of nuclear power in Black Sky Events
should be explored. Agent-based simulation approaches employing model
topologies similar to that depicted in Figure 5.2, could provide useful insights to
inform a host of Black Sky questions and issues. The range of issues worthy of
consideration include understanding; (a) interdependences between the electric
power infrastructure and other Critical Infrastructure Sectors; (b) optimal extension of
existing NPP EOP/SAMG/FLEX/EDMG procedures in Black Sky environments; (c)
NPP operational decision making in situations involving degraded situation
awareness and quality of information; (d) the development of federal, state, and local
emergency response plans; and (e) the development of relevant policy and
regulatory frameworks. The model “level” (e.g., individual generating plant, Regional
Transmission Organization, NERC Region, Interconnection, etc.), type of intelligent
82

•

•

•

•

agents employed, and phenomenological models and rules implemented in ABS
approaches would necessarily be tailored to the specific questions targeted for
exploration. One intriguing pathway for exploration would focus on evaluating the
efficacy of existing FERC / NERC emergency operating procedures within a single
nuclear generation and transmission entity in the U.S. Grid. At the other end of the
spectrum, a very high-level multi-agent model might be useful for probing questions
such as who/what should receive priority for power restoration in the event of a major
Black Sky Event.
Recommendation 2 – This paper has defined a preliminary framework for
addressing the question, “Can today’s nuclear power plants be transformed from
Black Sky Liabilities to Black Sky Assets, and if so, how?” This framework is built
upon a simplified NPP Black Sky event / functionality tree (Figure 5.7) that identifies
the key actions required (and therefore the key capabilities needed) if an NPP is to
become a Black Start Resource. The simple event/functionality tree defined in
Figure 5.7 should be expanded to provide a useful analytical framework, and
applied to individual NPPs to provide a better understanding of the challenges,
implications, and intricacies of achieving Black Start functionality.
Recommendation 3 – Todays NPPs are operated and regulated in a manner that
assumes diesel-dependent safe shutdown mode is the safest response to all loss of
offsite power events. The risk implications of this assumption in an “all hazards / all
threats” environment including Black Skies should be revisited. Given recent
developments regarding our understanding of the probability of naturally induced
GMDs, it is quite possible (perhaps even likely) the safest mode for NPPs would be
to runback/run through a loss of offsite power event rather than to shutdown and
simply hope offsite power is restored before the diesel fuel is exhausted.
Recommendation 4 – The feasibility of enabling existing NPPs to runback / run
through a BSE in a low power, “islanded” mode should be explored. Most NPPs
were designed for significant runback capability, but it is rarely employed. Why? It is
likely to be difficult to discriminate in real-time between events in which a reactor trip
is appropriate, and those in which runback is advised. Achieving this capability
would be one challenging aspect of this approach to BSE response – especially
because restart of the reactor once it has tripped is not possible absent offsite AC
power feed.
Recommendation 5 – The possibility of providing sustained NPP safe shutdown
cooling during prolonged Black Sky Events by harnessing the capabilities of
collocated micro-reactors as auxiliary power sources should be examined. Such a
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capability would free the NPP from dependence on diesel fuel supplies for sustained
shutdown decay heat removal during Black Sky Events.
Recommendation 6 – The efficacy of configuring NPPs, dedicated offsite cranking
transmission lines, and Black Start resources into “Secure Enclaves” should be
examined; and the extent to which this approach has been / is being deployed in the
electric power industry should be understood.
Recommendation 7 – The possibility of enhancing an NPP’s ability to remain
connected to an unstable Grid (both in terms of the NPPs power transmission
interties and is offsite power feed) should be investigated. Two aspects of the
challenge are evident. The first involves enhancing the NPPs load-following
capabilities. The second involves buffering (to the extent possible) the NPP from
Grid anomalies via use of DC-DC and VFT connections, rather than standard ACAC connections for both power transmission from the NPP and offsite power feed to
the NPP. Such connections might buffer the plant from Grid voltage, frequency, and
power angle anomalies that currently trigger plant trips and inhibit reattachment of
the NPP to the Grid during Black Sky recovery operations. Opportunities may also
exist to enhance relay and switching technologies, and fault detection and
management technologies in the NPP’s switchyard and on the Grid. Such actions
could result in an NPP-Grid interface that is more robust, more reliable, and more
resilient for both normal operations and Black Sky Events – and NPPs that are more
capable of aiding in Grid recovery during Black Sky Events.
Recommendation 8 – The possibility of enabling existing NPPs to become Black
Start Units by providing assured onsite cranking power supplies and enhancing
their ability to match a dynamic load of the type expected in the initial states of a
Black Sky recovery should be explored. Innovative approaches such as providing
small onsite megawatt class reactors for cranking power (see Recommendation 5)
and changes such as those described In Recommendation 7 could enable existing
NPPs to become true Black Start Units capable of cranking other power plants and
“boot-strapping” the Grid during an ongoing Black Sky Event.
Recommendation 9 – The opportunity exists to optimize future reactors (megawatt
class reactors and Small Modular Reactors) to both avoid the Black Sky challenges
presented by current NPPs and offer Black Start capabilities not afforded by today’s
nuclear power fleet. Studies should be conducted to understand (a) the functional
requirements of a megawatt class reactor and its interface to an NPP that would
enable it to perform as an assured onsite auxiliary power supply or cranking power
supply for the NPP in the case of loss of offsite power; (b) the SMR design features
that would enable it to function as a Black Start Resource; and (c) the SMR siting
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considerations and SMR–Grid integration considerations that would maximize the
SMR’s contribution to Grid resiliency during routine and Black Sky conditions.
Every day, as we go about our lives, the nation’s nuclear power fleet quietly provides
enormous benefits to society. A Black Sky Event has the potential to disrupt life as we know
it. Can nuclear power be the key to protecting society from the ravages of Black Sky
Events?
We can and should move promptly to address this question.
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6 THE KEY ATTRIBUTES, FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND
DESIGN FEATURES OF RESILIENT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
(rNPPs)
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This chapter is based on the Accepted Manuscript of an article accepted for publication as
an Open Access document by Taylor & Francis in the American Nuclear Society’s journal,
Nuclear Technology. The Version of Record will be available online at
https://doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2018.1480213 .
This article focuses on future U.S. NPPs and Grid resilience, contains the product of
research Tasks 4 and 5, and presents the answers to Research Questions 3 and 4:
3. Concerning future resilient nuclear power plants (rNPPs): What performance
attributes and functional requirements might maximize their value as Grid resilience
assets?
4. Concerning future rNPPs: What design features might enable the identified rNPP
functional requirements?
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Chapter 6 Abstract

This paper builds on previous work that characterized the nature of the nuclear power
plant–electric Grid system, the concept of Grid resilience, and the potential of current U.S.
nuclear power plants (NPPs) to enhance U.S. Grid, integrated Critical Infrastructure, and
societal resilience. The concept of a “resilient nuclear power plant” or “rNPP” is defined.
Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP Functional Requirements are presented. A
preliminary discussion of some rNPP design features that could enable a nuclear power
plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional Requirements is presented, along with a
preliminary discussion of some rNPP regulatory, siting, and economic considerations.
Taken as a package, the Six rNPP Functional Requirements define an NPP performance
envelope that extends the societal value proposition of nuclear energy well beyond that of
traditional baseload electricity generation. The paper lays the foundation for exploration of
high-value rNPP applications and for future rNPP conceptual design studies.
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6.1

Introduction

Previous analyses of the response of current U.S. Generation II and II+ nuclear power
plants (NPPs) to major Grid anomalies [6.1–6.3], concluded that current U.S. NPPs do not
deliver the Grid resilience benefits nuclear power can and should provide. In those
analyses, the author introduced the concept of a “resilient nuclear power plant,” or “rNPP” –
a nuclear power plant intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a manner to
enhance the resilience of the U.S. national electricity supply system, or “Grid” – along with
Six rNPP Functional Requirements. This paper moves beyond the previous analyses to
provide a more detailed description of the Six rNPP Functional Requirements and a
preliminary assessment of rNPP design features that would enhance a plant’s ability to
achieve the Six rNPP Functional Requirements. Both the previous analyses and those
discussed in this paper are products of the multi-phase research effort depicted in Figure
6.1. This paper discusses the results of Tasks 4 and 5 in Figure 6.1.
Section 6.2 briefly reviews the definition of Grid resilience adopted by the author and
employed as the context for the analyses discussed here. Section 6.3 defines the concept
of an rNPP in terms of its purpose, and the two key attributes of rNPPs. Section 6.4
provides an in-depth discussion of the Six rNPP Functional Requirements – the
performance attributes that distinguish rNPPs from current U.S. nuclear power plants
(NPPs). Having defined the concept of an rNPP, Two rNPP Key Attributes, and the Six
rNPP Functional Requirements, Section 6.5 provides a preliminary characterization of some
the design features future rNPP designers might consider as avenues to achieving the Six
rNPP Functional Requirements. Section 6.6 briefly discusses three additional issues related
to rNPP development and deployment: potential regulatory barriers, rNPP siting
considerations, and rNPP cost and economic considerations. The main points of the paper
are summarized in Section 6.7.

6.2

Grid Resilience – A Working Definition

The Grid is the integrated network of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution
assets required to produce and deliver electricity to the end user. The Grid is arguably the
most critical of all U.S. physical infrastructures, because it is the infrastructure upon which
virtually every other civil infrastructure depends for the energy required to execute their
functions. Thus, Grid resilience is a matter of great importance from the energy security,
economic prosperity, homeland security, and national security perspectives [6.4].
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Figure 6.1 Grid Resilience and rNPP Conceptualization Process
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Despite its ubiquitous usage, the term “resilience,” as applied to the Grid, is one that is not
easily defined [6.4]. System resilience has been generically defined [6.5] as “the ability of a
system to withstand a change or a disruptive event by reducing the initial negative impacts
(absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them (adaptive capability), and by recovering
from them (restorative capability).”
The practical challenges of applying this definition to the Grid and to the analysis, operation,
and planning of Grid architectures have been previously discussed [6.3]. The author has
offered the following working definition of Grid resilience: “Electric Grid resilience is the
system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers given a specific
load prioritization hierarchy” [6.2, 6.3].

6.3

Resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs) Defined

Given the challenges associated with quantification of Grid resilience, it is useful to consider
qualitative approaches to understanding and enhancing Grid resilience – approaches that
focus on individual elements (generation, transmission, and distribution) of the Grid, and the
characteristics of generic resilience systems. With this in mind, a resilient nuclear power
plant has been defined as follows [6.2, 6.3]: “A resilient nuclear power plant (rNPP) is one
whose performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance electric Grid
resilience – the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.”
When combined with the generic definition of system resilience cited in Section 6.2, it is
clear rNPPs (and resilient power plants, or “rPPs” in general) must possess two rNPP Key
Attributes:
1. rNPP Key Attribute 1 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to absorb and adapt to a
broad spectrum of Grid anomalies and upsets.
2. rNPP Key Attribute 2 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to recover from upsets, and
to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s load
prioritization hierarchy.
rNPPs would be nuclear power plants that are intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and
operated in a manner to enhance electric Grid resilience.
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6.4

The Six Functional Requirements Of rNPPs

Given the foregoing discussion, what are the key functional requirements an rNPP must
meet in order to maximize its Grid resilience benefit – i.e., maximize the Grid’s ability to
absorb and adapt to major disruptions, and accelerate Grid recovery and restoration in the
wake of major Grid disruptions? The Six Functional Requirements of rNPPs are
summarized in Table 6.1 and discussed below. An NPP does not have to possess all six of
the rNPP Functional Requirements listed in Table 6.1 in order to provide Grid resilience
benefits. It is not an “all or nothing” proposition. But the degree to which an NPP does
provide Grid resilience benefits is directly related to the number of (and which specific)
rNPP Functional Requirements it exhibits, as well as the attributes of the Grid into which it
is interfaced. The Six rNPP Functional Requirements are currently articulated in qualitative
terms consistent with the immaturity of the rNPP concept. Quantification of the qualitative
descriptors employed here (e.g., “robust,” “flexible,” and “immunity”) will be a focus of future
work.

6.4.1 rNPP Functional Requirement 1 – Robust Real/Reactive Load-Following
And Flexible Operation Capability
The ability to meet widely varying and dynamic load (real and reactive power) demands
(e.g., from 100% power down to housekeeping loads) is a critical rNPP functionality.
Modern U.S. nuclear power plants were designed with some load-following and flexible
operation capability. However, they have traditionally operated in baseload mode. The
nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) of a typical Gen II Westinghouse pressurized water
reactor (PWR) was designed to provide the following operational capabilities:
1. 15 – 100% of rated power consistent with the cyclic nature of the utility system load
demand.
2. 10% of rated power and ramp changes of 5% of rated power per minute.
3. A daily load cycle of 12 hours at 100% power, decrease to 50% power over 3 hours,
6 hours at 50% power, and return to 100% power over three hours [6.6].
Load rejection capabilities of up to 100% load were available as a design option for many
U.S. plants at the time they were ordered. However, the absence of a compelling need at
the time, and the increased capital costs of providing such functionality, dissuaded most
plant purchasers from availing themselves of the option. The reality was that the provision
of load-following and flexible operating capability for both nuclear and non-nuclear
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Table 6.1 Six rNPP Functional Requirements

rNPP Functional Requirement

Relevant
Resilience
Characteristics

1. Robust real/reactive load-following and flexible
operation capability

Absorptive
Adaptive
Restorative

2. Immunity to damage from external events (including
Grid anomalies)

Absorptive
Adaptive

3. Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in
response to Grid anomalies

Absorptive
Adaptive

4. Ability to operate in Island Mode (i.e., without
connection to offsite transmission load and electric
power supply)

Adaptive
Restorative

5. Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling
capability (i.e., requiring no offsite power or resupply
of diesel fuel from offsite)

Adaptive
Restorative

6. Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e.,
the ability to start with no offsite power supply from
the Grid)

Restorative
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generating units was primarily a financial question given the technical approaches required
to achieve it, as well as the potential plant and component lifetime degradation issues
associated with it.
While only a few U.S. NPPs operate in a load-following mode (due to their electricity market
conditions), many European NPPs maneuver between 100% and 30% power over short
periods of time [6.7]. NPPs in Europe (where the share of nuclear power generation in
some countries’ electric Grids is higher than in the U.S.) do operate in more dynamic power
maneuvering regimes than do their U.S. counterparts. As is evident from Figure 6.2, nuclear
power plants in France frequently maneuver between 100 % and ~ 30% power over short
periods of time. German plants (Figure 6.3) routinely maneuver between 100% and ~ 50%
power over several-hour periods. In both cases, this operational flexibility is necessitated
by regional Grid and electricity market demands.
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), in its 2014 study of the options for
transitioning nuclear power plants to “flexible operation” [6.8], identified four key operational
characteristics of “flexible nuclear power plants”:
1. Rate – the rate at which a plant can change power levels over time.
2. Depth – the extent (% of full power) of a power reduction a plant can make while still
having the capability to return to the initial power level.
3. Duration – the length of time that a plant can maintain a given power level.
4. Frequency – the frequency of significant changes to a plant’s power levels.
While these four parameters may be a sufficiently complete set of flexible operational
characteristics for “normal” flexible operations, these four operational parameters (or rather
the values established for their required ranges) are almost certainly not sufficient to
characterize rNPP load-following operations during plant black start and Grid recovery
operations. For instance, during the early stages of Grid recovery operations, the potential
exists for real and reactive load swings at the terminals of the NPP’s generator that exceed
those deemed acceptable during normal plant operations. This is particularly the case if the
rNPP were being employed to crank another generating plant – an operation current U.S.
NPPs are not allowed to conduct. Thus, there is a need to distinguish between the real and
reactive power maneuvering capability for normal conditions and those an NPP would
encounter during early Grid recovery operations.
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Figure 6.2 Typical Électricité de France (EDF) NPP power maneuvering operations
(% of rated power vs. time) [6.7]
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Figure 6.3 Typical German NPP power maneuvering operations [6.7]
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6.4.2 rNPP Functional Requirement 2 – Immunity To Damage From External
Events
The rNPP must be capable of withstanding credible external (natural or man-made) events
that disrupt the electric Grid, without incurring significant damage itself, and the rNPP must
be capable of operating as required in the wake of such events to aid in Grid recovery and
restoration. There must be no credible “common mode” Grid–rNPP failure mechanisms.
A fundamental functional requirement of a resilient nuclear power plant is that it must be
available when the Grid needs it most. The rNPP cannot be vulnerable to being damaged
or rendered inoperable by the same external events that could damage the Grid and trigger
the need for the rNPP to power Grid recovery and restoration efforts. This calls for rNPPs to
be designed, sited, constructed, and operated in such a way that they are effectively
immune to credible natural hazards and malevolent human threats to the Grid and their
induced Grid anomalies – including external events of a type and/or magnitude outside the
design basis of current U.S. NPPs:
1. Seismic events (earthquakes and tsunamis).
2. Terrestrial weather events (including flooding).
3. Electromagnetic disturbances (both geomagnetic disturbances induced by space
weather and electromagnetic pulse attacks).
4. Cyber attacks.
This functional requirement might seem to be self-evident. However, from the practical
engineering standpoint, this functional requirement could well be the one that is most
difficult to achieve and/or to confirm that it has been achieved. The definition of “credible”
should be informed by lessons from decades of probabilistic safety and risk assessment
(PSA/PRA), and by realistic evaluation of the changing (or changed understanding of)
external risk and threat environments. For instance, evolving knowledge from ongoing solar
heliophysics studies indicates the probability of a coronal mass ejection and associated
geomagnetic disturbance of the magnitude of the 1859 “Carrington Event” is actually
greater than that of some external events commonly considered in the design basis of
existing commercial nuclear power plants [6.1]. The Carrington Event set telegraph
equipment afire across northern North America and Europe.
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6.4.3 rNPP Functional Requirement 3 – Ability To Avoid Plant Shutdown In
Response To Grid Anomalies
Avoidance of reactor trips and plant shutdowns triggered by external events is a key
functional capability of future rNPPs.
This functional requirement is closely related to rNPP Functional Requirements 1 and 2.
Nuclear power plants prefer to serve “high-quality” (stable real/reactive power) electric
loads, and to be served by “high-quality” (tightly controlled voltage and frequency) offsite
power supplies. Rapid and/or significant variations in either electric load served by the
plant, or offsite power supply quality to the plant, can result in reactor trips and plant
shutdowns in current nuclear power plants. Indeed, the typical U.S. NPP’s response to
major Grid anomalies is to “shut down and wait“ until the Grid is energized and real/reactive
power flows (loads) are stabilized [6.3]. Only then are efforts made to restart the NPP.
The “shutdown and wait” response has potentially negative consequences both for Grid
resilience and for NPP safety. If the plant shutdown is an artifact of load variations, isolating
the plant from the Grid may actually exacerbate the problem at the Grid level by removing
generating capacity precisely at the time it is needed to stabilize and restore the Grid. This
concern over the potential for an NPP shutdown to worsen an already difficult situation is
one reason system operators are reluctant to place NPPs back in service until late in the
Grid restoration process. This concern is heightened in systems where nuclear generating
capacity makes up a significant fraction of overall system generating capacity. In addition,
shutting down the NPP in response to Grid anomalies transitions the plant to shutdown
cooling at a time when no one can know how long the Grid will be compromised and how
long shutdown cooling must be maintained without the aid of offsite power. Finally, the need
to maneuver through a series of “Limiting Conditions for Operation” or “LCOs” [6.1, 6.3]
would almost certainly undermine the ability to rapidly restart NPPs that have tripped due to
Grid anomalies – thus further undermining their ability to serve as Grid recovery assets.

6.4.4 rNPP Functional Requirement 4 – Ability To Operate In Island Mode
The ability to operate for extended periods in an “Island Mode” is a key functional capability
of future rNPPs.
Island Mode operation is an operating mode in which the nuclear power plant is isolated
from the Grid (both load and offsite power supply), and operating at a power level sufficient
to meet all of its housekeeping loads. It is essentially in a “hot spinning reserve” state, ready
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to reconnect to the Grid. An rNPP could theoretically enter Island Mode by either of two
paths (1) automatic or manual transition to Island Mode directly from its normal power
generation mode; or (2) by restarting into Island Mode following plant shutdown:
1. Transition To Island Mode From Normal Power Operations – In the absence of
advance warning of the need to transition to Island Mode operations from normal
power operations, the rNPP must be capable of detecting anomalies in the load it is
serving and its offsite power supply, and distinguishing between those it can tolerate
(with its enhanced load-following capability) and those it cannot tolerate. This
detection and discrimination would have to occur extremely quickly if the transition is
to be performed automatically. Conversely, manual transition to Island Mode
operations would likely require that the system operators and rNPP operators have
advance warning of the need to transition to Island Mode. In either case, the first
step in the process is to isolate the rNPP from the Grid (load and offsite power
supply) coincident with a power cutback.
2. Transition To Island Mode From Shutdown Configuration – The rNPP’s reactor must
be capable of restarting (cranking) in order to achieve Island Mode operation if the
reactor trips in response to the Grid anomaly. Offsite power would be available to
crank the plant if the transition to Island Mode is executed in advance of an
anticipated Grid anomaly. However, it is likely offsite power would not be available
to crank the plant if the transition is occurring in direct response to a real-time Grid
anomaly. The ability to restart the plant and achieve Island Mode operations in such
cases would depend on whether the plant had its own self-cranking capability (rNPP
Functional Requirement 6).
Conventional large NPPs comprised of GWe-class reactors would probably have difficulty
achieving and sustaining Island Mode operation since such operations require the reactor
to idle at power levels only a few-to-several percent of its rated power level. On the other
hand, large NPPs comprised of multiple “small” (e.g., < 300 MWe) reactors, and MWe-class
reactors would probably have less difficulty providing this functionality because their NPP
housekeeping loads could be met by a single reactor module operating within its normal
power generation levels, feeding power to the other modules. It is also technically possible
(though unlikely from the economic perspective) that MWe-class reactors could be colocated with the rNPP to operate in Island Mode as dedicated rNPP cranking and shutdown
cooling power sources.
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6.4.5 rNPP Functional Requirement 5 – Unlimited Independent Shutdown
Cooling
The ability to meet all shutdown cooling requirements indefinitely without reliance on offsite
power or other assistance is an essential functional capability of rNPPs.
Unlike other forms of electric generating plants, nuclear power plants cannot be completely
“turned off”. Subsequent to shutdown, nuclear reactors continue to produce decay heat and
therefore continue to require some form of cooling to maintain adequate heat removal. For
example, nuclear fuel still produces ~ 1% of its original operating power two hours after
shutdown. The decay power level drops to ~ 0.4% three days after shutdown, ~ 0.3%
seven days after shutdown, and ~0.04-0.05% six months after shutdown. The timedependent shutdown decay power produced depends on factors such as the original
operating power level, time at power, reactor fuel composition, fuel burnup, etc. Figure 6.4
depicts a typical decay power curve for a nominal 1 GWe (~ 3000 MWt) nuclear power
plant. The core of a 1 GWe commercial nuclear reactor still produces ~ 2-3 MWt of power
three months after the reactor has shut down. Thus, in the absence of forced cooling, a
reactor of this size, depressurized to 1 atm pressure, would boil off (and would need a
supply of) 3200-5000 kg/h or ~830-1320 gallons/h of water to remove this much energy.
This decay heat is produced whether the fuel is in the reactor or in the plant’s spent fuel
pool, and must be removed (in current reactors) by pumping cooling water through the core
of the reactor and/or spent fuel pool. This function is provided in current plants by
electrically-driven, direct diesel-driven, or steam-driven pumps – the latter only functional so
long as the reactor system is pressurized. The power for the electrically-driven cooling
systems is supplied from the Grid under normal circumstances. NPPs typically rely on
onsite diesel-driven generator systems to supply backup power in the event offsite AC
power isn’t available. All diesel-driven approaches depend on the continued availability of
diesel fuel.
Nuclear power plants have made great strides in their ability to deal with a wide range of
external events and maintain safe shutdown cooling for long periods of time. Still, the
industry’s current FLEX procedures ultimately depend upon the provision of offsite support
(diesel fuel, equipment, power, etc.) to maintain safe shutdown cooling for events involving
extended loss of AC power (ELAP) [6.9]. As a result, NPPs are priority or “critical” loads
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Figure 6.4 Approximate shutdown cooling requirements for a 1 GWe/3000 MWt
nuclear power plant.
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Grid operators must meet during system restoration activities before other loads can be
served. Thus, today’s NPPs actually present a burden on – rather than an asset to – Grid
operators during system restoration activities. The development nuclear power plants that
do not pose a burden on the electric Grid in the case of a major Grid disruption, would be a
major step along the way to rNPPs. rNPP Functional Requirement 5 addresses this need.

6.4.6 rNPP Functional Requirement 6 – Self-Cranking Black Start Capability
The ability to start without reliance on offsite power (e.g., the ability to self-crank) would be
a transformational capability of future rNPPs.
Many potential threats and hazards to Grid resilience could result in a Grid that is fractured
into dark (de-energized) Grid “islands” [6.10]. The electric power industry has prepared for
such circumstances through its provision of “Black Start Resources” (generating plants) that
have the ability to start/restart with no offsite power support.
The normal electric Grid recovery scenario (Figure 6.5) is a classic “bootstrap” procedure in
which small (typically < 50 MWe) gas turbine and hydro black start plants crank larger
plants. Once started, these larger plants crank even larger steam cycle plants in a carefully
choreographed procedure designed to rebuild and synchronize blocks of stable load and
electrical generation until normal Grid operation is restored.
Today’s nuclear power plants play no supportive role in the early stages of Grid recovery.
NPPs are typically among the first plants to drop off the Grid, and the last plants to return to
service in response to major Grid disruptions. This behavior is an artifact of several plant
and Grid characteristics:
1. The NPP size and its resultant need for large blocks of stable load and transmission
line capacity.
2. The plant’s limited load-following capability.
3. The plant’s Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and associated time required
for plant restart.
4. The plant’s need for high-quality offsite power.
5. The large cranking power requirements (typically a few tens of MWe) for GWe-class
NPPs.
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Figure 6.5 Current Grid Black Start Recovery Approach
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rNPP Functional Requirement 6 would be enabled by (1) achieving very small cranking
power requirements and (2) providing those cranking power requirements from secure and
reliable onsite power sources that have no common-cause failure modes with offsite power
sources. The smaller the cranking power requirements, the more options exist for providing
that cranking power. Both traditional cranking power sources, such as onsite diesel
generators and gas/oil fired turbines, and non-traditional renewable energy sources are
viable candidates if the NPP’s cranking power requirements are sufficiently small. Nontraditional cranking power sources could include co-located utility-scale battery storage
systems, compressed air energy storage systems, solar photovoltaic systems, and fuel
cells – and as noted, even dedicated MWe-class reactors.

6.5

Potentially Enabling rNPP Design Features

The design of a nuclear power plant is, like that of any complex system, an exercise in
multi-parameter optimization (trade-offs and compromises) in an environment rich in
requirements, desires, and constraints. Each design feature must be assessed in terms of
its impact on plant safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, lifetime, cost/economics,
and a host of other factors. The expansion of the NPP design exercise to encompass new
rNPP and electric Grid resilience goals adds another dimension to this endeavor.
The rNPP functional requirements defined in Section 6.4 are technology-neutral. Designers
of future rNPPs would logically evaluate every system architecture and technology selection
decision in terms of its impact on the ability of the plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional
Requirements while still meeting the plant’s traditional functional requirements.
Table 6.2 presents a preliminary list of some NPP design features that impact the NPP’s
ability to achieve the six rNPP functionalities. Many of these design features summarized in
Table 6.2 are relevant to rNPP’s that are employed strictly for electricity generation, as well
as rNPPs that are employed for combined heat and power generation. Plant architecture
and technology decisions are obviously interdependent rNPP design issues. Each design
“trade” decision would be accompanied by its own plant performance and cost implications.
The intent of this section is simply to demonstrate there is a design “trade space” available
to rNPP plant designers. Detailed definition and examination of each of these options is a
topic for future work. The rNPP design features are discussed from the “outside-in” or “Gridto-fission” perspective, consistent with the use-inspired philosophy that underpins the rNPP
concept.
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Table 6.2 Potential enabling rNPP design features

Potentially Enabling
rNPP Design
Features

Impact

*Enables
rNPP
Functional
Requirement
#

1. DC-DC or VFT NPP
interface with Grid

•

Buffers rNPP from Grid
transmission load and offsite
power quality anomalies

1–3

2. High-capacity load
switching and heat
rejection

•

Substitutes alternate thermal or
electrical load in case of Gridbased loss of load events

1–4

3. Multi-module
(reactor) NPP
architecture

•

Enables one operating reactor
module to supply shutdown
cooling and housekeeping
electrical loads to other rNPP
reactor modules
Enables one reactor module to
crank other reactor modules in
rNPP

4–6

•

4. Small reactor
(module) size

•

•
•

5. Adaptive turbinegenerator systems

•

Reduces cranking power
requirements of individual
reactor modules in rNPP
Enables non-traditional cranking
power supplies for rNPP
Reduces individual reactor
module shutdown heat removal
and housekeeping electrical
loads.

1, 3–6

Enhances rNPPs load-following
and flexible operation capability

1–3
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Table 6.2 Potential enabling rNPP design features (continued)

Potentially Enabling
rNPP Design Features

Impact

*Enables
rNPP
Functional
Requirement #

6. Passive shutdown
cooling

•

Eliminates dependence of rNPP
on consumable onsite resources
and offsite assistance to
maintain safe shutdown state

5

7. Inherent reactor
system energy
storage capacity

•

Buffers rNPP and individual
rNPP reactor modules from
electrical (transmission system)
load transients

1–4

8. Optimized reactor
core physics design

•

Enables rapid rNPP reactor
module power maneuvering and
restart across entire fuel cycle

1–4, 6

9. Robust nuclear fuels

•

Increases rNPP reactor
module’s power maneuvering
capability

10. Plant electrical,
instrumentation and
control (I&C), and
computer
technologies that
are resilient in face
of GMD, EMP and
cyber attack

•

Enables rNPP to avoid damage
and continue to function in event
of GMD, EMP, or cyber attack

*1 –
2–
3–
4–
5–
6–

1–5

Flexible Operation/Robust Load-Following Capability
Immunity To Damage From External Events
Ability To Avoid Plant Shutdown In Response To Grid Anomalies
Ability To Operate In Island Mode
Unlimited Independent Shutdown Cooling
Self-Cranking Black Start Capability
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6.5.1 DC-DC NPP–Grid Interfaces
The resilience value of an rNPP is not only a function of the rNPP itself. Its value as a Grid
resilience asset is also a function of the manner in which the rNPP is sited and interfaced
with the Grid and the world outside the plant boundary. rNPP Functionalities 1, 2, and 3
would all be enabled by designing rNPPs with the capability to buffer the NPP from and
moderate the coupling of Grid anomalies (transmission load and offsite power quality) into
the NPP. How might this be accomplished?
The U.S. Grid consists of three Interconnections (Eastern, Western, and the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas) that are connected via direct current (DC-DC) interties and
variable frequency transformer (VFT)-based interties. Among other things, this intertie
technology decouples Grid frequency and voltage anomalies in one Grid Interconnection
from the other. This same principle could be employed to accomplish similar goals for an
rNPP and the Grid it serves. DC-DC bridges or VFT bridges (rather than traditional AC-AC
interfaces) could be employed in the plant’s switchyard. This approach would buffer the
rNPP from offsite transmission system and offsite power system voltage and frequency
transients the plant might not otherwise be capable of tolerating. Depending on the manner
in which they are implemented, the use of DC-DC and VFT rNPP-Grid interfaces could
require or enable extensive redesign of many of the plant’s electrical systems. While there
is a natural tendency to view this as a negative factor, it could also be viewed as an
opportunity to rethink and improve some aspects of the nuclear power plant’s overall
electrical design. Thus, it is difficult to assess the impact of this plant interface approach on
overall performance and cost until (at least) preconceptual rNPP electrical system designs
are developed.

6.5.2 Substitution/Switching Of High-Capacity Load And Heat Rejection
The ability of a power plant to substitute an alternate thermal or electrical load when
confronted with a loss of load event would reduce the severity of reactor power maneuvers
required to cope with such events. This concept is, of course, the basis for the incorporation
of robust turbine bypass and high-capacity main steam condenser systems in existing
commercial PWRs. Current PWRs also dump steam directly to the atmosphere via special
main steam relief values during reactor startup and plant trips. However, neither of these
systems is designed for sustained continuous operation at high power [6.8]. rNPP
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designers could expand the use of this load switching concept to enable rNPPs to avoid
reactor scram and continue to operate at relatively high power levels (whether connected to
the Grid or in Island Mode) in the face of extreme load anomalies.
One approach to achieve this functionality would be to utilize high-capacity turbine
bypass/condenser systems and main steam dump systems designed for high-capacity,
sustained, and continuous operation. While the use of large steam bypass/condenser
systems moderate the reactor power ramp rate and cutback power levels required to cope
with load rejections, the use of large condensers can actually complicate the attainment of
stable (low reactor power) Island Mode operation. Large condenser systems are subject to
unstable condenser behavior when operated at low powers, along with the accompanying
thermomechanical stresses and associated risk of accelerated equipment aging. This issue
would be a design consideration both for large reactors coupled to large condensers, and
clusters of small reactors coupled to a common large condenser. However, multiple
reactor/condenser configurations are possible:
1. Several reactors coupled to a single large condenser.
2. One reactor coupled to one condenser.
3. Hybrid configurations in which one housekeeping reactor module is coupled to its
own condenser while the remaining reactor modules share common (large)
condensers.
Detailed design studies would, of course, be required in order to understand the
performance (real time and life time) tradeoffs of different reactor/condenser configurations.
Any realized performance benefits would come with the cost implications of foregoing the
economies of scale associated with large condensers.
Another option would be to incorporate some form of electric load dump for some portion of
the load. This concept of course underlies the use of pumped storage hydroelectricity,
electric-driven flywheel storage systems, etc. However, it is difficult to envision how such
systems could be acceptably interfaced to the rNPP from both the technical and economic
perspectives.
rNPPs that are employed for combined electricity and process heat production or as
elements of “hybrid energy systems” could be designed with the ability to dynamically
allocate electricity and process heat loads (or thermal energy storage [6.11]) in the event of
Grid load disruptions – presuming their process heat customers could tolerate such
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operations. The insertion of shared multi-reactor thermal energy storage reservoirs between
the reactors and their power conversion systems, or between an rNPP employed for
process heat generation and its process heat transmission/distribution system, would buffer
the reactor system from variations in process heat demand, and serve as a process heat
collection point for multi-reactor plant configurations. Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s
incorporation of a shared thermal energy reservoir for collection and storage of the thermal
output in its multi-unit SmAHTR plant concept is an example of the later approach [6.12].

6.5.3 Multi-Module (Reactor) NPP System Architecture
The use of multiple reactor modules to achieve the rNPP “nameplate” electrical generating
capacity (rNPP Design Feature 3 in Table 6.2) is perhaps the single most enabling design
feature of an rNPP. This approach is incorporated in NPP designs currently proposed by
NuScale Power [6.13]. Modularity potentially enables attainment of several rNPP
Functional Requirements. Individual reactor modules in an rNPP could conceivably be
powered up and down to enhance the plant’s overall load-following capability (rNPP
Functional Requirement 1). The multi-module plant design architecture would also enable
one reactor module (when coupled with the necessary electrical system design features) to
supply housekeeping and shutdown cooling power to other reactor modules in the rNPP –
thus enabling Island Mode operations and enhancing shutdown decay heat removal
functionality (rNPP Functional Requirements 4 and 5). Such a design would also enable
one reactor module to supply cranking power to other reactor modules (rNPP Functional
Requirement 6). Additionally, the use of multi-reactor modules reduces the size of the
cranking power supply required to restart the entire rNPP by limiting it to that needed to
crank one reactor module (also enabling attainment of rNPP Functional Requirement 6).
Finally, the use of multiple (smaller) reactor modules potentially reduces the plant’s accident
source term for certain types of accidents. NuScale Power has already sought (and been
granted) some regulatory relief from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) based
in part on this multi-reactor/multi-module design feature [6.13–6.15].

6.5.4 Small Reactor (Module) Size
The use of small (less than ~ 1 GWt) reactors in each rNPP reactor module (rNPP Enabling
Design Feature 4 in Table 6.2) enables attainment of multiple rNPP Functional
Requirements. Small reactor size would enable a single reactor module in a multi-module
rNPP to operate at near-normal power levels while supplying housekeeping loads for the
other reactor modules – potentially enabling Island Mode operations (rNPP Functional
Requirement 4). rNPP Functional Requirement 5 is enabled by reducing the shutdown
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decay heat removal demands of individual modules – preferably to levels achievable with
inherently passive cooling approaches. The cranking power requirement for a small (~ 200
MWt) light water-cooled reactor concept could be as low as 1-3 MWe [6.16]. As previously
discussed, such low cranking power requirements would enable the rNPP to utilize both
large diesel generators and non-traditional cranking and shutdown cooling power supplies.

6.5.5 Adaptive Turbine-Generator Systems
Despite not being located in the plant’s switchyard, the terminals of the rNPP’s generator
are in many respects the plant’s principle interface to the Grid. The use of “adaptive”
turbine-generator systems (rNPP Enabling Design Feature 5 in Table 6.2) having a robust
ability to tolerate Grid voltage, frequency, and reactive power anomalies would enhance a
plant’s ability to load follow, avoid damage in response to Grid anomalies, avoid reactor
scram (rNPP Functional Requirements 1–3), and enable the use of the rNPP as a black
start resource presuming rNPP Functional Requirement 6 is met. This approach would
require a rethinking of NPP turbine-generator system design – the physical and electrical
design of turbines and generators, Turbine-Governor Control (TGC) schemes, Grid
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) schemes, etc. Such systems would require enhanced
MVAR flexibility to deal with real/reactive power swings, and to reduce their susceptibility to
self-excitation – a particular risk should plants be employed as black start units or energy
resources during the early stages of Grid recovery and restoration in the wake of major Grid
anomalies.

6.5.6 Passive Shutdown Cooling
Passive shutdown cooling (rNPP Design Feature 6 in Table 6.2) reduces individual reactor
and overall NPP shutdown cooling power requirements. This directly impacts the plant’s
ability to achieve rNPP Functional Requirement 5 (Unlimited Independent Shutdown
Cooling Capability). As noted in Section 6.4, NPPs are currently considered priority loads
during the early stages of Grid recovery operations. The incorporation of reliable passive
shutdown cooling would reduce the urgency with which offsite power must be restored to
the NPPs in Grid de-energization events. This would, in turn, enable Grid operators to focus
more attention and resources on gaining situational awareness and damage assessment
during the earliest stage of Grid recovery operations.

6.5.7 Inherent Reactor System Energy Storage Capacity
The inherent energy storage capacity (i.e. bulk heat capacity) of the reactor’s primary
coolant system (nuclear steam supply system in traditional Rankine cycle power NPPs) and
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the associated system thermal inertia have a significant influence on the reactor system’s
dynamic response to load transients. Higher bulk heat capacity and thermal inertial buffers
the reactor from load variations by slowing the thermodynamic response of the primary
coolant system to load changes. These features enhance the dynamic stability of a reactor
system and reduce the severity of the safety challenge posed by operating transients and
accidents. These features, coupled with the reactor’s intrinsic reactivity feedback
characteristics and the actions of the reactor power control system, have a dominant impact
on the reactor’s rapid power maneuvering capability. Thus, the thermal design and the
neutronic/core physics design of the reactor system are tightly coupled. Many of the
attractive behavioral attributes of graphite reactors, liquid-metal cooled reactors, and liquid
salt/molten salt reactors are artifacts of their high primary cooling system heat capacity and
thermal inertia.
The inherent heat capacity and thermal inertia of the reactor’s primary coolant system are
(for a single phase system) functions of the specific heat and thermal conductivity of the
materials of construction and the mass of the system. These factors are, in turn, dictated by
several related primary coolant system design features:
1. System architecture (volume in particular).
2. Choice of reactor fuel, coolant/working fluid and structural materials.
3. The reactor’s thermodynamic operating state (temperature/pressure/phase).
These design choices also drive pumping power requirements (and therefore cranking and
housekeeping loads), system heatup and cool down rate capabilities (plant startup
behavior), and other plant operational characteristics. All of these design choices impact the
plant’s ability to achieve rNPP Functional Requirements 1–4. Of course high system heat
capacity and thermal inertia generally translate to higher system cost because the attributes
are a function of the size and mass of the primary coolant and reactor system.

6.5.8 Optimized Reactor Core Physics Design
An rNPP should have robust flexible operation and load-following capability, Island Mode
Operation capability, and start/restart capability throughout its entire fuel cycle from reload
to reload in order to achieve rNPP Functional Requirements 1–4 and 6. Provision of these
functionalities near the end of a fuel reload cycle (when core excess reactivity is low) would
be a design challenge. These functionalities could be enabled by reactivity control
strategies involving various combinations of fission spectrum, physical dimensions, lattice
pitch (in solid fuel designs), fuel enrichment, reactivity feedback coefficients, and fixed
burnable and soluble neutron absorbers (neutron poisons). As previously stated, these
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design decisions must be made in concert with decisions that impact the reactor systems
inherent energy storage capacity and thermal inertia.

6.5.9 Robust Nuclear Fuels
Robust nuclear fuels (from the thermomechanical and chemical perspectives) would
enhance the rNPPs load-following capability during normal operation, enable rapid power
ramping and transition into Island Mode operations, and facilitate prompt reactor restart in
the event of plant shutdowns. Nuclear fuels with these characteristics would directly enable
rNPP Functional Requirements 1–5. Much of the work currently underway in the federal and
private sectors to develop “Accident Tolerant Fuels” for light water reactors [6.17, 6.18] is
directly applicable to this requirement.

6.5.10 Plant Electric, Instrumentation And Control (I&C), And Computer
Technologies That Are Resilient In Face of GMD, EMP, And Cyber Attack
Extreme naturally occurring GMDs (such as the 1859 Carrington Event), along with EMP
attacks and cyber attacks, would present special challenges to all U.S. Critical
Infrastructure – especially the Grid. The ability of an rNPP to survive and continue to
function in the wake of such events would enable the plant to serve as the foundation for
recovery and restoration of regional Grid and Critical Infrastructure functionality during
circumstances the nation has never before confronted. Thus the adoption of rNPP and
rNPP–Grid interface technologies that are resilient in the face of extreme GMD events,
EMP attacks, and cyber attacks would greatly magnify the rNPP’s value to society.

6.6

Realization Of rNPPs – Other Critical Considerations

Work to date on the rNPP concept has focused on identification and characterization of
rNPP Key Attributes; high level rNPP functional requirements; and identification of relevant
and enabling rNPP system architectures, components, and technologies. Other critical
issues such as rNPP regulatory barriers, siting considerations, and economics are also
important determinants of overall rNPP viability. Although detailed evaluations of these
issues cannot proceed until (at least preconceptual) rNPP designs are available, a few
initial observations are evident.

6.6.1 rNPPs And The U.S. Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework
The development and deployment of rNPPs will take place in the context of evolving
nuclear safety regulatory frameworks. One immediate question that arises is, “How
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compatible are the rNPP Functional Requirements proposed in Section 6.4 with the existing
U.S. NRC regulatory framework?”
The Six rNPP Functional Requirements and the enabling rNPP design features discussed
earlier present some obvious points of tension/conflict with the sixty-four General Design
Criteria (GDCs) in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A [6.19] and the manner in which these GDCs are
currently implemented via various regulatory guidelines and standards. It is clear departures
from traditional design approaches for executing various rNPP safety functions will be both
required and justified in some instances.
One obvious area of regulatory tension will stem from GDC-17, entitled “Electric Power
Systems”. GDC-17 defines the high-level functional requirements and the system
architecture all U.S. NPP’s electrical power systems must meet. The requirements of GDC17 are implemented via U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.32 [6.20], IEEE Standard 308-2012,
“Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” [6.21], and
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.93 [6.22]. Briefly summarized, GDC-17 mandates that each NPP
must have both an onsite and offsite power supply to permit functioning of all structures,
systems, and components required to assure (1) acceptable fuel design limits and design
conditions for the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of
anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) the core is adequately cooled and containment
integrity along with other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
Island Mode operations, shutdown cooling, and self-cranking during a “dark-Grid” condition
would all require the rNPP to operate in the absence of any offsite power supply. However,
an rNPP possessing independent shutdown cooling capability, Island Mode operation
capability, and self-cranking capability could not operate in those modes in the U.S. today
because such operation would violate current offsite power mandates stemming from GDC17. Thus, achievement of rNPP Functional Requirements 4 (Island Mode Capability), 5
(Unlimited Independent Shutdown Cooling Capability), and 6 (Self-Cranking Capability)
would all be impeded by the current wording of GDC-17 and its associated implementation
practices.
It is anticipated that rNPPs would not require offsite power in order to successfully execute
any required safety function, so an exemption from offsite power requirements stemming
from GDC-17 would be justified. Indeed, the U.S. NRC recently granted NuScale Power’s
request for exemption from the Class 1E electrical system requirements emanating from
GDC-17 [6.23–6.25]. That waiver is specific to NuScale Power and not a general
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modification of the regulatory requirements arising from GDC-17. However, the NRC’s
willingness to grant NuScale’s request demonstrates their willingness to depart from
traditional interpretations of GDC requirements when plant design and performance
features justify such actions.
The operating characteristics of future rNPPs would probably also justify either exemptions
from, or modification of regulatory requirements originating from other GDCs – or at least
the traditional interpretation and implementation of the GDCs. In any case, it is evident the
operational characteristics and functional capabilities of rNPPs should enable some
simplification of the current U.S. nuclear power plant General Design Criteria and the
associated U.S. commercial nuclear power regulatory framework.

6.6.2 rNPP Siting Considerations
Siting flexibility is an important consideration for rNPPs because much of their potential
utility and value depends on the ability to site them at optimal locations within the Grid (i.e.,
in close proximity to existing transmission line corridors and/or other Critical Infrastructure).
An rNPP that could meet the Six rNPP Functional Requirements discussed in Section 6.4
would differ from current NPPs in ways that should expand rNPP siting options.
rNPPs will not require offsite power to maintain fuel integrity and safe shutdown status
(reactor and spent fuel pool cooling), thereby reducing or eliminating the requirement for
offsite power supplies and, at least theoretically, reducing the contribution to overall core
damage probability from such accidents. As noted above, by granting NuScale Power’s
recent request for exemption from normal Class 1E electrical power system requirements,
the NRC has signaled its willingness to eliminate this requirement when the plant’s design
merits such action. Thus, all else being equal, risk-based siting practices should broaden
the siting opportunities for rNPPs.
rNPPs that employ multiple small reactor modules might benefit from three siting
advantages:
1. Smaller emergency planning zones (EPZs) – The accident source term for any
individual reactor is reduced due to its smaller unit size. The manner in which this
impacts overall accident source terms and plant safety risk profiles will be a designspecific factor related to reactor size, operational interdependence/independence of
the reactor units, containment design, and a number of other detailed design
considerations. Here again, NuScale Power’s request to reduce the emergency
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planning zone (EPZ) for their multi-module SMR plant is a pathfinder activity directly
relevant to rNPPs [6.13–6.15].
2. Reduced need for cooling water for rNPPs that employ “dry” or other non-traditional
heat rejection techniques. Geographic proximity to major estuaries and reservoirs
would be a less dominant siting criterion in such cases.
3. Decreased vulnerability to some natural hazards and man-made malevolent threats
as a result of below-grade and underground siting enabled by the smaller physical
size of individual rNPP reactor modules.

6.6.3 rNPP Economics
Many will assume the rNPP functionalities in Section 6.4 and the design approaches
identified in Section 6.5 will render the plants too expensive to build and uneconomical to
operate. This may indeed be the case. But economics of rNPPs will be a function of both
their cost (capital, operating, etc.) and the monetized value (energy, capacity, reliability,
resilience) they provide. rNPPs are envisioned as elements of a “Future Grid” in which a
power plant’s Grid resilience contribution is monetized and compensated in some manner.
Expansion of nuclear power’s value proposition – from simply supplying baseload electricity
to enhancing Grid resilience – is a significant expansion in nuclear power plant
performance. History suggests that system performance and system capital costs are not
independent parameters. Whether it’s home appliances, automobiles, aerospace vehicles,
or nuclear power plants – higher performance systems are often accompanied by higher
system complexity and higher capital cost. Offsetting this reality is the possibility the Six
rNPP Functional Requirements and their resultant performance attributes, combined with
creative rNPP design approaches, may enable rNPP designers to simplify or eliminate
some current systems and components. The elimination of Class 1E electrical systems is
one example. Additionally, the likely use of multiple small reactor modules should facilitate
factory fabrication of some components and systems. Some cost savings could also
accrue via innovative rNPP field construction techniques.
With regard to operating expenses, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), published an analysis of impacts of load-following on existing
nuclear power plants [6.7] which concluded: “Generally speaking… the operation in the
load-following mode does not lead to any large additional costs attributable to it…
especially for recent power plants. However, there is some influence of the load-following
on the ageing of some operational components (e.g., valves), and one can expect a slight
increase of the maintenance costs.”
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This OECD conclusion relates primarily to rNPP Functional Requirement 1 (Robust
Real/Reactive Load-Following and Flexible Operation Capability) and conceivably to rNPP
Functional Requirement 4 (Island Mode Operations) for “evolutionary” rNPP concepts
employing incremental changes in the current commercial light water reactor technology
suite. The OECD analysis is limited in that it addresses only one element of overall plant
operating and maintenance costs. It is unclear how the OECD’s observations might apply
to future rNPPs.
Today’s commercial power reactors and future rNPPs must perform in demanding real-time
economic environments in which plant costs are tangible, while the benefits and value
stream produced by the plants is only partially monetized. The revenue stream of current
U.S. nuclear power plants is derived from their baseload electricity generation. Recent
activities within and between the Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, and the private sector [6.26–6.28] have heightened awareness of NPPs’
capacity, reliability, and Grid resilience contributions – as well as catalyzed a dialog
regarding the societal value of and appropriate mechanisms for monetizing these
contributions. Thus, resolution of rNPP economic viability questions ultimately rests on the
characteristics of the future electricity markets served by the rNPPs.

6.7

Summary

The nature of the NPP–electric Grid system; the concept of Grid resilience; and the
potential of current U.S. nuclear power plants to enhance U.S. Grid, integrated Critical
Infrastructure, and societal resilience have been explored in previous analyses [6.1–6.3].
This paper builds upon that foundation to provide a preliminary technical definition of rNPPs
– nuclear power plants that are intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a
manner to enhance Grid resilience.
rNPPs would possess two essential attributes: (1) they would enable the Grid to absorb and
adapt to a broad spectrum of Grid anomalies and upsets; and (2) they would enhance the
Grid’s ability to quickly recover from upsets to restore electric service in a manner
consistent with the system operator’s load prioritization hierarchy. Six qualitative rNPP
Functional Requirements have been defined. The integrated package of Six rNPP
Functional Requirements would enable a future plant to provide value to the Grid and to
society well beyond that associated with today’s baseload electricity production. However,
the package of Six rNPP Functional Requirements are not an “all or nothing” prospect.
Future NPPs do not have to achieve all six of the functional requirements in order to deliver
significant Grid resilience benefits. The Grid resilience value of a specific NPP would
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depend both upon which of the Six rNPP Functional Requirements it achieves, and the
characteristics of the Grid into which it is embedded.
rNPPs are not technically out of reach in the first half of the 21st century. Several rNPP
plant, system, and component design features with the potential to enable plants to achieve
the Six rNPP Functional Requirements have been identified and characterized in a
preliminary manner. While issues related to rNPP regulatory barriers, siting, and economics
have been addressed in a superficial manner, detailed evaluation of these issues can only
proceed in concert with rNPP conceptual design activities.
Admiral Hyman Rickover famously contrasted “Academic Reactors” and “Practical
Reactors” in his 1953 memorandum [6.29]. Advocates of new reactor concepts such as
rNPPs ignore Rickover’s analysis to their own peril. On the other hand, skeptics unwisely
persist in employing Rickover’s analysis as an antidote to innovation in the face of changing
realities. The last quarter of the 20th century and the first quarter of the 21st century have
hosted a number of events and developments that ended two “nuclear renaissances”.
Deregulation of electricity markets, fracking and inexpensive natural gas, the accident at
Fukushima, the wind and solar energy revolution, and cost overruns at the latest U.S.
commercial nuclear power plant construction projects are among the factors that have led
many to question the future of nuclear power and its value to society. These developments
suggest the value proposition of nuclear energy must improve in the 21st century if it is to
remain a major source of electricity throughout the world. rNPPs would enhance electric
Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience in a world inhabited by a plethora of
natural hazards and malevolent human threats. That is a value proposition worthy of
consideration.
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7 ENHANCING ELECTRIC GRID, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE,
AND SOCIETAL RESILIENCE WITH RESILIENT NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS (rNPPs)
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This chapter is based on the Author’s Original Manuscript of a paper that has been
submitted to the American Nuclear Society’s journal Nuclear Technology and is currently
under peer review.
This paper describes four resilience-enhancing applications of future U.S. rNPPs, contains
the product of research Task 6, and presents the answers to Research Question 5:
Concerning future rNPPs and the Grid they will serve: What specific applications of
rNPPs might enhance their overall contribution to electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure,
and societal resilience?
The paper is presented here without revisions to the author’s manuscript other than those
required to conform to UTK dissertation format and style requirements.
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Chapter 7 Abstract

This paper is the fourth in a series detailing the results of a study conducted to explore the
role current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants play, and the role a new type of nuclear
power plant – a resilient nuclear power plant or “rNPP” – could play, in enhancing U.S.
electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience. An rNPP is a nuclear power
plant intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a manner to enhance Grid
resilience. Four specific rNPP applications are discussed: (1) rNPPs as “flexible operations”
electricity generation assets, (2) rNPPs as anchors of nuclear hybrid energy systems, (3)
rNPPs as Grid Black Start Resources, and (4) rNPPs as anchors of Resilient Critical
Infrastructure Islands. These four applications, individually and collectively, could enhance
U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience during normal day-to-day
operations, and in the wake of major national disasters stemming from natural phenomena
and/or malevolent human actions. rNPPs would be both tactical and strategic resilience
assets – thereby extending the value proposition of nuclear energy well beyond that
associated with nuclear power’s traditional baseload electricity generation. These are
important topics as society grows increasingly dependent on electricity and the natural
hazard–malevolent human threat portfolio to the Grid continues to evolve. Thus the value of
and need for nuclear energy in the 21st century may depend in part on the whether rNPPs
can be successfully developed.
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7.1

Introduction

Electric Grid resilience is a subject of growing importance in the U.S. and abroad as modern
societies continue to expand their dependence on electric power and the infrastructure that
generates and delivers it [7.1]. (The term “Grid,” with or without the “electric” modifier, is
employed in this paper to refer to the integrated system of electricity generation, storage,
transmission, and distribution assets required to deliver electricity to the end-user.) Issues
such as the basic definition of “Grid resilience,” how Grid resilience can be measured and
estimated, the value of Grid resilience to society, how Grid resilience can be monetized,
and how Grid resilience can be achieved and secured, have recently attracted significant
attention in the U.S. [7.2–7.4].
This paper is the last in a series of four papers presenting the results of a study conducted
to examine key issues related to electric Grid resilience and nuclear power’s current and
potential future role in enabling Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience. The
study was structured to address four specific questions:
1. What role do current U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) play in enabling Grid
recovery and restoration in the wake of major Grid anomalies and blackouts [7.5]?
2. What is electric Grid resilience and to what extent are current U.S. NPPs Grid
resilience assets – electric generating plants that enable and enhance Grid
resilience [7.6]?
3. What type of future NPP (its attributes, functional requirements, and design
features) would be a significant Grid resilience asset – a resilient nuclear power
plant or “rNPP” [7.7]?
4. What future rNPP applications could contribute in meaningful ways to enhancing
U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience?
Previous papers [7.5–7.7] have addressed Questions 1–3. This paper presents the study’s
results with regard to Question 4.
Section 7.2 briefly summarizes the point of departure for consideration of rNPP applications
– the demonstrated performance of today’s U.S. commercial nuclear power fleet, and one
key strategic attribute of all nuclear power plants. Section 7.3 provides the context for
examination of Question 4 by summarizing the working definition of Grid resilience
developed in the study, the definition and key performance attributes of rNPPs, and the Six
rNPP Functional Requirements.
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Sections 7.4–7.7 discuss four potential rNPP applications that would significantly enhance
Grid and societal resilience while transforming the value proposition of nuclear energy in the
21st century. These applications are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

rNPP “flexible operations” (Section 7.4).
rNPP-based “hybrid nuclear energy systems” (Section 7.5).
rNPPs serving as Grid Black Start Resources (Section 7.6).
rNPP-based Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCIIs) (Section 7.7).

Though not the focus of the study, Section 7.8 discusses a few important economic
challenges related to monetization of Grid resilience and realization of rNPPs. Section 7.9
summarizes the main points of the paper.

7.2

Nuclear Power’s Demonstrated Performance And Promise

This section briefly summarizes the demonstrated performance of current commercial
nuclear power plants and one key attribute of nuclear power that is of strategic significance
with respect to future Grid resilience applications of rNPPs. These, and other, intrinsic
features of today’s NPPs are a foundation upon which rNPP functionalities can be built.

7.2.1 Nuclear Power’s Demonstrated Performance
Today’s commercial nuclear power plants exhibit a suite of operational and performance
characteristics which are the basis for nuclear power’s current role in Grid operations.
From a tactical day-to-day perspective, nuclear power plants are low carbon energy
sources capable of continuous “24x7” operation day and night. NPPs exhibit high-capacity
factors (~92% in 2017, compared to 37% for Grid-scale wind generation systems and 27%
for Grid-scale solar photovoltaic systems) [7.8]. Transitioning from the tactical to the
strategic perspective, NPPs have on multiple occasions demonstrated their ability to
operate during extreme weather events that either degraded or completely shutdown
operations at fossil-fired generating plants in the same geographical region [7.9–7.10].

7.2.2 NPP Fuel Security And Secure Fuel Power Sources
The potential value of rNPPs as Grid and societal resilience assets stems not only from the
discriminating performance attributes of rNPPs, but also from a fundamental attribute of all
nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants are unique from all other steam-cycle electric
power plants in one respect – their “fuel security”. Table 7.1 summarizes typical steam
cycle power plants’ onsite fuel inventory in terms of the plant operating (electrical power
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Table 7.1 Typical Steam Cycle Power Plant Fuel Inventories [7.1]

Steam Plant
Type

Typical Onsite Fuel
Supply
(Days)

Fuel
Replenishment
Mechanism

Gas-Fired

<1

Pipeline

Oil-Fired

<7

Pipeline & Truck

Coal-Fired

30-90

Truck, Rail, Barge

Nuclear

~ 365*

Truck

*Assumes mid-point of 2-year refueling cycle
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generation) time the onsite fuel inventory enables. Nuclear power plants’ onsite (“inreactor”) fuel inventories far exceed that of other steam cycle plants. Why is this fuel
security attribute such an important feature with respect to societal, Critical Infrastructure,
and Grid resilience?
A Black Sky Event (a long-duration de-energization of the U.S. Grid’s Interconnections or
other large geographic regions) would almost certainly challenge the ability of Grid
operators to reliably resupply fuel (oil, natural gas, coal) to fossil-fueled power plants [7.5].
Once restarted in the wake of a wide-spread failure, the ability of the Grid to stay energized
will depend in part on the ability of Grid operators to refuel power generation facilities. This
is where the unique fuel security attribute of NPPs could become a differentiating Grid
resilience asset. Hydroelectric dams and combustion turbine power plants would certainly
have an important role to play in Black Sky Grid recovery. However, the onsite fuel
inventory of a combustion turbine power plant is quite limited. Hydroelectric generation is,
at its limit, reduced to “run of river” generating capability. Nuclear power plants are secure
fuel power generation resources that could power the Grid and other major Critical
Infrastructure functions in a sustained manner during prolonged post-Grid-disruption
periods when fuel sources for other generating facilities might not be available. Thus the
expanded functionality of rNPPs, combined with nuclear power’s intrinsic fuel security,
could enable rNPPs to serve not only as Black Start Resources for the Grid, but as Black
Start Resources for the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and society as a whole in the wake of
national calamities.

7.3

Context For Consideration Of Potential rNPP Applications

7.3.1 Grid Resilience Definition
There is currently no consensus definition of “Grid resilience” among various industry,
regulatory, customer, and policymaker stakeholders [7.1]. The definition of Grid resilience
utilized in this study is derived from the following generic definition of system resilience:
“System resilience is the ability of a system to withstand a change or a disruptive event by
reducing the initial negative impacts (absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them
(adaptive capability), and by recovering from them (restorative capability)” [7.11]. With
this in mind, the definition of Grid resilience adopted in this study is, “Electric Grid
resilience is the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy.” [7.6] Thus Grid resilience is defined in
consideration of the reality that all electric loads served by the Grid are not of equal
priority/value, and the impacts of failure to serve various loads are dependent on the nature
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of the loads (customer class, specific societal function associated with the load, etc.).
Readers are referred to Reference 7.6 for a detailed discussion to the concepts of generic
system and Grid resilience.

7.3.2 rNPP Definition And Two Key rNPP Attributes
The concept of rNPPs is “use-inspired” – one that evolves from a philosophy that NPPs can
and should serve the Grid and society in ways that transcend traditional baseload electric
power generation. Indeed, “rNPPs are nuclear power plants intentionally designed, sited,
interfaced, and operated to enhance Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience.”
[7.7] In light of the definitions of generic system and Grid resilience articulated in Section
7.3.1, two basic attributes of rNPPs have been defined [7.7]:
1. rNPP Key Attribute 1 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to absorb and adapt to a
broad spectrum of Grid anomalies and upsets.
2. rNPP Key Attribute 2 – rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to recover from upsets, and
to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s load
prioritization hierarchy.

7.3.3 Six rNPP Functional Requirements
The Six rNPP Functional Requirements are defined in a preliminary qualitative manner in
Table 7.2 [7.7]. This package of Six rNPP Functional Requirements define a plant
performance envelope that substantially exceeds that of existing commercial nuclear power
plants. While considerable work remains to be done to quantify terms such as “robust,”
“flexible,” and “immunity” as employed in Table 7.2, it is evident an rNPP possessing all, or
even some of these functional capabilities would be capable of operating in modes and
roles beyond that of baseload electricity generation.

7.3.4 rNPP Enabling Design Features
Given the Six rNPP Functional Requirements presented in Table 7.2, an obvious question
is whether there is, from a technical perspective, a valid rNPP “design trade space”. In
other words, “Are there evident rNPP design features (system architectures and
technologies) that should enable a plant to achieve the Six rNPP Functional
Requirements?” A preliminary analysis reveals there are indeed several design features
that have the potential to enable rNPPs. Table 7.3 summarizes some enabling rNPP
design features together with an indication of which of the Six rNPP Functional
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Table 7.2 Six rNPP Functional Requirements

rNPP Functional Requirement

Relevant
Resilience
Characteristics

1. Robust real/reactive load-following and flexible
operation capability

Absorptive
Adaptive
Restorative

2. Immunity to damage from external events (including
Grid anomalies)

Absorptive
Adaptive

3. Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in
response to Grid anomalies

Absorptive
Adaptive

4. Ability to operate in Island Mode (i.e., without
connection to offsite transmission load and electric
power supply)

Adaptive
Restorative

5. Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling
capability (i.e., requiring no offsite power or resupply
of diesel fuel from offsite)

Adaptive
Restorative

6. Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e.,
the ability to start with no offsite power supply from
the Grid)

Restorative
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Table 7.3 Potential enabling rNPP design features

Potentially Enabling
rNPP Design
Features

Impact

*Enables
rNPP
Functional
Requirement
#

1. DC-DC or VFT NPP
interface with Grid

•

Buffers rNPP from Grid
transmission load and offsite
power quality anomalies

1–3

2. High-capacity load
switching and heat
rejection

•

Substitutes alternate thermal or
electrical load in case of Gridbased loss of load events

1–4

3. Multi-module
(reactor) NPP
architecture

•

Enables one operating reactor
module to supply shutdown
cooling and housekeeping
electrical loads to other rNPP
reactor modules
Enables one reactor module to
crank other reactor modules in
rNPP

4–6

•

4. Small reactor
(module) size

•

•
•

5. Adaptive turbinegenerator systems

•

Reduces cranking power
requirements of individual
reactor modules in rNPP
Enables non-traditional cranking
power supplies for rNPP
Reduces individual reactor
module shutdown heat removal
and housekeeping electrical
loads.

1, 3–6

Enhances rNPPs load-following
and flexible operation capability

1–3

138

Table 7.3 Potential enabling rNPP design features (continued)

Potentially Enabling
rNPP Design Features

Impact

*Enables
rNPP
Functional
Requirement #

6. Passive shutdown
cooling

•

Eliminates dependence of rNPP
on consumable onsite resources
and offsite assistance to
maintain safe shutdown state

5

7. Inherent reactor
system energy
storage capacity

•

Buffers rNPP and individual
rNPP reactor modules from
electrical (transmission system)
load transients

1–4

8. Optimized reactor
core physics design

•

Enables rapid rNPP reactor
module power maneuvering and
restart across entire fuel cycle

1–4, 6

9. Robust nuclear fuels

•

Increases rNPP reactor
module’s power maneuvering
capability

10. Plant electrical,
instrumentation and
control (I&C), and
computational
technologies that
are resilient in face
of GMD, EMP and
cyber attack

•

Enables rNPP to avoid damage
and continue to function in event
of GMD, EMP, or cyber attack

*1 –
2–
3–
4–
5–
6–

1–5

Flexible Operation/Robust Load-Following Capability
Immunity To Damage From External Events
Ability To Avoid Plant Shutdown In Response To Grid Anomalies
Ability To Operate In Island Mode
Unlimited Independent Shutdown Cooling
Self-Cranking Black Start Capability
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Requirements they should enable. Reference 7.7 provides an in-depth discussion of
potential rNPP design features summarized in Table 7.2.
Finally, it is noted that the immaturity of the rNPP concept, together with the current
absence of rNPP conceptual designs, precludes evaluation of the capital, operating, and
maintenance cost implications of various rNPP design features and approaches. Even if
this were possible, the current lack of consensus regarding the value of Grid resilience and
market mechanisms for monetizing Grid resilience (see Section 7.8) constrain credible
evaluation of overall rNPP economic viability. Nevertheless, the technical options defined
here provide a starting point for future cost and economic analyses.

7.4

rNPPs And Flexible Nuclear Power Operations

rNPP Functional Requirement 1 requires rNPPs to be capable of load-following operations
well beyond traditional baseload operations – in terms of both real and reactive power
maneuvering capability [7.7]. The IAEA [7.12] and the Electric Power Research Institute
[7.13] have evaluated the ability of current NPPs to operate outside of the baseload
generation envelope and the technical implications of doing so. The conclusion of work
conducted to date is that existing NPPs do generally have load-following capabilities
beyond stable baseload operation. However, their use in such a manner is constrained
primarily by electricity market and regulatory considerations. rNPPs with load-following
capabilities beyond those of current generation plants would have the ability to reduce
power output when electricity market prices are low, and shift their capacity to ancillary
markets.
Analysis of the potential economic impact of rNPP flexible operations is a complex
undertaking, heavily laden with assumptions regarding electricity market mechanics.
Competitive merchant electricity markets are actually comprised of distinct submarkets for
energy, capacity, and ancillary services. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) defines several ancillary services in Order No. 888: scheduling, system control and
dispatch; reactive supply and voltage control from generation service; regulation and
frequency response service; energy imbalance service; operating reserve–synchronized
reserve service; and operating reserve–supplemental reserve service [7.14]. Similar
competitive market mechanisms are utilized by Grid operators to access black start
services in merchant markets [7.15].
Recent investigations of the economic implications of flexible NPP operations (including
roles such as Grid frequency regulation and as spinning reserve capacity in a mixed-fuel
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generation environment) indicate “…flexible operation of NPPs can increase the revenue of
the nuclear units while at the same time lowering the total electric system operating costs,
thus providing a win-win for the nuclear owners and rate payers.” [7.16] Companion studies
[7.17] also indicate that flexible operation of NPPs would enable deeper penetration and
more efficient utilization of renewable energy resources. Thus the enhanced flexible
operations capability of rNPPs would enable them to provide functions beyond baseload
operations and benefit from the revenue streams associated with such operations, while
providing a low-carbon option for enabling deeper penetration of renewable energy sources.
The competitive nature of these markets would dictate whether a unit that is capable of
providing an ancillary service is actually employed in that manner.

7.5

rNPPs As Elements Of Hybrid Nuclear Energy Systems

Numerous investigations of so-called “hybrid nuclear energy systems” have been
conducted during the past decade [7.18–7.26]. Hybrid nuclear energy system concepts
would integrate the electrical and thermal energy production of an NPP with energy from
other sources, along with energy storage technologies, to reduce reactor power
maneuvering requirements and produce secondary energy products such as hydrogen,
synthetic fuels, etc.
Hybrid nuclear energy systems can employ reactors operating in two very different modes.
The first type of application involves modulating the combined electrical output of, and the
thermal load on, the nuclear reactor in a manner that reduces the need for reactor power
maneuvers. This type of hybrid nuclear energy system employs “load switching” (rNPP
Design Feature #2 in Table II) to divert the reactor’s thermal energy production from
electricity generation to either (a) energy storage or (b) the production of some alternate
energy product such as hydrogen or synthetic fuels.
The second type of hybrid energy system requires the reactor to perform in a flexible
operations mode (rNPP Functional Requirement 1) in response to intermittent electricity
generation by other (typically renewable) energy sources coupled to the same Grid. Thus in
their purest forms, these two systems impose very different power maneuvering demands
on the NPP. Schemes that employ a combination of the two approaches are of course
possible.
The topic of hybrid nuclear energy systems has become a specialized field of study that
continues to attract global attention. The use of rNPPs as anchors of hybrid energy systems
is an obvious application given the synergism between the functional requirements of
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rNPPs and the functional capabilities required of NPPs that operate as elements of hybrid
nuclear energy systems.

7.6

rNPPs As Black Start Resources

The author has previously described current U.S. Grid operators’ approach to system
recovery following major Grid disruptions [7.5]. As explained in that analysis, current NPPs
are incapable of contributing in any meaningful way to early Grid restoration efforts and, in
fact, place additional burdens on the Grid and Grid operators during system recovery and
restoration efforts. Today’s “bootstrapping” Grid recovery process typically begins with the
startup of one or more small (few MVA – 200 MVA) gas-fired, coal-fired, or hydroelectric
“Black Start Resource” (hereafter “Black Start Unit” or “BSU”) generating facilities (Figure
7.1) [7.27–7.29]. Once started, these Black Start Units “crank” larger steam cycle plants
that are typically a few hundred MWe in size. The larger steam cycle plants, in turn, crank
still larger steam cycle power plants and re-power larger and larger segments of the Grid.
NPPs are typically among the last plants to be restarted [7.5]. This serial method of Grid
black start, recovery, and restoration is the backbone of Grid recovery procedures
employed around the world. This section explores how rNPPs that achieve the Six rNPP
Functional Requirements outlined in Section 7.2 would enable improvements in traditional
Grid recovery and restoration operations in the wake of major Grid disruptions.

7.6.1 Derived Black Start Unit Functional Requirements
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) defines a “Blackstart” Resource” as
“A generating unit(s) and its associated set of equipment which has the ability to be
started without support from the System or is designed to remain energized without
connection to the remainder of the System, with the ability to energize a bus, meeting
the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for Real and Reactive Power
capability, frequency and voltage control, and that has been included in the
Transmission Operator’s restoration plan.” [7.30]
NERC’s Black Start Resource definition, along with the manner in which it is typically
implemented by generating and transmission system operators, can be deconvolved into
five basic derived Black Start Unit functional requirements” that are useful aids for
examining the ability of a future rNPP to serve as a Black Start Unit. These five BSU Black
Start Requirements are discussed in Sections 7.6.1.1–7.6.1.5.
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Figure 7.1 Current Grid Black Start Recovery Approach
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7.6.1.1 BSU Functional Requirement 1 – Self-Cranking
A Black Start Unit must have the ability to be started (“cranked”) multiple times [7.29]
without support from the electric Grid (i.e. without offsite power), or it must be designed to
operate at power without being connected to and loaded by the Grid (the “Island Mode” of
operation). Current (non-nuclear) U.S. Black Start Units are typically required to be capable
of startup in less than 4 hours [7.28], with a preference for BSUs that can successfully
startup within one hour of receiving a request to supply black start services [7.29]. This
BSU Functional Requirement implies the possibility of three different “Black Start Unit
Ready States” as discussed Section 7.6.2. The practical implication of NERC’s Black Start
Resource definition is that the startup cranking power demands for today’s BSUs must be
supplied by dedicated onsite power supplies – typically diesel or auxiliary generators that
are, in turn, cranked from batteries. rNPP Functional Requirements 4–6 would enable an
rNPP to meet this Black Start Unit functional requirement.
7.6.1.2 BSU Functional Requirement 2 – Islanding/Island Mode Operation
NERC’s Black Start Resource definition states that as an alternative to self-cranking
capability, a Black Start Resource must be capable of “islanding”. “Island Mode” is state in
which the plant is operating at some power level, but is not connected to and loaded by the
Grid. U.S. Black Start Units are typically required to be capable of operating in Island Mode
for only 10-30 minutes after self-cranking [7.28]. However, some fossil-fired generating
units have the capability to manually island themselves by cutting back power and isolating
from the Grid in advance of predicted threats to Grid integrity, or even to do so in real-time
response to a Grid anomaly. rNPP Functional Requirements 2–4 would provide rNPPs the
same capability to achieve and operate in Island Mode.
7.6.1.3 BSU Functional Requirement 3 – Grid Integration
A Black Start Unit must have the ability to energize a bus that, in turn, enables the cranking
of other power plants. In practice, this means the Black Start Unit’s interface to the Grid
must meet at least one of three configurations:
1. The Black Start Unit’s switchyard is directly connected to the Grid via multiple
transmission lines.
2. If the Black Start Unit’s switchyard is served by a single transmission line, that
transmission line is connect to a remote transmission node (bus) that serves
multiple transmission lines.
3. At least one transmission line that serves the BSU is a dedicated cranking line for
another generating unit.
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A BSU must, in practice, be capable of energizing its assigned bus for sixteen hours or
longer [7.28, 7.31]. Among other things, this BSU Functional Requirement means that the
cranking transmission lines between the BSU and the power plant(s) it will crank(s) must
either be pre-configured during normal operations, or be configurable under blackout and
emergency conditions. The ability of an rNPP to meet BSU Functional Requirement 3 would
depend on the manner in which the rNPP is integrated into its host Grid.
7.6.1.4 BSU Functional Requirement 4 – Real/Reactive Power Maneuvering
A Black Start Unit must meet the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for real
and reactive capacity, and frequency and voltage control. The capability of the Black Start
Unit to fulfill this requirement is a function of its design, the manner in which it interfaces
with the Grid, and the design of the Grid itself. Black Start Units must be tolerant of larger
than normal voltage and frequency variations on both the Grid load circuits (transmission
lines and cranking lines) and the power that is supplied back to the Black Start Unit once
the Grid is reenergized.
Black Start Units must have the real and reactive load-following capability (Requirement 6.1
in Reference 7.32) required to achieve and maintain system voltage and frequency
standards. The real and reactive power load-following requirement stems from several
sources intrinsic to Grid recovery operations [7.33]. First, the cranking of other generating
units involves the startup of a multitude of large electric motor-driven auxiliary systems at
the unit being cranked. During the time these motors are accelerating to speed, they can
draw many times their normal operating current and present very large reactive power
demand swings as their capacitive and inductive fields are energized. Secondly, the
energization of “cold” transmission lines is accompanied by significant transient reactive
power demands and voltage swings due to the “Ferranti effect” as various capacitive and
inductive fields are established. This effect can lead to Black Start Units absorbing reactive
power and, in extreme cases, self-excitation of the Black Start Unit’s generator excitation
system. The “cold load pickup” phenomenon is another source of real and reactive power
load swings on a Black Start Unit. The re-energization of loads that have been de-energized
for many hours can be accompanied by inrush currents ten times larger than normal steady
state load currents [7.33]. Due to these factors and others, Grid operators may have limited
control over the reactive power demands of the system at various points during the Grid
recovery process. The Black Start Unit must be capable of handling all of these system
issues while continuing to supply power to the Grid during black start and recovery
operations. rNPP Functional Requirement 1 would enable the rNPP to meet BSU Functional
Requirement 4.
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7.6.1.5 BSU Functional Requirement 5 – Grid Restoration Plan Integration
A BSU must be included in the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan as a Black Start
Resource. That is, the transmission system operator must have a specific plan and
functional capability for Grid recovery that enables use of the BSU in the Grid recovery
process. The details for use of a specific Black Start Unit within the Transmission
Operator’s restoration plan obviously relate both to the specific Black Start Unit’s
characteristics and those of the Grid into which it is interfaced. One obvious impact of rNPP
functionality (specifically rNPP Functional Requirement 5) is that unlike current NPPs,
restoration of offsite power to rNPPs for shutdown cooling would no longer be among the
Grid operator’s highest priorities during Grid recovery and restoration efforts.

7.6.2 Three rNPP Black Start Unit Ready States
Figure 7.2 depicts the three possible “Black Start Unit Ready States” for an rNPP (or any
other BSU) that could function both as a normal power generation unit and as a Black Start
Unit, along with the pathways for transition between the three ready states. Figure 7.3 is a
more detailed version of Figure 7.2 that depicts the BSU Ready State logic embedded in
the five BSU Functional Requirements, and the manner in which the Six rNPP Functional
Requirements (“rNPPFR” in Figure 7.3) enable an rNPP to operate in all three BSU Ready
States. The three Black Start Unit Ready States are discussed below.
7.6.2.1 BSU Ready State 1
The rNPP is operating in Ready State 1 (shutdown), but capable of rapid startup by “selfcranking” (without the aid of offsite power) into Ready State 2 Island Mode (via P12 in
Figure 7.2) until loading and re-powering the Grid (via P23 in Figure 7.2) from Ready State
3. Ready State 1 is the state in which conventional gas turbine Black Start Units function.
The rNPP would presumably only be in Ready State 1 if it were forced to shutdown due to
some internal or external issues associated with a Grid anomaly. As previously stated,
current U.S. Black Start Units are typically required to be capable of multiple black start
cranking attempts, and to be capable of restarting in less than four hours when called upon
to provide black start services. rNPP Functional Requirements 5 and 6 would enable an
rNPP to reside in this BSU Ready State and self-crank into BSU Ready State 2.
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Figure 7.2 Three Black Start Unit Ready States
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Figure 7.3 Black Start Unit Ready State Transition Logic
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7.6.2.2 BSU Ready State 2
An rNPP operating in this BSU Ready State is operating at or above housekeeping power
level in an Island Mode in which the plant is completely isolated from the Grid until called
upon to synchronize with, load, and repower the Grid from Ready State 3 (path P23 in
Figures 7.2 and 7.3). Island Mode is similar in some respects to a “spinning reserve” state –
albeit one in which the unit is not connected to the Grid and dispatched until called upon to
function as a Black Start Resource. In order to have a legitimate capability for Ready State
2 operation, the plant must be capable of (a) achieving stable Island Mode operation by
self-cranking from Ready State 1 (via path P12 in Figures 7.2 and 7.3) or (b) executing a
load rejection/islanding maneuver from Ready State 3 (P32 in Figures 7.2 and 7.3). All units
transition to Ready State 3 from Ready State 2. Thus, all Black Start Units must be
capable of operating in Ready State 2 (Island Mode). A BSU must also be capable of
maintaining a stable Island Mode operation (stable power level, voltage and frequency) as
long as required to function effectively as a Black Start Resource within the framework of
system operators’ Grid Recovery Plan. rNPP Functional Requirements 2–4 would enable
an rNPP to achieve and reside in BSU Ready State 2 for much longer periods than is
typically required of current U.S. Black Start Units (i.e. only 10–30 minutes).
7.6.2.3 BSU Ready State 3
An rNPP operating in Ready State 3 is supplying power to the Grid either in a normal power
generation mode, or in Black Start operations mode. When operating as a normal power
generation facility, the plant would ideally be capable of quickly isolating from the Grid and
transitioning to BSU Ready State 2 Island Mode (via path P32 in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3).
A variable-output rNPP that could accomplish this load rejection (P32) maneuver would be
of great utility in a number of Grid operations scenarios. The achievement of this capability
would require the unit to detect, evaluate, differentiate, and respond appropriately to Grid
anomalies in real time. Some non-nuclear steam power plants in the U.S. that do not have
self-cranking capability do have the ability to execute this load rejection-islanding maneuver
[7.27].
Alternately, and as a last resort, an rNPP operating in Ready State 3 could transition to
shutdown BSU Ready State 1 (via path P31 in Figure 7.2 and 7.3) if for some reason it
could not execute an islanding maneuver. If an rNPP operating in Ready State 3 were
forced to shutdown into Ready State 1, the rNPP would be capable of meeting its own
shutdown cooling requirements without any offsite power or assistance (rNPP Functional
Requirement 5) and would be capable of self-cranking restart into BSU Ready State 2
(rNPP Functional Requirement 6). Assuming the plant were not damaged (rNPP Functional
Requirement 2), the time required to restart or startup an rNPP would depend on the plant’s
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Limiting Conditions for Operations and associated surveillance requirements. The time
required to restart the rNPP from Ready State 1 might limit the unit’s utility as a Black Start
Resource to scenarios in which advance warning of an impending Grid anomaly is available
(as might be the case for extreme geomagnetic disturbances, or “GMDs” triggered by solar
coronal mass ejections), or when rapid black start capability is not required. Thus, the ability
of an rNPP to avoid plant shutdown (rNPP Functional Requirement 3) and to operate in
Island Mode (rNPP Functional Requirement 4) would greatly expand its potential value as a
Black Start Resource.

7.6.3 rNPP Black Start Unit Grid Interface And Grid Recovery Operational
Considerations
The Six rNPP Functional Requirements assure that an rNPP would have the ability to
function as a dual-purpose (normal power generation plus black start) unit, provided the
plant is interfaced to and integrated with the Grid in the appropriate manner; and the
surrounding Grid is, or can be, configured to enable the rNPP to crank other generating
units and power critical loads during the Grid recovery and restoration process. How might
the necessary Grid interface and configuration conditions be achieved?
The rNPP’s robust real and reactive power maneuvering capability (rNPP Functional
Requirement 1) would free the Grid operator from the traditional serial generating fleet
startup approach depicted in Figure 7.1. Figure 7.4 is a simplified depiction of an rNPP-Grid
architecture that would enable such operations. The configuration is one in which the rNPP
forms the “hub” of a radial arrangement of cranking lines (to other power plants) and
transmission lines (to load blocks and distribution centers). Switchgear, relays, circuit
breakers, isolators are not shown in Figure 7.4, but various bus configurations can be
envisioned both within the generating network, and the transmission/distribution network.
Such rNPP-Grid architectures should enable larger plants to be cranked sooner and/or
diverse load blocks to be recovered sooner – as soon as their local loads are sufficiently
stable to enable plant operation. Additionally, the rNPP hub, when accompanied by the
appropriate Grid architecture, would provide the Grid operator more flexibility in terms of the
order in which various transmission segments are energized and loads are recovered.
Thus, a single rNPP Black Start Resource, properly sited within and interfaced with its
surrounding Grid, would significantly enhance the ability of a system operator to employ a
robust “multi-point, multi-island” approach to Grid restoration.
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Figure 7.4 rNPP-based Grid Black Start Recovery Approach
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7.7 rNPPs As Anchors Of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands
(RCIIs)
Section 7.6 discussed the potential for rNPPs to serve as versatile Black Start Resources
for Grid recovery and restoration. But, an rNPP’s robust operational capabilities and black
start Grid recovery value can be leveraged to provide still greater strategic societal benefits
via the thoughtful integration of an rNPP with other national Critical Infrastructure elements
in a Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCII). The RCII concept is developed further in
this section.

7.7.1 Critical Infrastructure And Societal Resilience
U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 21 [7.34] defined sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors
upon which society depends (Figure 7.5). Each of these Critical Infrastructure Sectors is
either involved in the generation and distribution of electricity, or requires electricity to
perform its critical functions. Each Critical Infrastructure Sector has a distinct “grid” of its
own – a geospatially distributed combination of “production facilities” and “product delivery
networks” (along with the required human infrastructure) that uniquely defines the
architecture of that specific Critical Infrastructure Sector. The physical architecture of each
of these Critical Infrastructure Sectors has evolved over the past century in response to a
complex set of geospatially-dependent supply and demand factors. Chief among these
factors are natural resource location (closely related to siting of production centers), human
population dynamics (closely related to demand center location), and topology/geography
(a major driver for distribution and delivery network routing).
The present-day geospatial topology of the integrated system of sixteen Critical
Infrastructure grids can be viewed as a three-dimensional, sixteen-layer “stack” of twodimensional Critical Infrastructure Sector grids. Though beyond the scope of this paper,
even a casual analysis of the sixteen individual U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sector grids
reveals there are regions of the U.S. (and presumably other nations) where key elements of
multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors are found in close proximity to each other (i.e. colocated within relatively short distances of a few to a few tens of km). This close physical
proximity of diverse electricity-dependent Critical Infrastructure Sector elements provides a
great opportunity to enhance overall national Critical Infrastructure system resilience by
leveraging the capabilities of rNPPs as anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands
(RCIIs).

152

Figure 7.5 Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors
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7.7.2 rNPPs – The Foundation of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands
(RCIIs)
Our focus now shifts to higher-level strategic national resilience considerations – the
challenge of bootstrapping interdependent national Critical Infrastructure functionality in the
wake of events that could deal crippling blows to a nation’s Critical Infrastructure and its
social fabric. The types of catastrophes under consideration here are those “very bad day”
scenarios such as severe geomagnetic disturbances induced by solar coronal mass
ejections, electromagnetic pulse attacks, cyber attacks on the Grid. The rNPP’s unique
coupling of performance capabilities (stemming from the Six rNPP Functional
Requirements) together with its fuel security, could be harnessed to enable the national to
better endure and recover more rapidly from such events.
Imagine a future in which selected assets of different Critical Infrastructure networks were
configured into a number of “Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands” or “RCIIs”.
A Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island or “RCII” is an engineered network of
multiple Critical Infrastructure Sector facilities and their interconnections (electric
power, internet, pipelines, rail, etc.), powered by a fuel-secure rNPP, and “colocated” within a small (a few to tens of km) geographical area. RCIIs would be
regional “hubs” of Critical Infrastructure functionality from which national Critical
Infrastructure functionality could be restored and recovered in the event “very bad day”
scenarios.
An RCII is not simply an electric Grid or a “micro-Grid”. The electric Grid is but one of the
“grids” that constitute the RCII. From the topographic perspective, RCII’s are essentially 3dimensional overlays and interconnections of an electric Grid and multiple Critical
Infrastructure Sector “grids” (internet, pipelines, railways, etc.) in a defined geographical
region (Figure 7.6). While the architecture and functionality of each RCII would differ based
on its assigned functions, the “backbone” of all RCIIs is a secure supply of electric power
provided by an rNPP.
Figure 7.7 is a notional depiction of an RCII anchored by an rNPP. The RCII is configured
in a “hub and spoke” topography in which the rNPP is the hub. As depicted in Figure 7.7,
elements of Critical Infrastructure within RCIIs might utilize both electricity and nuclear
process heat. Thus rNPPs operating for combined electricity and process heat production
would be desirable in some circumstances. The hub and spoke topology depicted in Figure
7.7 envisions the use of a “ring bus” concept for distribution of electricity and thermal
energy from the rNPP to its companion Critical Infrastructure facilities. Thermal energy
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Figure 7.6 Siting of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands (RCIIs)
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Figure 7.7 Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCII) Architecture
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storage could be incorporated into the rNPP design to enhance its functionality as a
process heat source and/or to reduce reactor power maneuvering requirements.
The idea of employing nuclear power to enable critical national functionalities is, of course
not a recent epiphany. However the emergence of multi-layered, interdependent, national
Critical Infrastructure networks, along with continuing evolution of hazards and threats to
the Grid, provide significant motivation for exploring the potential for rNPPs and Resilient
Critical Infrastructure Islands to enhance societal resilience in the 21st century.

7.7.3 Siting RCIIs
RCII’s could be hubs from which national multi-sector Critical Infrastructure functionality
could be restored in the event of major Critical Infrastructure disruptions. But, where should
RCII’s be sited to maximize their ability to accomplish this function?
The design and performance attributes of rNPPs should enable some relaxation of current
NPP siting constraints [7.7] – making it possible to site the rNPPs closer to their electricity
and process heat “customers” than is the case with today’s commercial nuclear power
plants. For instance, one version of an RCII might be comprised of co-located
petroleum/petrochemcial refineries, petroleum pipeline/pumping stations, and rNPPs. Other
examples might include co-located configurations of rNPPs, Internet, e-commerce/finance,
and telecommunications hubs; rNPPs and water supply systems; rNPPs and military bases;
etc. Each RCII would be strategically designed to retain its assigned critical functionalities in
the event of a major national catastrophe. The RCII, having survived the initial event, could
enable more rapid recovery and restoration of our nation’s Critical Infrastructure Sectors in
a recovery protocol similar in many ways to the electric Grid black start recovery protocol
discussed in previous sections of this paper.
Intelligent siting of RCIIs would be essential to extracting maximum Critical Infrastructure
and societal resilience value from them. There are many potential strategies for selecting
high-priority sites for RCIIs. Most of these strategies are coupled closely to assumptions
regarding the specific hazard or threat scenario adopted as the basis of the analysis. One
general strategic RCII siting strategy would be to site one RCII in each the three U.S. Grid
Interconnections. Other approaches would site RCII’s as closely as possible to human
population centers or major military bases and defense installations. In any case, the next
step would be to search for locations within that Grid Interconnection or near the chosen
population center or client Critical Infrastructure facility that would enable high Critical
Infrastructure interconnection density. This search would involve the construction of detailed
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topographic overlays (similar to the notional overlays depicted in Figure 7.6) of the sixteen
U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, with the goal of identifying regions in which key assets
from multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors already exist. These locations would be prime
candidates for development of the first RCIIs. RCII’s might in the long-term, be developed
at locations based on a rigorous analysis of national hazards and threats portfolios, along
with scenario-specific societal recovery and restoration priorities. The ideas presented here
are but the simplest and most obvious of many possible RCII siting strategies.

7.8

rNPPs And Monetization Of Grid And Societal Resilience

The dialog concerning the definition and value of Grid resilience is in its infancy. Beyond the
question of what societal benefits rNPPs might deliver are the questions of (1) who benefits,
(2) who pays for the benefit, and (3) how the benefit is monetized. These are challenging
issues. Critical Infrastructure resilience in general, and Grid resilience in particular, are
currently “tragedy of the commons” issues – issues in which there are many stakeholders,
little consensus, and no obvious means to secure desired outcomes for all those affected
once such outcomes are articulated. Most of the Critical Infrastructure in the U.S. is owned
and operated by the private sector. Deregulation of the electricity market in the U.S. has
resulted in a fragmented patchwork of Grid asset owners and regulators focused on the
day-to-day generation and regulation of electricity as a commodity – rather than as an
essential strategic national asset.
Electric generating facilities (and nuclear power plants in particular) in the U.S. today
receive no economic compensation in exchange for their contribution to enhancing overall
generation system reliability or to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The development of
market and competitive mechanisms to guide private sector enterprises toward
achievement of strategic national goals is a complex process. A market that doesn’t
compensate current nuclear power plants for their reliability or carbon avoidance benefits is
unlikely to compensate future plants for their resilience contribution. Significant work will be
required to develop appropriate market incentives and structures to enable the development
and deployment of rNPPs. The development of mechanisms for monetizing the day-to-day
Grid resilience contributions of rNPPs can only proceed as a better understanding of Grid
resilience and its role in enabling Critical Infrastructure and societal resilience evolves. On
the other hand, a good argument can be made that the strategic resilience contribution of
rNPPs and RCIIs to homeland and national security in “very bad day” scenarios should
stand apart from consideration of the day-to-day Grid resilience value of rNPPs. Thus it is
not unreasonable to consider federal financing of RCII’s to be justified as an investment in
U.S. strategic resilience and national security.
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7.9

Summary

This paper is the fourth in a series detailing the results of a study conducted to examine the
role of nuclear power in achieving and sustaining U.S. Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and
societal resilience. The definition and functional capabilities of rNPPs defined in those
papers is the basis for identification and characterization of four potential rNPP applications
discussed in this paper. Two applications – the use of rNPPs to enable flexible electricity
generation operations of nuclear power plants and as anchors of of hybrid nuclear energy
systems – leverage ideas and concepts currently under investigation in the nuclear power
industry and academia. Two of these applications – the use of rNPPs as Grid Black Start
Resources and as anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands – are new concepts
introduced here for the first time.
rNPPs could extend the value proposition of nuclear energy beyond baseload electricity
generation in the 21st century. rNPPs could enhance Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and
societal resilience in ways current electricity generation technologies cannot. The realization
of rNPPs and the benefits they offer, will depend on the outcome of a dialog that is just
beginning regarding the value of Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal resilience; how
resilience should be monetized; and who pays for each resilience benefit. The outcome of
this debate is of great importance given modern society’s growing dependence on the Grid
and the evolving portfolio of natural hazards and malevolent threats to the Grid. The
conceptual work described in this paper is intended to catalyze and inform this forwardlooking dialog.
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8 SUMMARY OF MAJOR RESEARCH RESULTS
This dissertation seeks to answer the question, “What role do current U.S. commercial
nuclear power plants (NPPs) play in enabling electric Grid resilience, and what type of
future nuclear power plant might maximize nuclear power’s contribution to Grid resilience?”
This question has, in turn, been deconvolved into Five Research Questions that form the
core structure of this dissertation. The major research outcomes and conclusions with
respect to these five questions are summarized below.

8.1 Current U.S. electricity markets and regulatory frameworks do not
serve the strategic interests of the United States.
Valuation of electricity is a “tragedy of the commons” issue in the U.S. Electricity market
mechanisms and regulatory frameworks in the U.S. treat electricity as an everyday
commodity, rather than the strategic asset it actually is. Market mechanisms place no
explicit value on the unique strategic role electricity plays in enabling U.S. national security,
economic prosperity, and societal wellbeing (i.e. U.S. national resilience). Electricity market
deregulation, along with the ensuing fragmentation of both the electricity industry and its
regulatory oversight framework have created a “race to the bottom” electricity pricing
dynamic in which market signals provided to electricity producers have no effective
strategic component.

8.2 What is electric Grid resilience and why is it so important?
Electric Grid resilience is the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to
customers given a specific load prioritization hierarchy. A Grid is resilient to the extent it
has the ability to withstand a change or a disruptive event by reducing the initial negative
impacts (absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them (adaptive capability), and by
recovering from the event (restorative capability). All Critical Infrastructure Sectors depend
on an uninterrupted supply of electricity to accomplish their essential societal support
functions. Thus, while Grid resilience may be deconvolved into its constituent generation
subsystem, transmission subsystem, and distribution subsystem components, it is the
resilience of the Grid as an overall system that is of primary importance with respect to
Critical Infrastructure and societal resilience.
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8.3 Are current U.S. commercial nuclear power plants significant Grid
resilience assets, and why or why not?
Current U.S. NPPs have an enviable record of safe and reliable operation. The plants have
on multiple occasions demonstrated their ability to continuously operate during regional
“cold weather” or “polar vortex” events that disabled fossil-fired power plants in the affected
regions. This experience demonstrates that NPPs do provide some important Grid
resilience benefits for scenarios in which the Grid is not disrupted or damaged. However,
(as discussed in Chapter 4) the design and operational approaches adopted to achieve
nuclear power’s demonstrated safety and reliability attributes have resulted in plants that are
intolerant of Grid disruptions. Today’s NPPs do little to enable the Grid to absorb and adapt
to major disruptions or to rapidly recover and restore electric service to customers in the wake
of Grid disruptions. Thus, it is clear NPPs are not significant Grid resilience assets for
scenarios involving major Grid disruptions or damage. As discussed in Chapter 5, today’s
NPPs are actually burdens on Grid operators during Grid recovery and restoration activities
such as those required in the wake of major Grid disruptions or Black Sky Events.

8.4 Concerning future resilient nuclear power plants (rNPPs): What
performance attributes and functional requirements might
maximize their value as Grid resilience assets?
A resilient power plant (rPP) in general, and an rNPP in particular are power plants whose
performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance Grid resilience—the
system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers given a specific
load prioritization hierarchy. rNPPs would be intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and
operated in a manner to enhance the resilience of their host Grid. The two essential rNPP
Key Attributes discussed in Chapter 6 are:
1. rNPP Attribute 1: rNPPs enable the Grid to absorb and adapt to a broad spectrum of
Grid anomalies and upsets.
2. rNPP Attribute 2: rNPPs enhance the Grid’s ability to quickly recover from upsets
and to restore electric service in a manner consistent with the system operator’s
load prioritization hierarchy.
These two attributes are equally applicable to nuclear and non-nuclear rPPs.
The Six Functional Requirements of rNPPs are:
1. Robust real/reactive load-following and flexible operation capability.
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2. Immunity to damage from external events (including Grid anomalies).
3. Ability to avoid plant shutdown (reactor scram) in response to Grid anomalies.
4. Ability to operate in Island Mode (i.e., without connection to offsite transmission load
and electric power supply).
5. Unlimited independent safe shutdown cooling capability (i.e., requiring no offsite
power or resupply of diesel fuel from offsite).
6. Independent self-cranking black start capability (i.e., the ability to start with no offsite
power supply from the Grid).
Considered as a package, these six functional requirements define an rNPP performance
capability that significantly exceeds the traditional baseload electricity generation role of
current U.S. NPPs.

8.5 Concerning future rNPPs: What design features might enable the
identified rNPP functional requirements?
Several promising rNPP design features (system architecture and technology suite
considerations) were identified during the course of the study. These design features
(discussed in Chapter 6) include:
1. Direct current–direct current (DC-DC) or variable frequency transformer (VFT) NPP
interface with the Grid (rather than the traditional AC-AC interface) to reduce the
coupling of Grid voltage, frequency, and phase angle anomalies into the rNPP’s
electric system.
2. High-capacity load switching and heat rejection capability to enable the plant to
rapidly and seamlessly substitute alternate thermal or electrical loads in the event of
loss of Grid (transmission system) load.
3. Multi-module (reactor) rNPP architectures that can enable a single reactor module
to meet the startup and housekeeping loads of companion reactor modules within
the rNPP.
4. Small reactor (module) size (probably no larger than 200-300 MWe) that reduce
overall rNPP cranking power requirements, enable the use of a broader suite of
onsite black start cranking power supplies, and eliminate the need for offsite
cranking power.
5. Adaptive turbine-generator systems capable of meeting large and very dynamic real
and reactive load transients.
6. Passive shutdown cooling to eliminate the need for offsite power and diesel fuel
resupply in the event of long-term Grid disruptions.
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7. Large inherent/intrinsic reactor system energy storage capacity to reduce the need
for rapid reactor power maneuvers in the event of loss of Grid (transmission system)
load.
8. Optimized reactor core physics designs that enable robust reactor power
maneuvering and restart over the plant’s entire fuel (refueling) cycle.
9. Robust nuclear fuels that enable aggressive power maneuvering without the
concerns imposed by the thermal-mechanical limitations of current LWR nuclear
fuels.
10. rNPP electric, instrumentation and control (I&C), computer, and rNPP-Grid interface
technologies and systems that are resilient in the face of extreme GMDs as well as
EMP and cyber attacks.

8.6 Concerning future rNPPs and the Grid they will serve: What
specific applications of rNPPs might enhance their overall
contribution to electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and societal
resilience?
Four specific rNPP applications have been identified and discussed in Chapter 7. These
applications have the potential to expand the value proposition of nuclear energy well
beyond that of baseload electricity generation while enhancing Grid, Critical Infrastructure,
and societal resilience. The four applications are:
1. Flexible Electricity Generation – the Six Functional Requirements of rNPPs
assure they would have the ability to meet “flexible operations” requirements as
currently defined by EPRI and the OECD.
2. rNPPs As Anchors of Hybrid Nuclear Energy Systems – the Six Functional
Requirements of rNPPs assure these plants could meet the performance
capabilities previously identified by developers of hybrid nuclear energy system
concepts.
3. rNPPs As Grid Black Start Resources – rNPPs would present transformational
Black Start Resource capabilities (and would, at a minimum, remove the burden
posed by current U.S. NPPs in the event of a major Grid de-energization or Black
Sky Event.
4. rNPPs As Anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands – the performance
attributes of rNPPs, coupled with their use as anchors of Resilient Critical
Infrastructure Islands, could provide the U.S. a transformational strategic Critical
Infrastructure and societal resilience asset.
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9 UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES
This dissertation focuses sharply on The Five Research Questions defined in Chapter 3.
Several other important insights and impressions regarding U.S. national resilience and
nuclear power’s potential role in enhancing societal, Critical Infrastructure, and Grid
resilience surfaced during the course of this research. These results provide both a
foundation for and a (partial) roadmap to a more resilient U.S. Grid. A few of the most
evident and most important observations and recommendations for future research are
discussed in this chapter.

9.1 Need For Inclusive Fact-Based Grid and Critical Infrastructure
Resilience Dialog
Every resident of the U.S. is a stakeholder in the electric Grid and Critical Infrastructure
resilience dialog. The presence of many diverse stakeholders and the perspectives they
bring to the table create an environment that can be hostile to useful dialog.
All stakeholders in societal, Grid, and Critical Infrastructure resilience must be willing to
engage in fact-based dialog about Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience – one that is
informed by sound science and Grid operations experience. Participants in this dialog must
not seek to inflate or minimize the challenges such threats pose, nor should they seek to
advance their own special interests. The achievement of this dynamic is, in the author’s
view, the first obstacle to progress in the Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience arena.

9.2 Establishment Of A Forum For Science-Based Stakeholder Dialog
On Grid and Critical Infrastructure Resilience
No effective forum for dialog among the many stakeholders in U.S. Grid and Critical
Infrastructure vulnerability and resilience currently exists. No obvious venue for such a
forum exists given the sensitive, multi-disciplinary nature of the challenges, and the
diversity of stakeholders. This is a classic “tragedy of the commons”. Such a forum is
needed. The academic sector seems well positioned to host such a forum. One or more
universities should partner to establish a continuing Grid resilience forum (or forums).
These forums would be ongoing activities, punctuated with events in which Grid resilience
stakeholders from the electric power industry, nuclear power industry, elected officials,
policymakers, regulators, researchers, national defense and homeland security officials,
and the public come together for meaningful and honest dialog about Grid and Critical
Infrastructure vulnerabilities, resilience, and pathways to enhance resilience. While much
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more can be said about the preferred structure, dynamics, and process of such forums, it is
evident modest first steps involving only a few of the stakeholders can catalyze useful
progress.

9.3 Need For Consideration of Extended Hazards and Threats Portfolio
U.S. society in the early 21st century is so dependent on electricity for our vital functions that
any natural event or human action capable of disabling the Grid for extended periods of
time must be viewed as a threat to U.S. existence (e.g., “an existential threat”). U.S. Grid
operators have dealt with anticipated, but infrequent regional events such as hurricanes,
floods, superstorms, etc., since the inception of the Grid. The U.S. Grid has evolved a
certain level of operational resilience for this traditional portfolio of hazards and threats.
Today there are three known hazards and threats that stand apart from the traditional Grid
hazards and threats portfolio in terms of the risk they pose to the Grid: (1) geomagnetic
disturbances, or “GMDs” induced by solar coronal mass ejections (2) nuclear
electromagnetic pulse, or “EMP” attacks, and (3) cyber attacks. These threats are not
inventions of over-zealous science fiction writers, nor should those who call attention to
such threats be considered “Chicken Littles”. These three hazards and threats are
inconvenient realities in the 21st century.
Geomagnetic disturbances on the scale of the 1859 Carrington Event are expected to occur
roughly every 100-to-150 years. The potential consequences of a Carrington-class GMD in
today’s environment are almost impossible to bound. Both the U.S. and Russia conducted
tests of nuclear EMP weapons in the 1960s. Such attacks (at least theoretically) require
only one nuclear weapon and one launch vehicle. Given the proliferation of nuclear weapon
and ballistic missile technologies over the past few decades, the number of nation-states
capable of executing such attacks is growing. The U.S. Grid is under virtually continuous
cyber “probes” or “mini-attacks” today. Cyber “warfare” is an asymmetric threat in that
small, modestly resourced groups have the ability to inflict major damage on target nations
and their infrastructures. Cyber attacks have (on at least one occasion) already inflicted
crippling damage on a national Grid. Finally, climatologists today tell us the frequency of
superstorms, hurricanes, cyclones, and tsunamis is likely to increase over the coming
decades.
Terms such as “high-impact, low-frequency event” and “low-frequency, high-consequence
event” are being employed by some to characterize the types of events under consideration
here. This is a misleading application of the term “low frequency”. While it is difficult to
170

quantify probabilities and expected frequencies of malevolent human actions (such as EMP
and cyber attacks), there can be little debate at this point that the probability (expected
frequency) of a major GMD is not “low” given the normal use of the term in day-to-day
engineering risk management practice. Based on the best available heliophysics data, the
Earth is actually overdue for a Carrington-class GMD. The likelihood of a massive GMD is
well within the range of events that nations, industries (such as nuclear power,
telecommunications, transportation, health care, etc.) and individuals routinely and
aggressively seek to avoid, mitigate, and survive.
The Grid and Critical Infrastructure resilience dialog should include consideration of an
Extended Hazards and Threats Portfolio (relative to “normal” operations) – and that
includes Carrington-class GMDs, EMP attacks, and coordinated cyber and physical attacks
on the Grid.

9.4 Defining and Characterizing Grid Resilience For Normal and
Extended Hazard and Threat Portfolios
There is no current consensus on the definition of Grid resilience or the metrics of Grid
resilience. The reality that Grid resilience metrics must ultimately capture the “last mile”
implications of electricity delivery to the end-user, and that U.S. electric distribution systems
are not designed to provide high granularity (selectively) between loads, is an enormously
challenging consideration. Most Grid resilience metrics that have been suggested to date
are forensic in nature; they can only be estimated after an event has occurred. Truly useful
Grid resilience metrics are those which:
1. Encompass both routine Grid operations in the face of traditional hazards and
threats portfolios, and Grid operations under extended hazards and threats
portfolios that include GMDs, EMP attacks, and cyber attacks.
2. Are relatable in a transparent manner to the impacts of Grid resilience on the
performance of other Critical Infrastructure, and electricity end-users (ultimately on
societal health and welfare).
3. Can be numerically quantified
4. Can, for a defined Grid architecture and event, be predicted/estimated in advance of
the event.
5. Can be measured in situ in real-time during an event.
6. Can be utilized for comparison of the response and performance of different Grid
system compositions and architectures (at the generating, transmission, and
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distribution levels) to relevant natural hazards and human malevolent threats – and
therefore be useful for informing Grid design and investment decisions.
7. Are useful for development and implementation of Grid regulatory regimes that
enable monetization of resilience.
With regard to the electric generation system and individual generating units, useful Grid
resilience metrics must be able to reflect the Grid resilience impacts of:
1. Generating unit fuel diversity
2. Generating unit fuel security
3. Functional capabilities of different types of generating units and the manner in which
they are interfaced to the Grid (ability to be dispatched, Black Start capability, etc.)
The cognizant federal agencies (energy, homeland security, defense, commerce) should
partner with industry and academia to develop practical, science-based Grid and Critical
Infrastructure resilience metrics for both tactical and strategic Grid resilience. This will be a
long-term endeavor – one that requires a dialog as described in Section 9.1–9.2.

9.5 Quantification Of Grid Resilience: Toolbox Development
Once useful Grid metrics are selected, the computational simulation and real-time
measurement methods required to quantify (estimate and measure) the relevant
parameters must be created. Given the limitations of current Grid simulation tools and
computational platforms, the development of the credible Grid resilience simulation
capabilities is likely to be a decadal quest on par with other computational “Grand
Challenges” recently undertaken by various scientific and technical communities. However,
the development of predictive tools that require the power of the world’s most powerful
computing platforms would be of little practical day-to-day value to the typical Grid operator.
Progress can and should be made in the near-term by separately considering the Grid’s
three primary subsystems (generation, transmission, and distribution). The development of
qualitative heuristics for evaluation of Grid subsystem resilience should be a near-term
priority.
Cognizant federal agencies and the electric power industry, working in conjunction with
state and local governments, should mount an effort to address the Grid resilience
quantification issues discussed here. This effort will necessarily be paced by progress in
the areas discussed in Sections 9.2–9.3.
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9.6 Development Of Market Mechanisms For Monetizing Grid
Resilience
Most of the Grid infrastructure in the U.S. is privately owned. Deregulation of the U.S.
electricity market has resulted in fragmentation of the industry, and the demise of the
traditional vertically-integrated electricity company. The Grid is now comprised of
thousands of specialized business entities who own and/or operate only generation,
transmission, or distribution assets, or some combination of the three. These entities
operate both in regulated and deregulated (merchant) electricity markets. Grid resilience in
such an environment is almost inevitably a “tragedy of the commons” issue. Grid resilience
has become an essential, but invisible commodity – one that is not easily measured and is
therefore not valued. Nevertheless, mechanisms for incentivizing investments in Grid
resilience must be developed if U.S. Grid resilience is to be assured in the 21st century.
Federal and state governments should take leadership roles in the development of such
market mechanisms. This activity, like those discussed in Section 9.4, will be paced by
progress in the activities described in Section 9.3.

9.7 Development Of rNPP Conceptual Designs
A key contribution of the research described in this dissertation is the concept of a resilient
nuclear power plant or rNPP. Two rNPP Key Attributes and Six rNPP Functional
Requirements have been defined in a qualitative manner. Though useful as defined, terms
such as “robust” and “immunity” used in the current high-level rNPP functional requirements
must be quantified to facilitate responsive rNPP design.
A valid rNPP “design trade space” has been identified. Several NPP design features
(system architecture and technology options) that show promise for enabling rNPPs have
been discussed in a preliminary manner. The next logical step is to draw upon this
foundation to develop one or more specific rNPP preconceptual and conceptual designs.
Some SMR concepts currently under development appear to achieve one or more of the
Six rNPP Functional Requirements. Some of these concepts might be adapted/modified to
achieve more complete rNPP functionality.

9.8 Development Of rNPP Applications And Grid Integration
Approaches
The value of an rNPP will depend not only on the plant’s functionality, but the manner in
which the rNPP is integrated into its host Grid. This is particularly true in the case of rNPPs
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serving as Black Start Resources. Once preconceptual and conceptual rNPP designs are
available, the next step would be to investigate how existing and future Grids
(Interconnections, regional Grids, etc.) could/should be configured to maximize the benefits
the Grid can extract from an rNPP employed in one of more of the four applications defined
in Chapter 7. A next step would be for an existing Grid operator to perform such a study for
their system.

9.9 Evaluation Of rNPP Costs And Economic Viability
The capital, operating, and maintenance costs of rNPPs can be estimated once rNPP
conceptual designs are available. But this is only half of the information required to assess
rNPP economic viability. The other component of the rNPP value proposition is the
economic value of rNPPs’ Grid resilience contributions and the ancillary services rNPPs
could provide. (In this case, the definition of “ancillary service” could/should be extended to
include enablement of deeper renewable energy generation into the Grid.) Therefore, the
assessment of rNPP economic viability should proceed in concert with the activities outlined
in Sections 9.5 and 9.6.

9.10 Development And Deployment Of Resilient Critical Infrastructure
Islands (RCIIs)
The use of rNPPs as anchors of Resilient Critical Infrastructure Islands stands apart from
other potential rNPP applications in terms of its potential strategic value as a national
Critical Infrastructure and societal resilience asset. This is particularly the case in light of the
societal threats posted by natural events such space weather-induced GMDs, EMP attacks,
and cyber attacks on the Grid. The development of RCIIs concepts and their deployment
strategies would be primarily a federal responsibility. The cognizant federal entities would of
course have to work closely with industrial leaders from the different Critical Infrastructure
Sectors. Some potential RCII deployment strategies were discussed in Chapter 7. One
initial goal could/should be to place one RCII in each of the three U.S. Grid
Interconnections. Other approaches might be preferable for specific Grid/Critical
Infrastructure hazards and threats portfolios.
Two contemporaneous actions are in order. Cognizant military and civilian planners should
conduct a study to determine the appropriate U.S. RCII deployment strategy in light of U.S.
national interests and the extended hazards and threats portfolio. At the same time,
detailed geospatial maps should be created for each U.S. Critical Infrastructure Sector.
The regions of geospatial intersection between various Critical Infrastructure Sectors
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represent obvious RCII siting options. Specific plans for implementation of RCIIs can and
should be formulated once the results of these two studies are available.

9.11 Enhancing The Resilience Of Current U.S. Nuclear Power Plants
Existing U.S. nuclear power plants have a remarkable safety record. However their
operation has with few exceptions been limited to baseload electricity generation.
Additionally, their performance attributes during extended Grid blackouts (i.e. their need for
offsite support to maintain a safe shutdown state and the burden this requirements places
on Grid operators who would be immersed in Grid recovery efforts) is a reality. It is possible
that some of the rNPP design features identified in this study could be backfitted to existing
NPPs to enhance their performance capabilities and further improve their safety and
operating risk profiles – especially as they related to extended Grid blackouts. This said, it
seems unlikely such plant modifications could be justified on the basis of NRC’s current
Backfit Rule or a purely financial cost/benefit analysis during a time in which current NPPs
in merchant electricity markets are already under extreme financial pressure.
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10 CLOSING THOUGHTS
The scope of the analysis presented in this dissertation is expansive, necessarily
integrating knowledge, information, and concepts from diverse social, scientific, and
engineering disciplines. The depth of the analysis presented here is limited to that
achievable by one person, interacting with many people, but working in isolation. Thus this
analysis is best viewed as the first “baby step” along one possible path to enhanced U.S.
societal, Critical Infrastructure, and Grid resilience in the 21st century – and to a future in
which nuclear power’s promise as a transformational energy source is more fully realized.
The challenges and obstacles to achieving this future are numerous and immense. Much
work by many others will be required to validate the merit of the concepts presented here.
In the mean time, U.S. societal dependence on electricity continues to grow, and the
hazards and threats portfolio to the Grid continues to evolve.
Time may not be on our side.
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APPENDIX A – NUCLEAR POWER’S ROLE IN BLACK SKY GRID
RECOVERY: A LITERATURE REVIEW
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A1.

BACKGROUND

The U.S. electric Grid is vulnerable to a variety of natural hazards and man-made threats
presenting the potential to de-energize the Grid over large geographical regions for
extended periods of time in so-called “Black Sky Events” or “BSEs”. The nation’s ~ 100
commercial power reactors present unique challenges during BSEs due to their need for
continuous long-term shutdown cooling. This appendix documents the results of a literature
review conducted at the outset of the research effort documented in this report. The intent
of the review was to establish a basic understanding of the expected behavior of current
U.S. nuclear power plants during BSEs and extended Grid outages, and the role today’s
commercial nuclear power plants play in restoring Grid operations in the wake of a BSE.
This information was a critical starting point for formulation of the research approached
outlined in Chapter 3 of this report.
The reader is referred to Appendix B for the definition of unfamiliar terms.
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A2.

LITERATURE REVIEW APPROACH

The first step in the literature review process was to identify publications relevant to the
issue of nuclear power and Grid resiliency – and more specifically to the matter of nuclear
power and its role in Grid recovery following major Grid disruptions. A literature survey
was conducted via use of the major internet search engines (Google, Bing, etc.), searches
of online public document bases maintained by relevant regulatory agencies such as the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) ADAMS document archive, and via direct
inquiries to professionals in the electric power industry.
Publications identified in the survey step were then screened for content and categorized
with respect to their topical coverage and relevance.
Finally, key publications of particular relevance were reviewed in detail to extract major
observations and insights relative to operational, technical, regulatory, and economic issues
associated with the nuclear power/Grid resiliency issue.
Throughout the remainder of this appendix, notable observations from the literature will be
highlighted in red for ease of identification and assimilation.
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A3.

LITERATURE METADATA

It is useful to consider the following “search statistics” as a context for the review that
follows:
• A Google search conducted in August 2017 for the combined terms “nuclear” and
“grid recovery” returned 2150 results.
• A Google search conducted at the same time for the combined terms “nuclear” and
“power system restoration” returned 10,800 results.
These search results suggested there is a significant body of literature relevant to the
subject of this review. However, with a few notable exceptions to be discussed in this
report, the vast majority of these internet search “hits” proved to be of little technical value.
The void with respect to literature that deals specifically with NPPs and Grid recovery from
Black Sky or major Grid blackouts can be demonstrated by two examples:
• The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) published a volume
entitled, “Power System Restoration: Methodologies & Implementation Strategies” in
2000 [A3.1]. This volume, which is sometimes referred to by power system
professionals as “the Black Start Bible,” is a collection of 87 reprints from IEEE’s
Transactions on Power Systems, spanning the period between 1979 and 2000. It
contains only one paper (reviewed later in this report) devoted to the role of NPPs in
Grid recovery operations.
• More recently, Liu, Ran, and Terzija published a review of power system restoration
literature from the decade between 2006 and 2016 [A3.2]. Their review focused on
Black Start procedures, network reconfiguration for Grid recovery, and load
restoration during Grid recovery. The review, which cites 82 publications, does not
contain a single reference to nuclear power other than a brief mention of the
accident at Fukushima Daiichi.
Indeed, with a handful of exceptions to be discussed below, virtually all of the existing
literature deals in one manner or another with only one main issue: how to assure NPPs
quickly transition to and remain in a safe shutdown state during a blackout. Even issues
related to NPP restart and resynchronization following a blackout go largely unaddressed in
the scientific and technical literature.
The small body of academic and industrial literature identified in this review falls into one or
more of several topical categories. The relevant categories span a range of issues having
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to do with the NPP, the Grid, and the interfaces between them. Literature sources (of
authorship) include: U.S. federal agencies (regulatory and otherwise), industrial entities,
professional organizations, the federal research complex (e.g., national laboratories), and
academia.
The results of this literature review are organized to reflect the main relevant topical areas
treated in the published literature. The overwhelming majority of the published literature
simply establishes the context in which NPP–Black Sky events must be considered, rather
than dealing with the NPP-Black Sky or NPP Black Start issues themselves. The principal
relevant topical areas (“Categories”) treated in the literature are:
1. nuclear regulatory requirements (that establish the current NPP design and
operational safety context in which NPP–Black Sky issues must be considered)
2. transmission system regulatory requirements (that establish the current Grid
operational context (both normal operations and Black Start operations) in which
NPP-Black Sky issues must be considered)
3. NPP-Grid interface during routine operations (that provide a context for examining
NPP-Grid interface issues during Black Sky events)
4. Industry Grid recovery and Black Start plans
5. NPP-Grid interface requirements during Grid-recovery / Black Start operations.
The remainder of this appendix is organized in a manner mirroring these topical areas.
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A4.

RELEVANT REGULATORY LITERATURE

There are two federal agencies within the U.S. that have jurisdictional authority relevant to
NPPs and Black Sky issues: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). FERC’s regulatory authority primarily relates to
operation and reliability of the bulk power system. FERC typically operates by chartering
the not-for-profit North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to draft standards,
which FERC then reviews and approves. The NRC’s jurisdictional authority governs the
regulation of all matters relevant to the safety of commercial power reactors and NPPs.
The regulatory jurisdictions of the two agencies intersect at the interfaces between the NPP
and the bulk power system (the primary interface being the NPP station switchyard). They
also share jurisdictional authority in a limited number of other areas (such as cyber security)
that are beyond the scope of this review.

A4.1 FERC/NERC Regulations and Standards and Bulk Electric System
Regulatory Context
•

•

NERC Standard NUC-001-3, Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination – [A4.1]
requires coordination between NPP operators and transmission entities for the
purpose of ensuring NPP safe operation and shutdown. This standard stipulates
that NPP operators and their host transmission entities must adopt a set of “Nuclear
Plant Interface Requirements” or “NPIRs”. The scope of information and issues to
be addressed in the NPIRs is very broad, including structures, components, and
systems design and operational parameters; communications requirements,
operations and maintenance coordination, training, planning, and a host of other
interfacial issues. Noteworthy among the requirements placed upon NPP operators
and their host transmission entities in NUC-001-3 is Requirement R9.3.5, which
reads, “Provision for considering, within the restoration process, the requirements
and urgency of a nuclear plant that has lost all offsite and onsite AC power.”
NERC Standard EOP-005-2, System Restoration and Black Start Resources –
[A4.2] The purpose of this standard is to “Ensure plans, Facilities, and personnel
are prepared to enable System restoration from Black Start Resources to assure
reliability is maintained during restoration and priority is placed on restoring the
Interconnection… The Restoration plan shall allow for restoring the Transmission
Operator’s System following a Disturbance in which one or more areas of the Bulk
Electricity System (BES) shuts down and the use of Black Start Resources is
required to restore the shut down area to service, to a state whereby the choice of
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the next Load to be restored is not driven by the need to control frequency or
voltage regardless of whether the Black Start Resource is located within the
Transmission Operator’s System.” Notable among the requirements in EOP-005-2
is Requirement R1.2, which stipulates that the restoration plan shall include: “A
description of how all Agreements or mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols
for offsite power requirements of nuclear power plants, including priority of
restoration, will be fulfilled during System restoration.”
NERC also has issued a standard for geomagnetic disturbance operations [A4.3]. However
this standard does not directly address Black Start operations, nor nuclear power plant
issues.
The “bottom line” with respect to current FERC/NERC regulations and standards is: (1)
NPPs play no role in Black Start planning other than that of a “critical load” that must be
maintained / restored with the highest priority in order to facilitate their continued safe
shutdown state; (2) transmission system operators and utilities must have an agreed plan
and testable capability in place to assure sufficient offsite AC power is available to, or
promptly restored to the NPP to assure a safe shutdown state can be maintained for as
long as necessary during the blackout event, and (3) NPP operators and Transmission
System Operators must collaborate in defining Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements that
define the specific interfacial commitments each part can expect under all operating
conditions.

A4.2 Relevant NRC Regulations and Nuclear Safety Regulatory Context
A4.2.1 NPP’s Ability To Withstand Station Blackout
A station blackout or “SBO” is defined by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as “the
complete loss of alternating current (ac) electric power to the essential and nonessential
switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant (i.e., loss of offsite electric power system
concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system).
Station blackout does not include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station
batteries through inverters or by alternate AC sources as defined in this section, nor does it
assume a concurrent single failure or design basis accident. At single unit sites, any
emergency AC power source(s) in excess of the number required to meet minimum
redundancy requirements (i.e., single failure) for safe shutdown (non-DBA) is assumed to
be available and may be designated as an alternate power source(s) provided the
applicable requirements are met. At multi-unit sites, where the combination of emergency
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AC power sources exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements for safe shutdown (nonDBA) of all units, the remaining emergency AC power sources may be used as alternate
AC power sources provided they meet the applicable requirements. If these criteria are not
met, station blackout must be assumed on all the units.” [A.4]
10 § 50.63 [A4.5] mandates that power reactors licensed in the U.S. “must be able to
withstand for a specified duration and recover from a station blackout… The specified
station blackout duration shall be based on the following factors: (i) The redundancy of the
onsite emergency AC power sources; (ii) The reliability of the onsite emergency AC power
sources; (iii) The expected frequency of loss of offsite power; and (iv) The probable time
needed to restore offsite power.” The regulation goes on to state, “(2) The reactor core and
associated coolant, control, and protection systems, including station batteries and any
other necessary support systems, must provide sufficient capacity and capability to ensure
that the core is cooled and appropriate containment integrity is maintained in the event of a
station blackout for the specified duration.” Finally, the regulations states, “The alternate
AC power sources(s)… will constitute acceptable capability to withstand station blackout
provided an analysis is performed which demonstrates that the plant has this capability
from onset of the station blackout until the alternative AC source(s) and required shutdown
equipment are started and line up to operate… Alternate AC source(s) serving a multiple
unit site where onsite emergency AC sources are not shared between units must have, as a
minimum, the capacity and capability for coping with a station blackout in any of the units.
At sites where onsite emergency AC sources are shared between units, the alternative AC
source(s) must have the capacity and capability as required to ensure that all units can be
brought to and maintained in safe shutdown.”
An important observation with respect to these sections of 10 § 50.2 [A4.4] and 50.63
[A4.5] is that the duration of the station blackout which an NPP must endure is not
specified, but is a plant-specific parameter. Indeed, 10 § 50.63 does not address: (1)
station blackouts involving damage to both the onsite and offsite AC power sources
(including unavailability of alternate AC power), or (2) station blackouts that extend
indefinitely [A4.6].
A4.2.2 NPP Electric Power System Design Requirements
10 § 50 Appendix A [A4.7] contains sixty-four “General Design Criteria” (“GDC”s) each
commercial nuclear power plant design must meet. General Design Criteria establish
“minimum requirements for the principal design criteria.” “Principal design criteria…
establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance
requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety; that is,
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structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility
can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.” GDC-17, entitled
“Electric Power Systems” defines the high-level functional requirements and the system
architecture the NPP’s electrical power systems must meet. Briefly summarized, GDC-17
mandates that each NPP must have both an onsite and offsite power supply to permit
functioning of all structures, systems, and components required to assure (1) acceptable
fuel design limits and design conditions for the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not
exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) the core is cooled and
containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated
accidents.
Onsite electric power supplies (including batteries and the onsite electric distribution
system) must have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their
safety functions assuming a single failure. Electric power from the transmission network
(offsite power supplies) must incorporate two physically independent circuits (not
necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize the
likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating, postulated accident, and
environmental conditions. A common switchyard for the two independent offsite supply
circuits is acceptable. One of the two offsite circuits must be designed to be available
within seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident. Efforts must be made to minimize the
probability of a coincidental loss of power from the reactor, the onsite power sources, or the
offsite power sources, or that a loss of any one of these sources can lead to the loss of the
others.
NRC Regulatory Guides 1.32 [A4.8] describes a method the NRC deems acceptable for
complying with their mandated electrical power system design, operation and testing of
NPP electric power systems (specifically GDC-17). The guideline affirms that adherence to
IEEE Standard 308-2012, “Criteria for Class 1 E Power Systems for Nuclear Power
Generating Stations,” [A4.9] is an acceptable approach for satisfying NRC’s requirements.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.93 [A4.10] describes guidelines the NRC considers acceptable
when the number of available electrical power sources are less than the number of sources
required by the LCOs. (LCOs or “limiting conditions for operation” are codified in the plant
Technical Specifications, and identify the lowest functional capability or performance level
of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.)
LCOs are very relevant to NPP operation in station blackout environments and to postblackout NPP restart protocols. LCOs dictate the NPP’s systems functional capabilities and
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conditions required to enable plant restart, and can be the controlling factor in the time
required to restart the NPP after shutdown – especially in the case of failure of the
surrounding Grid.

A4.2.3 NPP Black Sky Coping Capability and FLEX
Following the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP in March 2011, the U.S. NRC
embarked upon an effort to identify “lessons-learned” from the event, and to convolve those
lessons into the U.S. NPP regulatory framework [A4.11]. One of the many outcomes of this
effort was the issuance of NRC Order EA-12-049 [A4.12] in March of 2012. This order
required U.S. NPPs to identify and implement strategies to enhance their ability to safely
cope without their normal electric power sources for indefinite periods of time. Specifically,
“Order EA-12-049 requires a three-phase approach for mitigating BDBEEs.” (Author Note:
See Appendix B for definition of BDBEE.) “The initial phase requires the use of installed
equipment and resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling
capabilities. The transition phase requires providing sufficient, portable, onsite equipment
and consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be accomplished with
resources brought from off site. The final phase requires obtaining sufficient offsite
resources to sustain those functions indefinitely.” [A4.12] In November 2015, the NRC
issued a notice of proposed rule making [A4.13], that would apply EA-12-049 to any
operating or future U.S. nuclear power plant.
EA-12-049 is very relevant to the issue of NPPs and BSEs, because it mandates that
essential reactor cooling functions be maintained indefinitely in the presence of a complete
station blackout, and approves the use of offsite resources and infrastructure to accomplish
this function.
The U.S. nuclear industry, lead by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), responded to this
order by developing the “FLEX Program” (NEI 12-06 in various revisions) [A4.14]. As
stated in [A4.14], “The objective of FLEX is to establish an indefinite coping capability to
prevent damage to the fuel in the reactor and spent fuel pools and to maintain the
containment function by using plant equipment and FLEX equipment.” The coping actions
are organized into three “phases” consistent with EA-12-049:
• Phase I – Coping strategies rely on equipment already installed at the NPPs (plant
specific duration, but at least 24 hours).
• Phase II – Coping strategies involve the use of FLEX equipment and consumables
pre-staged on site.
• Phase III – Coping strategies rely on additional capabilities and redundancy from
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offsite equipment “until power, water, and coolant injection systems are restored or
commissioned.” [A4.14]
Thus, Phase I and II coping strategies rely on resources already installed or pre-staged
onsite, while Phase III coping strategies rely on delivery of additional resources to the NPP
from offsite locations.
Subsequent to NEI’s submission of NEI 12-06, the NRC issued interim guidance (JLD-ISG2012-01) [A4.15] endorsing with some exceptions, the FLEX Program as one acceptable
approach for an NPP owner to comply with the requirements codified in EA-12-049. As of
July 2016, some 68 of 100 commercial power reactors in the U.S. were in compliance with
EA-12-049 by virtue of having implemented the FLEX program [A4.16]. All NPPs have
emergency diesel generators (including spares) located onsite for provision of backup
power in the event of a SBO or other extended Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) event. Many,
if not all NPPs have already expanded, or are in the process of expanding their onsite
emergency diesel fuel supplies as an element of their FLEX program implementation.
Our nation’s NPPs have invested heavily in the FLEX program and related mitigation
actions in response to EA-12-049. Nevertheless, the question remains, “How effective will
FLEX strategies be in enabling NPPs to cope with Black Sky Events involving simultaneous
and extended degradation of multiple Critical Infrastructure Sectors?”
NEI 12-06 states, “Once the analysis determines the FLEX equipment requirements for
extended coping the licensee should obtain the required onsite equipment and ensure
appropriate arrangements are in place to obtain the necessary offsite equipment including
its deployment at the site in the time required by the analysis for the purpose of sustaining
functions indefinitely. In planning the coping strategies, water and fuel resources, among
other things, needed to cope indefinitely would imply the need for an infinite source of
supply. Since site access is considered to be restored to near-normal within 24 hours, by
72 hours from the event initiation, outside resources should be able to be mobilized by that
time such that a continuous supply of needed resources will be able to be provided to the
site. Within these first 72 hours a site will have deployed its FLEX strategies which should
result in a stable plant condition on the FLEX equipment and plans will have been
established to maintain the key safety functions for the long term. Therefore, FLEX
strategies and/or resources are not required to be explicitly planned in advance for the
period beyond 72 hours.” [A4.16]
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Although the exact nature of an NPPs response to EA-12-049 and its FLEX implementation
approach are plant-specific, an NPP that has implemented the FLEX program should be
able to sustain all functions required for safe shutdown for a minimum of 72 hours
employing only resources available onsite – perhaps much longer depending on the
preparatory actions it has taken (e.g., Increased onsite diesel fuel inventories, pre-staged
diesel generator spares and diesel-driven pumps onsite, etc.). Nevertheless, at some point
during a continuing Grid blackout, the NPPs ability to maintain a safe shutdown status for
the duration of the Black Sky Event will be completely dependent on offsite support –
support that must be delivered by a civil infrastructure that is likely to have been seriously
compromised or damaged.
Thus (presuming no damage to NPP systems) the real challenge to NPPs in Black Sky
Events will begin at the initiation of FLEX Phase III, as the plants become dependent on
offsite support in order to remain in a safe shutdown condition. Based on current plantspecific configurations, this transition from Phase II to Phase III will be reached somewhere
between three days and a few weeks after the onset of the Black Sky Event.
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A5.

NPP-GRID INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS

A5.1 NPP-Grid Interface Requirements
A number of publications were identified that deal in various ways with the nature of the
interface between the NPP and the Grid during normal operations. The physical
manifestation of this interface is, of course, the NPP’s switchyard. Much of the literature
deals with interface requirements and issues related to (1) the quality of the offsite power
provided to the NPP, and (2) the constraints on the load-following capability (real and
reactive power demand, phase/power angle, power ramping rate, etc.) of the NPP. These
publications are briefly reviewed below.
Reference A5.1 (1983), deals with the selection and integration of NPPs into electric Grids
(large and small). The report discusses key Grid and NPP operating characteristics that
must be reconciled if NPPs are to function safely and efficiently in the Grid. Emphasis is
placed on the Grid’s ability to provide high reliable and high-quality (stable voltage and
frequency) power to the NPP for startup and shutdown cooling, and the ability of the NPP to
maneuver as necessary to match the loads placed upon it by the Grid. Basic NPP startup
scenarios are described, along with reactor power set-back and load change limitations are
discussed.
Reference A5.2 (1987) extends the analysis documented in Reference A5.1 to focus on
the introduction of NPPs into small Grids. The report discusses issues stemming from the
large size of the NPP’s generating capacity relative to total Grid load demand, and the
special challenges small Grids face with respect to frequency and voltage control, reactive
power balance, and fault handling. The report reviews the dynamic behavior of an NPP in
response to voltage and frequency transients and the limits of NPP’s ability to respond to
various types of Grid transients.
Much of the discussion in References A5.1 and A5.2 is relevant to consideration of the use
of NPPs as Black Start Units in a Black Sky Event in which the Grid is fractured into a
number of smaller “generation/load islands”.
References A5.3 (2001) and A5.4 (2011) focus on NPP safety considerations related to
Grid power quality (for offsite power supply to the NPP) and load behavior. These two
publications review four basic types of transients: load rejection / loss of external load,
degraded voltage and frequency, loss of offsite power due to external Grid disturbances,
and the special case of the trip of an NPP that is carrying a large portion of the Grid’s load,
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producing a cascading Grid collapse that results in the loss of the tripped NPP’s own offsite
power. The special challenges associated with long-term shutdown decay heat removal
are also discussed. Finally the key assumptions regarding the NPP-Grid interface that are
“built into” the NPP design are discussed. These assumptions include (1) the quality of the
offsite power supply to the NPP is such that startup of the NPP’s largest pump motors will
not “droop” grid voltage/frequency to levels that trip the plant, (2) NPPs will not be called
upon to load faster than 5% per minute, (3) NPPs will be capable of unloading at ~ 5-10%
per minute without tripping. All of these considerations are relevant to the discussion of
NPP response, restart, and reloading following in a Black Sky Event.
Reference A5.5 (2007) reviews the history of NPP performance in the face of Grid voltage
and frequency perturbations and concluded that an increasing penetration of nuclear power
on the Grid has the potential to increase Grid fragility due to the fact that NPPs “do not
provide automatic generation control in response to frequency decay and are also limited in
providing voltage support.” Again, these conclusions are relevant to the challenge
embodied in restarting and operating NPPs in a Black Sky environment during a time when
the Grid will be vulnerable to abnormal load variations.
Reference A5.6 (2009) presents a broad overview of the issues involved in interfacing
NPPs with the Grid. It begins with a discussion of the brief history of large-scale Grid failure
events, a review of the structure of the electric Grid, Grid operations, specific NPP-Grid
interface requirements, NPP operational modes, and a detailed treatment of disturbances
that have the ability to challenge the NPP-Grid interface and lead to NPP shutdown. This is
followed with a discussion of the potential for NPP performance limitations and shutdowns
to lead to Grid failure. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at
strengthening NPP-Grid system resilience by enhancing the bulk electric system’s ability to
accommodate unanticipated trips of NPPs.
Reference A5.7 (2009) is (along with Reference A5.9) the most detailed examination
published to date of NPP-Grid interface issues as they related to NPP safety. The report,
published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s)
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) describes the rational behind NPP electrical system design
and its “defense in depth” philosophy; examines the benefits and risks of enabling NPPs to
decouple from the Grid and run at the (much) reduced power levels required to meet its
own house loads; examines the offsite power supply requirements for NPP protection and
control systems; discusses desirable NPP electrical system “fail safe conditions” that would
reduce the NPP’s vulnerability to Grid faults and perturbations; examines a number of
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specific NPP electrical system design issues that impact the ability of the NPP to withstand
Grid fault, voltage, and frequency transients, and discusses the role of the NPP operators
and communications systems in managing the NPP-Grid interface. Reference A5.7 is very
relevant to the question of if, and if so how, NPPs might be configured to reliably “runback
and run through” a BSE.
Reference A5.8 was published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2012.
The report was “intended to provide an understanding of the characteristics of the electrical
grid system from the point of view of an NPP and the special requirements of an NPP with
regard to its grid connection; the quality and reliability of its electrical supply.” The report,
“…describes the necessary characteristics of the electrical grid system that are required for
the connection and successful operation of an NPP, and the characteristics of an NPP that
are significant for the design and operation of the electric grid system.” Among other
things, this report discussed the key design features of NPPs and how they impact the
NPP’s need for a stable and reliable Grid system, issues associated with integrating large
NPPs into small Grids, the range of Grid events that have the potential to impact NPP
safety systems; the need for and role of effective communications between the NPP
operator and the transmission system operator (TSO) on NPP startup and operations.
Reference A5.9 focuses on the regulatory requirements and standards relative to Grid
voltage and frequency control that must be met during NPP operation, and discusses a few
anecdotal incidences that demonstrate the approaches various NPP and Grid operators
have taken to ensure these standards are met.
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A6.

NPP LOAD-FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES

A small subset of the literature deals with the ability of NPPs to follow varying loads.
Reference A6.1 (2011) and A6.2(2011) document the results of a study by the OECD-NEA
to examine the load-following capability of current-generation nuclear power plants. The
reports observe that most current-generation NPPs were actually designed to be capable of
maneuvering between ~ 50% and 100% of rated power, with a rate of change of 3-5% of
rate power per minute. Many NPPs in Europe currently operate in this manner.
Reference A6.3 (2014) is a presentation given at the IAEA Technical Meeting on Flexible
(Non-Baseload) Operation for Load Follow and Frequency Control in New Nuclear Power
Plants, in Erlangen, Germany. The presentation points out that NPPs prefer a reliable Grid
with frequency control within plus or minus 1%, and voltage control within plus or minus 5%.
It briefly summarizes the responsibilities of the Grid System Operator / TSO, the NPP
operator, the electricity or energy regulator, and the nuclear regulator in defining the NPPGrid interface requirements. The presentation focuses significant attention on one potential
NPP-Grid interface issue: the problem of “low inertia,” or the tendency for Grid frequency to
“free-fall” in the wake of Grid disturbances if the Grid is host to significant variable speed
wind turbines, solar panels, or high voltage direct current (HVDC) inverters. This behavior
can pose a significant problem for NPPs due to the tight tolerances their offsite power
sources must meet.
Reference A6.4 (2014) is unique among the documents identified in this survey. It is a
forward-looking analysis of the increasing need for operational flexibility in NPPs (“flexible
power operations” or “FPO”), and the implications of this growing need on future NPP
design and operations. The report discusses specific NPP structures, systems, and
components (SSC) design features that inhibit for facilitate FPO, the potential impact of
FPO on these SSCs, FPO implications for NPP balance of plant design and operability,
NPP FPO operating modes, and other related issues. This report provides a good point of
departure for considering the types of NPP modifications and design evolutions needed to
enhance the ability of NPPs to serve as Black Start and “early start” generating units in the
wake of a Black Sky Event.
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A7.

NPP OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN BLACKOUTS

This section provides a brief summary of available literature that focuses on operating
experiences involving NPPs in “degraded Grid” or blackout conditions.
Reference A7.1 (2007) provides an analysis of the “Millstone-2 Undervoltage Event” of
1976 in which the NPP’s operators attempted to restart the plant promptly after an
undervoltage trip resulted in additional undervoltage transients that placed the plant at
higher risk than the original initiating event.
Reference A7.2 (2008) presents a concise overview of eleven events in North America that
involved significant NPP-Grid interactions between 1965 and 2008, beginning with the
Great Northeast Blackout of November 1965. The initiating event and the subsequent
event cascade are described in each case, along with a description of the behavior and role
of the “participating” NPPs in each event. This presentation is notable in that it presents an
interesting chronology tracing the evolution of commercial NPP’s ability to cope with load
perturbations. According to the author, the first commercial NPPs had the ability to respond
to ± 10% step load changes. The next series of NPPs had the ability to stay online
following 50% load rejection via 45% steam bypass and automatic reactor regulation.
Some mid 1970’s vintage U.S. NPPs had the ability to stay online following a full load
rejection by bypassing 85% of turbine steam to large condensers coupled with cutting back
reactor power to housekeeping load levels. The NPPs designed and built during the 1980’s
had the ability to stay on line following a full load rejection, runback to house load without
tripping the unit, but with a smaller steam bypass capability (~55%) coupled with more
aggressive reactor regulation. The basic design objective in the event of a major load
disruption was to “island the NPP, runback to House Load, allow the grid to stabilize, then
use the NPP to restart grid consistent with FPC report” (here, “FPC report” refers to
Reference A.7.3). The author traces the subsequent compartmentalization and
specialization of the NPP design practice into separate reactor design, turbine design, and
balance of plant design disciplines with fixed interfacial requirements between each,
resulting in inadequate attention being given to the integrated plant behavior and response
to loss of load events.
Reference A7.3 (2014) presents a detailed discussion of the performance of nuclear power
plants in the U.S. and Canada during the August 14, 2003 blackout that impacted large
portions of the Midwest and Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada. Nine U.S. NPPs
and seven Canadian NPPs experienced rapid shutdowns during the event. (Many non200

nuclear generating units also tripped offline during the event.) These shutdowns were
triggered by the NPPs’ automatic reactor protection systems. While four of the nine U.S.
units that tripped offline returned to service three days later, the last of the nine did not
return to service for eight days (August 22). Four Canadian NPPs disconnected from the
Grid due to the impact of the electrical transients they experienced, but continued to
operate at reduced power levels while offline. These four units returned to service within 7
hours of the event and were available to assist in restoring the Grid. The last of the
remaining Canadian units did not return to serve for eleven days (August 25). Six NPPs in
the U.S. and one in Canada were able to ride through the event and continue generating
electricity. Some seventy other NPPs in the U.S. experienced some level of load or offsite
power disturbance. The report concluded that NPPs “did not trigger the power outage or
inappropriately contribute to its spread.” The report is a very useful starting point for
examining how differences in Canadian and U.S. NPP design and (NPP and Grid)
operational characteristics impacted the NPPs’ performance during and after the event.
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A8.

NPPs AND GRID RESTORATION

A8.1 Background
Adibe, Adams, Jenkins, and Gill [A8.1] provided an analysis of NPP requirements during
power system restoration as an element of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE) Power System Restoration Working Group in 1995. This paper is the
sole publication identified in this literature review that focuses specifically on the
issues associated with NPPs and Grid restoration. Reference A8.2 (by the same
author) integrates some of the conclusions of Reference A8.1 into a broader discussion of
post-blackout Grid restoration procedures. Reference A8.3 echoes many of the
observations and conclusions from Reference A8.1. The following points are conveyed in
the papers:
1. An NPP’s plant technical specifications (see below) detail the conditions that must
exist before an NPP that has automatically tripped or has been manually taken
offline can restart. The optimal mode for NPP restart following a Grid disruption is
“hot standby”. (See discussion of reactor operating modes below.)
2. NPPs that have been manually taken offline in a controlled manner might return to
service within 24 - 48 hours. Plants that automatically trip in response to external
stimuli could take considerable longer to return to service. For these reasons,
current Grid restoration plans focus on providing assured offsite power to the NPPs
in order to maintain their safe shutdown condition, while restoring as much of the
service area load as possible without any assistance from the NPPs. Therefore, full
customer restoration may not be achievable for many days in areas in which nuclear
power constitutes a significant fraction of the generation mix.
3. Grid restoration strategies involving NPPs must incorporate real-time knowledge
about the NPPs generation (mode) status, and must facilitate intimate and
continuous communications between the NPP operator and the Grid system
operator.
4. Grid restoration is typically a “bottoms-up” approach. NPPs interface with the Grid
via extra high voltage (EHV) transmission lines that are neither available nor stable
early in the Grid restoration process. Given the power maneuvering limitations of
large NPP turbogenerators, the ability to rebuild a sufficient amount of stable load
for the NPP is a crucial constraint on the speed with which NPPs can return to
service and contribute to the early Grid restoration process.
5. Premature attempts to reload large NPPs can result in system-wide voltage and
frequency perturbations that can trigger automatic NPP and Grid system protection
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measures resulting in generating unit trips and Grid re-fragmentation (i.e. premature
attempts to restart/reload large NPPs can make matters worse rather than better.)

A8.2 Impact of NPP Operating Mode Status on Restart Capability
As noted in Reference A8.1, commercial nuclear power plants have several “operating
modes” and rules for transitioning between these modes, which influence the ability of and
schedule for an NPP returning to service and reattaching to the Grid in the event of a major
Grid disruption event. The definition of the modes differs between reactor types and reactor
vendors [A8.4] [A8.5]. Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) have six operational modes,
while boiling water reactors (BWRs) have only five modes. However, in all cases, a
particular mode is defined by a unique combination of reactor thermal power level, reactor
average coolant temperature, and the status of the reactor closure head bolts (all fully
tensioned or not).
Westinghouse PWRs are the most prevalent reactor type in the U.S. commercial nuclear
fleet. These reactors have six operating modes. [A8.4]
• Mode 1 or “Power Operation” is the mode in which the reactor is tied to the Grid and
producing power above 5% of its rated thermal power
• Mode 2 is the “Startup Mode,” in which the reactor is ascending in power output (I.e.
to Mode 1), but is operating at or below 5 % of its rated thermal power.
• Mode 3 is termed “Hot Standby,” in which the reactor is subcritical and its average
coolant temperature is greater than or equal to 350 ºF. (This mode is unique to
PWRs.)
• Mode 4 or “Hot Shutdown” is the mode in which the reactor is subcritical and its
coolant temperature greater than 200 ºF but less than 350 ºF.
• Mode 5 or “Cold Shutdown” is the state in which the reactor is subcritical and its
average coolant temperature is at or below 200 ºF.
• Mode 6 is the “Refueling Mode” in which the reactor vessel is either open, or not
fully sealed, as would be the case during refueling operations at the plant.
It is important to note that Modes 3-5 all involve a reactor system that is sealed and ready
to evolve to the next higher operating mode.
With respect to NPPs and Black Sky Events, the relevance of reactor operating modes is
that the operating mode the plant is in at any time dictates the speed with which the NPP
can return to service (I.e. “Mode 1”) when called upon to do so. This is true because the
plant’s technical specifications dictate a diverse set of LCOs, surveillances, checks, tests,
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and conditions that must be executed or achieved as pre-requisites for moving or “evolving”
between operating modes. In addition, the manner in which an NPP evolved to its present
operating mode (e.g., whether the plant was tripped by the reactor protection system, or
whether the plant was manually shutdown in a controlled manner), and the reactor’s
operating history (reactor fuel burnup) also impact the operating mode evolution protocol.
Given current NPP configurations and technical specifications, it is likely a PWR NPP
involved in an extended Black Sky Event would be in either “Cold Shutdown” or “Refueling
Mode” (if it was in that mode prior to the onset of the BSE) at the beginning of its restart
evolution. Thus, an NPP’s operating modes, LCOs, and operating history are of great
importance with respect to consideration of its ability to and schedule for return to service in
the wake of a Black Sky Event.
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A9.

NPPs ROLE IN SYSTEM RESTORATION PLANNING

The availability of individual TSO/ISO Grid restoration plans is quite limited in the open
literature. Although NERC EOP-005-2 and NUC-001 require every TSO/ISO to have a
system restoration plan, NERC does not require the operators to openly publish their plans.
The two system restoration plans identified in this literature survey that address the role of
NPPs in a system restoration are reviewed below.

A9.1 The Role of NPPs in PJM’s System Restoration Planning
PJM is a U.S. Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) that coordinates the flow of
wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West
Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Reference A9.1 (2016) describes PJM’s system
restoration plan.
“The high level strategy of the PJM System Restoration Plan is to restore the integrity of
the interconnection as quickly as possible. In general, the following steps are taken by
PJM, Transmission Owners and Generation Operators:
• Perform a system assessment to determine event of outage
• Start Black Start units to form islands
• Build cranking paths to other generations units, nuclear stations and critical gas
facilities
• Restore critical load as defined in Attachment A
• Synchronize and interconnect islands to form larger islands
• Connect to outside areas
• Return to normal operations”
The report continues:
“Minimum Criteria for Meeting Objectives of Reliability Coordinators Restoration Plan (EOP006-2 R1.1)
• Provide nuclear stations with auxiliary power to maintain safe shutdown. Target
time for restoration of this auxiliary power is 4 hours
• Restore interconnections between all internal TOs
• Restore interconnections to all external Reliability Coordinator Areas.”
“…Nuclear units require additional consideration. Restoring customer load will normally
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need to be accomplished without the help of nuclear units due to their start up
requirements. Generally, the following prerequisites are necessary to restart a nuclear unit:
(1) A minimum of two independent offsite power sources need to be available; (2) Adequate
actual and unit trip contingency voltages must be observed on the transmission system
supplying the nuclear unit; and (3) Stable system frequency must be present. Any decisions
regarding the satisfying of the prerequisites for startup must be made by the nuclear plant
personnel. NRC start-up checklists do not permit hot restarts of nuclear units and their
diesels are not permitted to supply auxiliary power to other generating stations. Nuclear
units that are taken offline on a controlled shutdown can normally be restored to service
between 24 and 48 hours following the controlled shutdown.”
“…Offsite safe shutdown power should be restored as soon as possible to nuclear units,
both units that had been operating and those that were already offline prior to the system
disturbance, without regard to using these units for restoring customer load. Transmission
Owners and Nuclear Power Plants must effectively communicate to keep Nuclear Power
Plant apprised of the anticipated restoration time for offsite power.”
“…Shutdown generating units that do not have black start capability require start-up
cranking power from an offsite source… The following types of paths are defined: …
• Critical Restoration Path (Nuclear) – transmission path from a Black Start unit (or
other source) that provides offsite power to a nuclear plant’s auxiliary equipment to
allow the nuclear plant to maintain safe shutdown…”
Reference A9.2 (2016) defines, in detail the procedural protocols required for interactions
and communications between an NPP and the Grid during blackout situations. It makes
extensive reference to the use of Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) as defined
in NERC NUC-001, [A4.1] but does not define specific operational protocols or restart
protocols for NPPs during a blackout condition.

A9.2 The Role of NPPs in Ontario Power System’s Restoration Planning
With an installed electrical generating capacity of over 17,000 MWe, the Ontario Power
System produces almost 50% of Ontario’s electricity. About sixty percent of its power
comes from NPPs (CANDU units) and about forty percent from hydroelectric stations.
Reference A9.3 (2016) discusses Ontario Power’s restoration plan of the Ontario Power
System. Section 3.1 (Objective) of the report states…
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“Following a blackout, our objective is to regain a reliable integrated power system by
restoring the grid using the available equipment. In doing so, we must ensure that voltage,
frequency, and power flows are controlled so that restoration does not damage customer or
poor system equipment or re-collapse the grid. We meet this objective through execution of
the strategy.”
Section 3.2 (Strategy) continues…
“Following a major disturbance, the grid may be totally or partially blacked-out and may
contain isolated electrical islands consisting of load and generation. The overall strategy is
to:
• Stabilize any surviving islands
• Recover generation
• Energize transmission
• Restore loads
• Synchronize islands to each other and to the remainder of the Eastern
Interconnection
Execution of the the strategy should reflect the priorities and load restoration principles
below.”
Section 3.3 (Priorities) indicates the first priority for grid restoration is to…
“1. Restore grid-supplied power to all nuclear sites – to secure the generation units and
make them available to assist in restoration as soon as possible.” The report continues…
“…although restoring power to nuclear sites is the number one priority we will first need to
restore some critical power system loads to enable this outcome.”
Under Section 3.4 (Load Restoration Principles), the report states: “Surviving large thermal
generation units (fossil and nuclear) need to be reloaded as soon as possible after the
disturbance, otherwise the thermal stresses and other physical limitations can slow
recovery or prevent them from recovering. So after the transmission path to these
generation units is built, they must be reloaded as quickly as possible, typically using large
blocks of load.”
Sections 4.2 and 4.4 address a unique NPP operating constraint that is particularly relevant
to CANDU reactors due to their low excess reactively margins and inability to override
xenon poisoning. (This issue can also be relevant to some light water reactors depending
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on their average core burnup and the point in their operating cycle when the shutdown
occurs… Section 4.2 (Recover Generation) states “…surviving thermal and nuclear facilities
must be loaded to respective minimum load points as soon as possible to ensure they
remain available to support restoration. This may include providing their own unit service.
Failure to respect these minimums mean loss of the generation unit (poisoned out nuclear
units) or very slow reloading times.” Section 4.4 (Restoring Load), states, “In the early
stages of restoration, load is restored solely to maintain an acceptable voltage profile and to
ensure the survival of nuclear and fossil generation units so they will be available for
subsequent phases of restoration. Nuclear units are unavailable to the grid for a minimum
of 36 hours if they are allowed to poison out.”
CANDU NPPs do participate in Ontario Hydro’s Grid recovery operations to a much larger
extent than is the case with U.S. LWRs. This is possible, in large part, because of the
CANDU plant’s ability to deal more effectively than U.S. LWRs with load rejection; it is
necessary both because of Ontario Hydro’s dependence on nuclear power (~ 60% of total
generating capacity), and the fact that CANDU NPPs become incapable of restarting for an
extended period if they are not restarted within 36 hours due to xenon poisoning.

A9.3 FERC–NERC Assessment of Current Industry Grid Restoration Plans
NERC recently published the results of a review of a “representative sample of nine
registered entities with significant bulk power grid responsibilities” [A9.4]. This review,
commissioned in 2014 and completed in 2016, examined the entities’ system restoration,
response, and recovery plans (including procedures for deploying Black Start resources);
their actual practices; and Black Start experience. Among the major conclusions and
recommendations of the FERC–NERC review that are relevant to the issue of NPPs and
BSEs were:
1. “Overall, the joint staff review team found that the participants have system
restoration plans that, for the most part, are thorough and highly-detailed.”
2. “Those transmission operators responsible for providing primary or back-up service
to nuclear power plants prioritize the restoration of offsite power to those plants for
safe shutdown.”
3. “…All participants’ plans clearly identify as a top priority reestablishing offsite power
supply to nuclear power plants”.
4. Some participants in the study identifed a set of non-black start generators that are
designed to start-up quickly (e.g., in 4 hours or less), and prioritize the provision of
cranking power to them from the black start units.
5. Additional attention should be given to system restoration planning steps that may
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be difficult if Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), Inter-Control
Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) and/or Energy Management System (EMS)
operability is degraded or absent.
6. Studies should be conducted to assess the “availability of black start resources,
including the identification of strategies for replacing black start resources going
forward and factors to be considered for such replacement resources (e.g.,
locational diversity, dual fuel, etc.)”.
7. Studies should be performed to “identify options for expanding restoration plan
testing beyond the currently-required black start resource testing, to ensure the
black start resource can energize equipment needed to restore the system as
intended in the restoration plan.”
Some observations relative to the FERC–NERC review findings include:
• With respect to #1 above, FERC’s use of the qualifiers “Overall” and “for the most
part” imply that not all U.S. RTOs / TSOs are adequately prepared for Black Start
recovery operations.
• With respect to #1 above (the overall finding from the report), the Electric
Infrastructure Security (EIS) Council summarizes their view of the NERC report’s
overall conclusion in the following terms, stating that the report “…has confirmed that,
under stressing “Gray Sky” conditions, the power industry’s Black Start system
provides a solid foundation for grid restoration… However “Black Sky” hazards
represent a substantial departure from Gray Sky events. Power outages like
Superstorm Sandy, while challenging, have not been characterized by a general
communications breakdown or widely distributed damage to power grid hardware
and SCADA control systems. Blackouts in such severe scenarios will not be quickly
recoverable. Power outage durations would be unprecedented, and the resulting
disruption of civil communications, transportation, water and other lifeline
infrastructures would make conventional Black Start restoration procedures
unworkable.”
• With respect to #2 and # 3 above, FERC appears to be satisfied that operating
entities have taken the appropriate steps to assure restoration of offsite power to
NPPs will receive top priority in the event of a Grid disruption event.
• With respect to # 5, there is a high likelihood that SCADA, ICCP and EMS
infrastructures would be compromised if the BSE event were triggered by a
Carrington-Class Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD) or an Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) attack.
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The summary conclusion from this review of existing industry Grid recovery planning is that
current plans do not fully address the widespread damage and infrastructure disruption
(electric power system and all other civil infrastructures) that distinguish a Black Sky Event
from shorter duration Grid failures.
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A10. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW

1.

Today’s electric Grid restoration strategies employ a “bottoms-up” incremental
approach to rebuilding load and generating capacity (typically with incremental steps
as small as several MWe) within Grid “islands” (fragmented and isolated portions of
the Grid). These islands are eventually reconnected via high-voltage transmission
lines and interties once the islands are stable.

2.

While there is a large body of literature that is broadly relevant to the issue of NPPs
and Grid recovery, virtually all of this literature deals in one way or another with one
issue: that of maintaining NPPs in a safe shutdown state during a blackout.

3.

Commercial nuclear power plants within the U.S. do not participate in the early stages
of post-blackout Grid restoration process other than as priority loads that must be
continually served or restored as a first priority in order to maintain their safe
shutdown status.

4.

NPP’s require both high-quality offsite cranking power (from voltage and frequency
standpoint) to restart, and high-quality stable loads to remain attached to the Grid.
Both of these conditions are, by definition, compromised in Black Sky Events.

5.

Premature attempts to reattach a nuclear plant to the Grid before the Grid is stable
(from the frequency and voltage standpoint), can lead to the NPP tripping off line and
destabilization of the Grid in the midst of the Grid recovery process (i.e. premature
attachment of an NPP to an unstable Grid can exacerbate an already bad situation).

6.

Nuclear power plants are loaded by high-voltage transmission lines that typically are
not energized until late in the Grid restoration process. Due to this fact, and (probably
to a lesser extent) the NPP’s relatively large minimum generating capacity, NPPs (at
least in the U.S.) do not participate in the early stages of Grid restoration.

7.

By virtue of design, licensing, and operating protocols, the Canadian CANDU reactors
play a more significant role in Grid restoration than do their U.S. light water reactor
counterparts.

8.

Virtually all commercial NPPs were originally engineered to have a 50-100% loadfollowing capabilities and ramp rate potentials of ~ 5% of rated capacity/min within
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certain power ranges. Many NPPs in Europe operate in a load-following mode, while
those in the U.S. do not.
9.

Attributes that enhance load-following capability of an NPP will likely enhance the
ability of the NPP to serve as a Black Start or Early Start unit if a shutdown plant can
be restarted; or if a plant can isolate from the Grid, runback its power level to match
housekeeping loads during the blackout, and subsequently reattach to the Grid.

10.

Under current nuclear safety regulatory protocols and plant Technical Specifications,
the length of time the NPP has been shutdown and the NPP’s Limiting Conditions for
Operation will dictate the shortest time in which an NPP could return to service once
called upon to do so. A period of twelve hours to perhaps four days might be a
reasonable estimate of the range of startup times for a plant that has been shutdown
or has tripped off-line during a blackout, provided the plant has sustained no damage
in the process. Hard (automatic) shutdowns and plant damage can significantly
expand these minimum restart times.
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APPENDIX B – GLOSSARY
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Precise terminology is essential for effective communications. This is particularly true in
highly technical endeavors. The study of electric Grid, nuclear power plant, and Critical
Infrastructure resilience necessarily involves the integration of diverse technical
communities, knowledge bases, and vocabularies. It has been necessary to integrate
vocabulary and terminology from several different technical fields to facilitate this study.
Useful terminology did not exist in some cases, and had to be “invented”. Many of the new
or (possibly) unfamiliar terms employed in this report are defined here for the convenience
of the reader.
AC – Alternating Current
Alternate AC Source – The NRC defines an “Alternate AC Source” as “an alternating
current (ac) power source that is available to and located at or nearby a nuclear power plant
and meets the following requirements: (1) Is connectable to but not normally connected to
the offsite or onsite emergency AC power systems; (2) Has minimum potential for common
mode failure with offsite power or the onsite emergency AC power sources; (3) Is available
in a timely manner after the onset of station blackout; and (4) Has sufficient capacity and
reliability for operation of all systems required for coping with station blackout and for the
time required to bring and maintain the plant in safe shutdown (non-design basis accident)”
[B.1].
Baseload – From a practical Grid operations standpoint, baseload is the minimum power
demand encountered or expected to be encountered during a defined period of time – a
day, week, month, year, etc. An individual power generation plant operating in purely
baseload mode operates at a steady power level, while other generating plants vary their
power outputs as needed to accommodate Grid load (power demand) variations.
BDBEE – Beyond-Design-Basis External Event – A event, originating outside the
physical boundaries of the nuclear power plant that is outside or “beyond” the scope of
events and accidents which a nuclear power plant is explicitly designed and built to
withstand. The term always includes natural events (such as a weather, space weather,
and seismic events). Some authors include malevolent human actions such as physical
and cyber attacks in the definition. As used in this document, the term includes both natural
and human-induced external events.
BES – Bulk Electricity System – The electrical generation resources, transmission lines,
interconnections with neighboring systems, and associated equipment, generally operated
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at voltages of 100 kV or higher [B.2]. The BES does not include local electricity distribution
networks and assets.
Black Start – The terms “black start” and “blackstart” are employed to characterize both (1)
the startup of a power generation facility without support (specifically AC power) supplied
from outside the physical confines of the facility; (2) the startup of a completely deenergized Grid or portions thereof. Both terms are employed in the electric power industry,
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation preferring the term “blackstart,” while many in the electric power industry prefer
the term “black start”. The term “black start” will be employed for consistency throughout
this document.
Black Start Plant –See Black Start Resource
Black Start Resource – The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) defines a
“Blackstart Resource” as “A generating unit(s) and its associated set of equipment which
has the ability to be started without support from the System or is designed to remain
energized without connection to the remainder of the System, with the ability to energize a
bus, meeting the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for Real and Reactive
Power capability, frequency and voltage control, and that has been included in the
Transmission Operator’s restoration plan.” [B.2]
Black Start Unit – see Black Start Resource
Black Start Unit Functional Requirements – Four functional requirements (capabilities)
derived from NERC’s Black Start Resource definition:
•

Black Start Unit Functional Requirement 1 – A Black Start Unit must have the
ability to be started (“cranked”) without support from the electric Grid (i.e. without
offsite power), or it must be designed to operate at power without being connected
to and loaded by the the Grid (the so-called “Island Mode” of operation).

•

Black Start Unit Functional Requirement 2 – A Black Start Unit must have the
ability to energize a bus.
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•

Black Start Unit Functional Requirement 3 – A Black Start Unit must meet the
Transmission Operator’s restoration plan needs for real and reactive capacity, and
frequency and voltage control.

•

Black Start Unit Functional Requirement 4 – A Black Start Unit must be included
in the Transmission Operator’s restoration plan as a Black Start Resource.

Black Start Unit Ready State – The state of operability from which a Black Start Unit is
assumed to initiate its operations. There are three Black Start Unit Ready States:
•

Black Start Unit Ready State 1 – The condition in which the plant is completely
shutdown, but capable of self-cranking. The plant is isolated from the Grid,
producing no power, but is ready for immediate startup via self-cranking with no offsite power support. In the case of a nuclear power plant, this means the reactor is
subcritical (e.g., any Operating Mode 5-3 in a PWR) and capable of self-cranking.

•

Black Start Unit Ready State 2 – The condition in which the plant is producing
some level of power, is isolated from the Grid (operating in an Island Mode), but is
available for immediate synchronization with and loading from the electric Grid. In
the case of a nuclear power plant, this means the reactor is critical and operating at
sufficient power to meet all required plant housekeeping loads (Modes 2 and 1 in a
PWR-based NPP).

•

Black Start Unit Ready State 3 – The condition of a dual purpose power
production / Black Start plant when it is operating as a normal power generation
facility, but capable of transitioning to Black Start Ready State 1 or 2 in the event of
a major Grid anomaly.

BSE – Black Sky Event – The Electric Infrastructure Security (EIS) Council defines a Black
Sky Event as “…very large multi-region or potentially continent-scale outages, with widely
distributed damage to major equipment… Outages would span very large regions, and
utilities could require weeks or potentially months to restore power to even the highest
priority customers… Black Sky hazards represent a substantial departure from Gray Sky
events. Power outages like Superstorm Sandy, while challenging, have not been
characterized by a general communications breakdown or widely distributed damage to
power grid hardware and SCADA control systems. Blackouts in such severe scenarios will
not be quickly recoverable. Power outage durations would be unprecedented, and the

219

resulting disruption of civil communications, transportation, water and other lifeline
infrastructures would make conventional Black Start restoration procedures unworkable”
[B.3].
Bus (or Busbar) – An abbreviation for “busbar”. A major point of interconnection between
generators, loads, and feeders, etc. in an electric power system. From the electrical
standpoint, a bus is a network node characterized by four quantities: voltage magnitude,
voltage phase angle, real power magnitude, and reactive power magnitude.
BWR – Boiling Water Reactor
Crank – (A verb.) The act of starting-up a generating plant from a shutdown condition to a
power level beyond which it can provide its own housekeeping power requirements for
continued power ascension. In the case of a traditional PWR nuclear power plant, this
would involving providing all NPP power demands to bring the plant from Operating Modes
5 (Cold Shutdown), 4, or 3; to Operating Mode 2 (Startup Mode).
Cranking Loads – The electrical power needed to start-up a electric generating facility. In
the case of a traditional PWR nuclear power plant, cranking loads include all NPP loads
required to bring the NPP from Operating Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to Operating Mode 2
(Startup Mode).
Cranking Path – NERC defines a cranking path as: “A portion of the electric system that
can be isolated and then energized to deliver electric power from a generation source to
enable the startup of one or more other generating units” [B.2]. It is effectively a
transmission path from a Black Start Unit to another generating unit used to facilitate
startup of that unit and thereby support the Grid restoration process.
Critical Infrastructure – As defined by the Patriot Act of 2001, “Critical Infrastructure” is
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters.”
Critical Infrastructure Sectors – Sixteen categories or “sectors” of Critical Infrastructure
defined by Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Chemical; Commercial Facilities;
Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency
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Services; Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities;
Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste; Transportation Systems; and Water and Wastewater Systems.
Critical Restoration Path – a transmission path from a Back Start Unit (or other source)
that provides offsite power to a nuclear plant’s auxiliary equipment to allow the nuclear plant
to maintain safe shutdown
Dedicated Black Start Units – Electric generating facilities that function only as Black
Start Resources (i.e. they are only connected to the Grid when powering Grid recovery
[Black Start] operations).
Dual-Purpose Black Start Units – Electric generating facilities that can and do function
both as normal generating units, and in addition, have the capability to serve as Black Start
Resources to power Grid recovery operations.
EHV – Extra High Voltage – The terminology employed in electric power systems
community to refer to voltages above 230 kV.
EIS Council – Electric Infrastructure Security Council
ELAP – Extended Loss of AC Power – The definition of this term is a matter of discussion
between the U.S. nuclear power industry and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
NEI 12-06 [B.4] defines ELAP as “loss of off-site power, emergency diesel generators and
any alternate AC source but not the loss of AC power from buses fed by station batteries
through inverters.” It is basically “a station blackout that extends indefinitely.” [B.5].
Among other things, an ELAP would involve (1) complete loss of AC power to the essential
and nonessential switchgear busses, (2) loss of offsite power that results in a reactor trip
and concurrent turbine trip, (3) unavailability and non-recoverability of onsite emergency AC
power sources and offsite AC power sources continuing beyond the duration determined by
the licensee per § 50.63, and (4) unavailability and non-recoverability of a § 50.63 alternate
AC power source [B.5]. This event can be viewed as one in which no AC power is
available to the NPP except that available through inverters fed from station batteries.
Electric Grid – The integrated network of electrical generating facilities, transmission
infrastructure, distribution infrastructure, and supporting subsystems required to generate
and deliver electricity to the end consumer.
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EMP – Electromagnetic Pulse – The definition of this term is (somewhat surprisingly)
appears to be in flux. Reference B.6 (a joint product of the U.S. Department of Energy and
the Electric Power Research Institute) defines the term as “A very intense pulse of
electromagnetic energy, deliberately caused by the detonation of a high-energy explosive
device (nuclear or non-nuclear) or generated by a high energy radio frequency, or direct
energy weapon.” Reference B.7, issued just six months later by the U.S. Department of
Energy, expands the definition of the EMP to include certain space-weather induced
phenomena; viz., EMPs “are intense pulses of electromagnetic energy resulting from solarcaused effects or man-made nuclear and pulse power devices.”
EMS – Energy Management System – A system of computer-aided tools used by bulk
power system operators to monitor, control and optimize system performance [B.8].
External Event – A natural or human-induced event, originating outside the physical
boundaries of the nuclear power plant (such as a weather, space weather, and seismic
events; or physical and cyber attacks).
FERC – U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FPO – Flexible Power Operation – A power generation plant operational mode that
departs from or addresses Grid load (power demand) requirements beyond baseload
demand. Flexible power operation would be characterized by a frequency of power ramps
(number of power variations over a designated time period), magnitude of power ramps
(difference between maximum and minimum power levels within a single power maneuver),
power ramp rates (rate of change of power within a single power maneuver), time at power,
etc., that differ from those typical of baseload operations.
GDC – General Design Criteria – Requirements stipulated in 10 § 50 Appendix A, that
establish the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria” for commercial nuclear
power plants. “Principal design criteria… establish the necessary design, fabrication,
construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and
components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and components that provide
reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and
safety of the public.” There are currently sixty-four GDCs.
GMD – Geomagnetic Disturbance – A naturally occurring disturbance in the Earth’s
magnetosphere that occurs when there is an exchange of energy between the solar wind
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and the space environment surrounding the Earth. The spatially- and time-dependent
magnitude of the induced geomagnetic disturbance is a function of space-time-energy
attributes of the intercepting charged particles, as well as local geomagnetic latitude and
earth conductivity at the particular location on the Earth’s surface.
Gray Sky Event – See Grey Sky Event
Grey Sky Event – The EIS Council describes Grey Sky Events as “…occasional serious
interruptions in electric service, typically when local or regional damage to power lines and
other distribution hardware causes a shutdown to prevent more serious damage to the
system. In such instances restart of generation facilities generally uses power coming in
from outside the affected area…In severe examples of “grey sky days” external power may
be unavailable or impractical, and power companies then use “black start” procedures to
restart a grid segment without assistance form external power. Outages in such scenarios
result from preplanned shutdowns designed to prevent damage or major hardware
elements. Power can usually be restored — at least to the most vital facilities — within
hours.” [B.3]
Grid – See “Electric Grid”
Grid Anomaly – Any deviation of the electric Grid’s normal operating state (spatially
dependent real and reactive power magnitudes and inter-bus flows, voltage magnitudes,
and voltage phase angles) not intentionally introduced by system operators.
House Loads – See Housekeeping Loads
Housekeeping Loads – The internal electrical loads in an electric generating facility
(power plant). The net electrical power output of the power generation facility is equivalent
to the rated power capacity minus the housekeeping loads of the plant.
Housekeeping Unit – The reactor module in a multi-reactor modular nuclear power plant
that is designated to supply all of the housekeeping loads for the other reactor modules and
the entire power plant.
HVDC – High Voltage Direct Current – Direct current with voltages between 100 kV and
1,500 KV.
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ICCP – Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) – A data communications
protocol employed by various Grid entities (RTO’s, ISO’s, distribution system operators,
etc.) to provide data exchange over wide area networks between electric Grid control
centers.
IEEE – Institute of Electric and Electronics Engineering
ISO – Independent System Operator – Typically a transmission system operations entity
which coordinates, controls, and monitors electric Grid operations within a single state. The
term is also occasionally employed for multi-state entities, in which case it is essentially
equivalent to Regional Transmission Organization (RTO).
LCO – Limited Conditions for Operation – The lowest functional capability or
performance level of equipment required for safe operation of the NPP and for evolution
from one NPP Operating Mode to another. LCO’s are typically codified in the NPP’s
Technical Specifications.
LOOP – Loss Of Offsite Power – An event or condition in which a power generation
facility has lost access to all offsite AC power sources.
Micro-Reactors – A nuclear power plant (NPP) with a rated capacity of 10 MWe or less.
NEA – Nuclear Energy Agency
NEI – Nuclear Energy Institute
NERC – North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NPIR – Nuclear Plant Interface Requirement – Requirements based on Nuclear Power
Plant Licensing Requirements (NPLRs) and Bulk Electric System requirements that have
been mutually agreed to by the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable
Transmission Entities [B.2].
NPLRs – Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Requirements – Requirements included in the
design basis of a particular nuclear plant and statutorily mandated for the operation of the
plant, including nuclear power plant licensing requirements for: (1) off-site power supply to
enable safe shutdown of the plant during an electric system or plant event; and (2) avoiding
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preventable challenges to nuclear safety as a result of an electric system disturbance,
transient, or condition [B.2].
NPP – Nuclear Power Plant – An electric generation facility which employs a nuclear
reactor as its energy source.
NPP Operating Mode – A designator of a nuclear power plant’s physical configuration and
thermodynamic state. A particular mode is defined by a unique combination of reactor
thermal power level, reactor average coolant temperature, and the status of the reactor
closure head bolts (all fully tensioned or not). Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) have six
operational modes. Boiling water reactors (BWRs) have only five operating modes.
NPP Operating Status – One of three basic configurations a nuclear power plant may be
in at any point in time: Shutdown, Power Ascent/Descent, and Power Operations.
NRC – U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor – A common nuclear power reactor design in which
very pure water is heated to a very high temperature by fission, kept under high pressure
(to prevent it from boiling), and converted to steam by a steam generator. A PWR
essentially operates like a pressure cooker, where a lid is tightly placed over a pot of heated
water, causing the pressure inside to increase as the temperature increases (because the
steam cannot escape) but keeping the water from boiling at the usual 212°F (100°C). About
two-thirds of the operating nuclear power plants in the United States are PWRs [B.1].
RCS – Reactor Cooling System – The system used to remove energy from the reactor
core and transfer that energy either directly or indirectly to the steam turbine [B.1].
Resilience – The ability of a system to withstand a change or a disruptive event by
reducing the initial negative impacts (absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them
(adaptive capability), and by recovering from them (restorative capability).
Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island (RCII) – A Resilient Critical Infrastructure Island or
“RCII” is an engineered network of (multiple) Critical Infrastructure Sector facilities and their
interconnections (electric power, internet, pipelines, rail, etc.), powered by an rNPP or other
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resilient electric generating facility functioning as a Secure Fuel Power Source, that
enhances national Critical Infrastructure System resilience – a geographical zone (“island”)
in which essential Critical Infrastructure functions (production and distribution of essential
goods and services) are maintained, and from which national Critical Infrastructure
functionality can be restored in the event of major Critical Infrastructure disruptions.
resilient Nuclear Power Plant (rNPP) – A resilient nuclear power plant (rNPP) is one
whose performance attributes and functionalities enable and enhance electric Grid
resilience – the system’s ability to minimize interruptions of electricity flow to customers
given a specific load prioritization hierarchy. rNPPs are nuclear power plants that are
intentionally designed, sited, interfaced, and operated in a manner to enhance the resilience
of their host electric Grid.
RTO – Regional Transmission Organization – an electric power transmission system
operations entity that coordinates, controls, and monitors a multi-state region of the electric
Grid.
Safe Shutdown – Nuclear Power Plant shutdown conditions specified in plant technical
specifications as Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown, as appropriate (plants have the option of
maintaining the Reactor Cooling System at normal operating temperatures or at reduced
temperatures) [B.1]. The practical implication of this state is that the reactor is in a safe,
stable, and managed, subcritical state.
SBO – Station Blackout – A station blackout is defined by the NRC as “the complete loss
of alternating current (ac) electric power to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses
in a nuclear power plant (i.e., loss of offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine
trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system). Station blackout does not
include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or
by alternate AC sources as defined in this section, nor does it assume a concurrent single
failure or design basis accident. At single unit sites, any emergency AC power source(s) in
excess of the number required to meet minimum redundancy requirements (i.e., single
failure) for safe shutdown (non-DBA) is assumed to be available and may be designated as
an alternate power source(s) provided the applicable requirements are met. At multi-unit
sites, where the combination of emergency AC power sources exceeds the minimum
redundancy requirements for safe shutdown (non-DBA) of all units, the remaining
emergency AC power sources may be used as alternate AC power sources provided they
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meet the applicable requirements. If these criteria are not met, station blackout must be
assumed on all the units.” [B.9]
SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition – A system of remote control and
telemetry used to monitor and control the transmission system [B.2].
Secure Fuel Power Source – An electricity generation facility that can serve both as a
Black Start Resource, and as a source of sustained electricity generation during the postdisruption Grid Recovery and Restoration Phases. Secure Fuel Power Sources must be
capable of operating for at least ninety days without resupply of fuel from offsite locations.
Self-Cranking – Self-cranking is the act of starting up an electric generating plant while
powered strictly with onsite power sources independent of any offsite power or other offsite
support from the Grid.
SFP – Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Pool – the pool of water in which nuclear fuel that
has been discharged from the reactor is stored.
SMR (Small Modular Reactor) – The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines Small
Modular Reactors as “light water reactor (LWR) designs generating 300 MWe or less”. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more broadly defines SMRs as “small and
medium sized advanced reactors that produce electrical power up to 300 MWe”.
SSC – Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems, and Components
Transmission Line – A system of structures, wires, insulators, and associated hardware
that carry electric energy from one point to another in an electric power system. Lines are
operated at relatively high voltages varying from 69 kV up to 765 kV, and are capable of
transmitting large quantities of electricity over long distances [B.2].
TSO – Transmission System Operator – An entity responsible for operating
Transmission Lines within the electric Grid.
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